This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SOFIA 001729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EUR/PGI (LREASOR/IWEINSTEIN), EUR/ACE (SKUX), 
EUR/PPD (VWALKER), S/CT (MNORMAN), DS/DSS/ITA, AND EUR/NCE 
(BRANDON). 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC SOCI PINR BU
SUBJECT: ISLAM AND ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN BULGARIA 
 
REF: A. STATE 144222 
     ¶B. COPENHAGEN 1220 
     ¶C. SOFIA 1681 
     ¶D. SOFIA 1504 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Bulgaria's large Muslim community is 
predominantly moderate and traditional, though both foreign 
and indigenous Islamic extremists are active in the country. 
Bulgaria's government is officially tolerant, but Muslim 
minorities and their problems are often ignored by central 
authorities.  Moderate central Islamic institutions are 
nearly bankrupt and cannot afford to pay salaries to imams or 
fund moderate religious education.  Islamic institutions at 
every level are financially dependent on loosely-monitored 
foreign Islamic foundations, some of which promote Islamic 
extremism.  Extremist activity in Bulgaria includes 
fundraising, logistical support to terrorist operations, and 
the recruitment of Bulgarian Muslims.  Rampant unemployment, 
weak moderate Islamic institutions, and a history of 
discrimination enhance the vulnerability of Bulgarian Muslims 
to extremist exploitation.  Reftel C provides an overview of 
U.S. and GoB actions to counter extremism in Bulgaria. END 
SUMMARY 
 
----------------- 
Islam in Bulgaria 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Bulgaria has one of the largest indigenous Islamic 
communities in Europe, with over 900,000 Muslims constituting 
approximately 13 percent of the country's population.  The 
Muslim community consists of three traditional groups -- 
Turks, Muslim Roma, and ethnic Bulgarian Muslims ("Pomaks"). 
There is also a small Muslim immigrant community that dates 
back to 1960s Arab-Bulgarian student exchanges. 
 
¶3. (C) Ethnic Turkish Muslims are the country's largest 
minority group, constituting approximately 7 percent of 
Bulgaria's population.  They are concentrated in southeastern 
Bulgaria along the Turkish border and near the towns of 
Razgrad and Shumen in northeastern Bulgaria.  The compact 
distribution of Bulgaria's Turkish population has facilitated 
the continued use of the Turkish language and a strong sense 
of communal identity.  Ethnic Turks faced harsh 
discrimination from Bulgaria's former communist government, 
including a failed attempt in the mid-1980s to force them to 
adopt ethnic Bulgarian names.  Despite this, Bulgarian Turks' 
strong sense of communal identity and relative economic 
prosperity has made them less receptive to foreign Islamic 
influences than other Muslim communities. 
 
¶4. (C) Muslim Roma comprise the second largest group of 
Muslims in Bulgaria.  The majority are so-called "Turkified" 
Roma ) descendents of Roma who converted to Islam during the 
Ottoman Empire.  These communities speak Turkish, practice 
Islam, and identify as Turks, but are generally not accepted 
by the mainstream Turkish community in Bulgaria.  Because of 
the complicated questions of identity surrounding this 
community, census data do not provide a clear picture of 
their numbers, but sociologists estimate them at between 
200,000 and 400,000.  Muslim Roma form a majority in urban 
Roma ghettoes such as Pazardzhik, Stolipinovo, and Hadjihasan 
Mahalla.  Though Roma throughout Bulgaria face persecution 
and ethnic discrimination, conditions in these communities 
are particularly bleak.  Most residents lack functioning 
schools or work opportunities, and many do not have access to 
electricity or heat in winter.  Reftel D discusses political 
issues surrounding the Roma community in Bulgaria.  The 
extreme social marginalization and lack of opportunity faced 
by Muslim Roma in these communities may increase their 
susceptibility to recruitment by Islamic extremists. 
 
¶5. (S) Approximately 200,000 Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarian 
Muslims) live in the western and central Rhodope Mountains of 
southern Bulgaria.  Pomak society is village-based and is 
distinguished by traditional dress and conservative religious 
views.  Repeated historical attempts by Christian Bulgarians 
to forcibly assimilate them are resented by many Pomaks, who 
view strict observance of their religion as an important mark 
of identity.  The closure of loss-making state enterprises 
and collectivized farms in the 1990s has led to massive 
unemployment among Pomaks.  Poor infrastructure and isolation 
have inhibited investment, and agricultural reforms have led 
to lower commodity prices for many farmers.  Many Pomaks have 
been forced to seek work abroad, and it is common for Pomak 
men to support their families through seasonal labor. 
Nevertheless, many Pomaks continue to live in grinding 
poverty.  The role of Islam in Pomak society has become more 
important in recent years as communities have turned to 
religion in the face of these challenges. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Pomaks have received far more money and attention 
from foreign Islamic groups than have Turks and Muslim Roma, 
in part because of their fair-skinned European appearance. 
According to another U.S. government agency, the desire of 
terrorist organizations to attract "European-looking" Pomak 
recruits has been a principal motive of Islamic NGO activity 
in Pomak regions of Bulgaria.  The poverty, isolation, and 
social marginalization of Pomak communities have made some 
members receptive to exploitation by such groups.  A 
Bulgarian Pomak, Toni Radev (AKA Milenov) is known to have 
participated in the 3/11 terrorist attacks in Madrid. 
 
¶7. (S) Immigrants are an increasingly influential part of the 
Muslim community in Bulgaria.  The first wave appeared in the 
1960s in the form of Arab students (chiefly Syrians, 
Lebanese, and Palestinians) studying at Bulgarian 
universities.  Those who married Bulgarians were allowed to 
stay and became well-integrated members of Bulgarian society. 
 Some have become influential business leaders, while others, 
particularly Syrians, have been linked to Bulgarian organized 
crime groups.  A second wave of Muslim immigration to 
Bulgaria has taken place since the fall of Communism. 
Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians have been represented, 
but an increasing number of immigrants and refugees have come 
from countries such as Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
Overall, the number of immigrants from the Arab and Islamic 
world living in Bulgaria has more than tripled from 5,438 in 
1992 to approximately 17,000 in 2004.  Of these 85 percent, 
or roughly 14,500, are Muslim.  The bulk of these immigrants 
are male, with an average age of 37.8.  Roughly half are 
Syrian, with significant numbers also coming from Lebanon (14 
percent), Iraq (10 percent), and the Palestinian territories 
(8 percent). 
 
¶8. (S) A 2005 anthropological survey of Muslim immigrants in 
Bulgaria estimated that between 2 and 8 percent (roughly 
300-1100 immigrants) hold Wahhabi or other fundamentalist or 
extremist beliefs.  According to the study, the "core" 
members of this group are also among the approximately 400 
Muslim immigrants who preach and recruit in the local Muslim 
community.  These missionaries are heavily represented among 
the estimated 2 percent of Muslim immigrants (roughly 300) 
who live and work in urban Roma ghettos. 
 
--------------------- 
Extremism in Bulgaria 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) Bulgaria's participation in US-led action in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has increased its profile as a potential target 
for Islamic terrorist groups.  Currently, however, such 
groups appear to view Bulgaria principally as a fundraising 
center, transit point, and logistical base for carrying out 
attacks in other countries.  Extremist operations in Bulgaria 
are facilitated by official corruption, ties to organized 
crime, and strong traditions of Muslim hospitality to foreign 
guests, particularly in the rural Pomak communities of 
southeastern Bulgaria. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) According to U.S. and Bulgarian intelligence, 
extremist groups operating in and through Bulgaria include 
Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al Qa'ida, 
Ansar-al-Islam, Hizballah, and Chechen rebels.  Extremists 
linked to Al Qa'ida routinely transit Bulgaria between cells 
in Western Europe and the Middle East.  Hizballah draws 
supporters from Bulgaria's expatriate Arab community, many of 
whom support the organization financially with profits from 
legal businesses, smuggling of drugs and stolen cars, and 
human trafficking.  Chechen extremist groups are supported in 
Bulgaria by the smuggling and drug trafficking activities of 
local Chechen organized crime gangs, while secular Kurdish 
groups such as the KGK (formerly PKK) also raise funds in 
Bulgaria through vehicle theft, narcotics, and arms 
trafficking. 
 
¶11. (S/NF) U.S. intelligence sources have also noted official 
Iranian efforts to radicalize the Muslim community in 
Bulgaria, particularly Pomaks.  These efforts have included 
attendance of Iranian diplomats at Pomak community meetings 
and official Iranian encouragement of attempts to form a 
religiously based Pomak political party.  "Vafka" and "Evet", 
two Iranian-backed NGOs, were reported to be active among 
Muslim immigrant communities in Bulgaria, but have not been 
linked to Islamic extremism. 
 
------------------- 
Islamic Foundations 
------------------- 
 
¶12. (S/NF) Since the 1990s, foreign missionaries and 
international Islamic NGOs have been active in the country, 
some espousing Wahhabism and other extremist ideologies. 
These Islamic foundations are concentrated primarily among 
Pomak and Muslim Roma communities, both of whom are more 
socially marginalized and economically vulnerable than the 
larger ethnic Turkish minority.  There has been little 
effective regulation of foreign donations, but large sums 
have been spent on mosque construction, the establishment of 
religious schools, and scholarships for Bulgarian children to 
study in countries such as Jordan, Syria, Iran, Sudan, and 
Saudi Arabia.  Currently, there are three legally registered 
Islamic NGOs active in Bulgaria. 
 
¶13. (S/NF) Taiba (Taibah), supported by donations from Saudi 
Arabia, was registered in 1995 as a successor to two NGOs 
(Dar al-Irshad and Al Waqf al-Islamiyya) which were closed by 
the GoB in 1994 for supporting Islamic extremism.  Bulgarian 
security services report that the organization's objective is 
to radicalize Bulgaria's Muslim population, in part by 
encouraging central institutions such as the Muftiship to 
become financially dependent on its contributions.  The 
founder of Taiba, Abdurahman Takan, was expelled from 
Bulgaria for illegally preaching against the state.  Post 
reporting indicates that businesses linked to Taiba operate 
as fronts for financial transfers to extremist groups in the 
Middle East, and that Taiba director Hussein Odeh Hussein abu 
Qalbain has been linked to planning attacks against Coalition 
forces in Iraq. 
 
¶14. (S/NF) Neduwa (Neduba, Neoua, Nedlae), also supported by 
Saudi donations, was registered by a Syrian citizen in 1994. 
It finances religious camps and workshops and sponsors 
pilgrims for the Hajj.  Neduwa has been linked to an 
unregistered Islamic school in the Pomak town of Surnitsa 
that has been dubbed a "Taliban madrassa" by the Bulgarian 
press. 
 
¶15. (S/NF) Al-Waqf al-Islamiyya, banned in 1994, was allowed 
to re-register in Bulgaria in 2002 under the terms of a new 
law on religions.  It is financially supported by a Dutch 
organization of the same name and is linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the banned NGO Irshad, and an unregistered NGO 
known as Al Manar. 
 
¶16. (S/NF) Information on unregistered and informal Islamic 
NGOs is more difficult to obtain, but the largest such group 
is known as Igase (Igassa, Al-Hayat Al-Igathata).  Igasse 
functions as the Bulgarian branch of the Saudi-based 
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO).  Post 
reporting has suggested possible links to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Al Qa'ida, and other extremist groups. 
 
¶17. (S) Islamic foundations are suspected to be involved in 
the financing of two new Islamic publications that appeared 
in 2005.  The publications, "Ikra", based in the town of 
Madan; and "Miosiolmanska obshtestvenost" ("Muslim 
Community"), published by the "Union for Islamic Development 
and Culture" in the town of Smolyan, have quickly gone from 
primitive newsletters to sophisticated periodicals with 
impressive production quality.  While there is no indication 
that they espouse extremism, the shady origins and unclear 
financing of these publications has raised suspicions that 
they are funded by foreign Islamic groups. 
 
------------------------ 
Institutional Challenges 
------------------------ 
 
¶18. (S) The Bulgarian government follows an official policy 
of equality and social inclusion; however, progress is 
hampered by longstanding prejudice, lack of funds, and 
political infighting.  Bulgaria's Muslim community is led by 
the Office of the Chief Mufti of Bulgaria, which operates 
through a system of regional muftis.  The Chief Mufti's 
Office promotes a moderate version of Islam, but its 
authority has been damaged by a lack of funding and a 
recently resolved legal battle between two claimants to the 
title of Chief Mufti.  The Muftiship does not effectively 
control the activities of foreign religious foundations.  In 
fact, it relies on donations from abroad for the bulk of its 
budget and often competes with foreign donors for influence 
at the local level. 
 
¶19. (S) The Muftiship has faced a continual funding crisis 
since the collapse of communism.  In a recent meeting with 
Embassy political and public affairs officers, Deputy Chief 
Mufti Vedat Ahmed estimated that the Muftiship receives 
roughly 100,000 BGN (USD 62,500) annually from the 
government, most of it directed to the restoration of 
historic mosques.  The Muftiship receives a similar amount of 
income from "Wakaf" community property, and is forced to 
finance the rest of its budget through donations from the 
Bulgarian Muslim community and foreign donors.  Housed in a 
run-down building on the outskirts of downtown Sofia, the 
Muftiship commands few resources and little political 
leverage.  It cannot afford to pay salaries to Bulgaria's 
estimated 1050 local imams and hodjas and has little 
enforcement capacity to combat extremist influences in the 
country's 1300 mosques. 
 
¶20. (S) Other Muslim institutions at the national level 
include the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia and three 
officially recognized Muslim secondary schools in the cities 
of Shumen, Russe, and Momchilgrad.  These institutions are 
moderate and receive some educational materials and guest 
instructors from Turkish Islamic authorities (the Dianet). 
Bulgarian law allows for optional religious education in 
public schools, but according the Deputy Chief Mufti Ahmed, 
Islam is currently taught in only 35 public schools in 
Bulgaria, nearly all in Pomak regions.  Some local officials 
report that they are reticent to implement religious 
education for fear of feeding tension between students of 
different faiths. 
 
¶21. (S) Unfortunately, Islamic educational institutions 
suffer from the same funding issues that affect the Chief 
Mufti's Office.  The GoB does not recognize the Higher 
Islamic Institute or Islamic secondary schools as public 
institutions and does not allocate any funds for them. 
Funding woes are a major reason why over one third of the 
seats in Islamic secondary schools go unfilled.  As 
Bulgaria's moderate Islamic institutions atrophy, more Muslim 
Bulgarians have come to rely on unregulated Islamic education 
promoted by foreign foundations, both in local mosques and 
abroad. 
 
¶22. (S/NF) The Internet is an increasingly important medium 
for radical and moderate Bulgarian Muslims alike.  While 
mainstream websites such as www.islam-bg.net are the most 
popular, lesser-known websites advertised by word of mouth 
connect Bulgarian Muslims to extremist Islamic ideology. 
During a recent visit to a mosque in the Pomak town of 
Dospat, the local hodja told us that without curricular 
support from the Muftiship, he is forced to obtain training 
materials for children's religious classes from the Internet. 
 He proceeded to show slickly produced Bulgarian-language 
videos on the dangers of Satanism and achievements of Islamic 
science.  He declined to provide specifics on where he had 
downloaded the videos, but indicated that similar materials 
were propagated by Islamic extremist groups "who promote 
suicide." 
 
--------------------------------- 
Returnees ) A Potential Wild Card 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶23. (S/NF) Only recently have Bulgarian students begun to 
return from long-term study in the Arab world in significant 
numbers.  Exact figures on the number of students 
participating in such programs are not available, but they 
are believed to number in the hundreds.  Their return has 
sparked fears of links to terrorist groups and other 
extremist organizations.  The returnees' espousal of 
"classical" Arab-influenced Islam has also led to cultural 
clashes with community elders over issues of religious 
doctrine and local cultural traditions. 
 
¶24. (S/NF) Mainstream Pomak imams in the central Rhodope 
region have told us that they routinely ban returnees from 
preaching in their mosques and submit them to informal 
monitoring by community members.  With the encouragement of 
Bulgarian security services, moderate imams also make an 
effort to track foreign visitors to their regions.  In many 
cases, these returnees reject local mosques entirely, 
choosing instead to pray at home or set up alternative houses 
of prayer.  Some towns in Pomak areas of the Rhodope 
Mountains have become "two mosque villages", with new, 
foreign-financed mosques competing for worshippers with more 
traditional places of worship. 
 
¶25. (S/NF) Bulgarian and U.S. intelligence services share a 
concern that Bulgarian Muslims returning from religious study 
abroad could form a network of detached extremist cells that 
would be difficult to monitor and secure. 
 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
¶26. (S) COMMENT: Islamic extremism in Bulgaria is a very real 
concern, and the U.S. Mission is engaged in extensive efforts 
to monitor and combat extremism (Reftel C).  Despite this 
fact, the overwhelming majority of Bulgarian Muslims are 
moderates who are not receptive to radical ideology. 
However, among certain sub-groups, Islamic extremism could 
potentially thrive on the lack of strong, adequately funded 
moderate Islamic institutions and the alienation of Muslim 
youth through discrimination and lack of opportunity. 
 
¶27. (S) Numerous USG-financed programs currently promote 
ethnic integration and opportunity among Bulgaria's Roma 
minority.  Post requests the Department's assistance in 
supporting these programs and expanding them to address the 
urgent needs of Pomaks and ghettoized Muslim Roma.  The 
influence of Islamic extremists in Bulgaria will also be 
curtailed if the GoB can be persuaded to subsidize Islamic 
education, return disputed "Wakaf" properties, or otherwise 
lessen the financial dependence of central Islamic 
institutions on foreign Islamic organizations.  END COMMENT 
 
 
BEYRLE