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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV6228, SHARON STAYS HIS COURSE FOLLOWING HADERA BOMBING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TELAVIV6228 2005-10-28 17:01 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPAL KWBG IS GOI INTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: SHARON STAYS HIS COURSE FOLLOWING HADERA BOMBING 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The October 26 suicide bombing of the 
Hadera market by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) that 
claimed the lives of five Israelis and wounded 20 has 
resulted in a cycle of violence that -- barring significant 
additional casualties -- experience indicates will be 
short-term.  As it has done following attacks in the past, 
the GOI has temporarily frozen all high-level talks with 
the PA, but continues contacts on lower levels, including 
negotiations on Rafah and the crossings.  The GOI's 
security response has also followed established patterns, 
with the IDF employing targeted killings, precision air- 
and artillery strikes, arrests, low-level overflights, and 
movement restrictions against the Palestinians.  The 
Israeli press reacted with stoic resignation, generally 
refraining from attacks on disengagement or Sharon, but 
often questioning the utility of the security barrier. 
Sharon remains in control on the Israeli side, and seems 
determined to continue on his previous course even ordering 
the evacuation of several recently-established outposts 
yesterday.  Barring additional terrorist attacks involving 
Israeli casualties and/or attacks out of Gaza, we expect 
that the GOI will be prepared to resume high-level talks 
with the PA well before the PLC election.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Sharon-Abbas Meeting on Hold, but GOI-PA Contacts Continue 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
2. (S) As it has done following attacks in the past, the 
GOI has temporarily frozen all high-level contacts with the 
PA and renewed calls for Abbas to act against extremists. 
On October 27, Sharon announced that he would not meet with 
Abbas under such conditions, effectively postponing a 
summit that had originally been scheduled for the beginning 
of October.  Sharon also cautioned that "if the PA does not 
take serious and tangible steps against terrorism, there 
will be no diplomatic progress."  DefMin Mofaz made the 
most pessimistic comments, telling the press that "I am not 
sure that we will ever be able to reach a peace agreement 
with the current Palestinian leadership.  We will have to 
wait for the next generation.  The most we can expect in 
the meantime is perhaps another interim agreement." 
Several high-ranking IDF officers have echoed these 
thoughts in conversations with DAO, saying they do not 
believe they have a Palestinian security partner. 
 
3. (C) Working-level discussions between the GOI and PA on 
technical issues related to Gaza crossings continue.  Gabi 
Golan, Advisor to the Prime Minister for Planning and 
Development, told EconCouns on October 28 that significant 
progress has been made with the Egyptians on details and 
protocols for Rafah and that -- despite Hadera -- the GOI 
is prepared to meet with PA representative on October 30 to 
discuss the issue.  The USG representative on Wolfensohn's 
team confirmed that trilateral talks of the Rafah Steering 
Group are on track for October 30.  The PM's foreign policy 
advisor, Shalom Tourgeman, also confirmed this to the 
Ambassador noting that if necessary, additional meetings on 
Rafah would be held on Tuesday, November 1, and Saturday 
evening, November 5.  Tourgeman added that he should be 
ready to hold discussions on the study of transportation 
links between the West Bank and Gaza with AID consultants 
by Tuesday or Wednesday of next week. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Determined -- and Predictable -- IDF Response Targets PIJ 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
4. (S) The response by Israeli security services to the 
Hadera bombing has followed patterns set after September's 
rocket attacks from Gaza, the July bombing in Netanya, and 
the February bombing at the Stage Disco in Tel Aviv.  IDF 
officers have told DAO that following disengagement the IDF 
is seeking to establish and maintain a robust level of 
deterrence, with a particular focus on Gaza.  The IDF 
continues to use tactics that it is has employed in the 
past, including: 
 
-- targeted killings: On October 27, UNRWA reported that an 
IDF aircraft fired on a car in Gaza's Jabalya refugee camp, 
killing seven -- including PIJ operative Shadi Mahanna -- 
and wounding 19 others.  Targeted killings never fully 
ceased despite a lull during disengagement. 
 
-- airstrikes and artillery fire: As it did in September, 
the IDF has shelled areas in northern Gaza used to launch 
rocket attacks into Israel, including access roads.  UNRWA 
reports that an electrical transformer near Gaza City was 
also hit, resulting in power outages.  According to UNRWA, 
Palestinians have launched 13 rockets toward Israel in the 
past two days. 
 
-- arrests: On October 27 the IDF detained approximately 17 
suspects in raids near Tulkarm and in Jenin.  In the past 
few months, Israeli security services have arrested 
hundreds of suspects in the West Bank.  The IDF has also 
increased troop strength along the Gaza border. 
Newly-appointed IDF Chief of Operations (J3) MG Gadi 
Eisencott and Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence BG Yosi 
Kupperwasser both told DAO that they believe the GOI will 
avoid using ground operations for deterrence operations in 
Gaza in the near term.  Eisencott cautioned, however, that 
another attack like that in Hadera could result in a 
large-scale IDF offensive in the northern West Bank. 
 
-- overflights: At an event in Tel Aviv on October 27, PA 
Deputy PM and Information Minister Nabil Shaath told poloff 
that IDF aircraft have broken the sound barrier over Gaza 
repeatedly each night since the Hadera bombing. 
 
-- movement restrictions: Following shootings in the West 
Bank last week, the GOI tightened restrictions for 
Palestinians in the area.  These measures include increased 
numbers of checkpoints and roadblocks, reported limitations 
on the use of private automobiles, and resulted in the 
de-facto separation of the northern West Bank from other 
Palestinian areas. 
 
-- closure of crossings:  The Karni and Erez crossings 
between Gaza and Israel were closed following the Hadera 
attack, although Israeli officials maintain that this 
action was the result of concrete threats against the 
crossings themselves and not a result of the Hadera 
bombing.  UNRWA reports that Erez is now open for 
internationals only.  Karni is open on October 28 only for 
food products entering Gaza.  Although prices in Gaza have 
increased on some goods, such as sugar and meat, contacts 
report no serious shortage of food.  Consumption generally 
increases, however, in preparation for the Eid holiday, so 
the impact of crossing closures, and of abbreviated hours 
when crossings are open, may be more apparent in the coming 
days. 
 
5. (C) The IDF's primary target has been Islamic Jihad, 
which claimed that the Hadera market bombing was in 
retaliation for the October 25 killing by Israeli security 
forces of Luay Saadi, its military leader in the Tulkarm 
area.  The GOI has nonetheless also arrested other 
suspects, including Hamas members.  PM Sharon announced 
that "we must seek out these murderers and strike at them 
wherever they are found," and said Israel's response "will 
be wide-ranging and continuous until we have brought about 
the cessation of terrorism."  IDF Chief of Staff Halutz 
declared "a war to the bitter end" against PIJ.  Halutz is 
on record as willing to assume a higher level of collateral 
damage after disengagement, and he openly quarreled with 
his then chief of operations about the appropriate response 
to rocket attacks in September.  Press reports indicate 
disagreements between Halutz, who supports a 
take-off-the-gloves approach, and new Shin Bet Chief 
Diskin, who has cautioned against non-surgical strikes that 
could draw other Palestinian factions into the fight. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Press Reaction and Questions About the Barrier's Utility 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
6. (U) The Israeli press reacted to the latest suicide 
bombing and IDF response with stoic resignation, largely 
refraining from attacks on Sharon or disengagement.  Noting 
that the Netanya bomber had passed through a gate in the 
security barrier and speculating that the Hadera terrorist 
had done the same, several editorials questioned the 
utility of the fence.  Alex Fishman wrote in the 
Hebrew-language Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel's largest 
circulation newspaper, that "after the terror attack in 
Hadera, we find ourselves back at square one, back in the 
same place we were in 2004, before Arafat's death."  Ben 
Caspit, a senior analyst for Ma'ariv, the country's other 
mass circulation Hebrew-language daily, said, "we have to 
get used to it:  this will happen occasionally ...  The 
most we can expect ... is to maintain a tolerable rate of 
terror attacks, one every few months instead of a few every 
month, and the understanding that it won't be easy, it 
won't be quick, and it won't always be pleasant."  The 
English-language Jerusalem Post, anticipating calls for a 
restrained Israeli reaction to the Hadera bombing, called 
on the international community to "spare us the lectures 
about how defending ourselves is futile and the wisdom of 
'humanitarian' measures that lay the groundwork for the 
next atrocity." 
 
------------------------ 
Sharon Remains on Course 
------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Comment: The cycle of violence after the Hadera 
bombing closely follows previous patterns.  Strong 
statements by Sharon, Mofaz, and others should be read at 
face value, as determination to protect Israeli citizens at 
almost any cost, but not as unconditional pledges to pursue 
unlimited punitive action absent additional terrorist 
attacks.  With the Knesset winter session beginning on 
October 31, Sharon will again face routine no-confidence 
motions submitted by opposition parties that have little 
chance of mustering the necessary 61-vote majority.  Sharon 
remains in control on the Israeli side, and -- while 
sensitive to threats from his political right -- seems 
determined to continue on his previous course.  Sharon and 
Mofaz (a loyal Sharon supporter who often takes the harder 
line in public) have not been deterred by the Hadera attack 
from ordering the forced evacuation of several new outposts 
established on October 26 near the settlements of Alon 
Moreh, Qedummim, Efrata, and Qiryat Arba.  Barring 
additional terrorist attacks involving Israeli casualties, 
including rocket or suicide attacks originating in Gaza 
that result in Israeli deaths, we expect that the GOI will 
be prepared to resume high-level talks with the PA well 
before the PLC election. 
 
 
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Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
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JONES