This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KTFN ETTC ECON SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON 
 
REF: A. SINGAPORE 2155 
 
     ¶B. SINGAPORE 1706 
 
Classified By: DCM Judith R. Fergin, Reasons 1.4(b)(c)(d) 
 
¶1. (C) We look forward to your visit to Singapore from 
October 19-20.  This will be an excellent opportunity to 
thank Singapore for its close counterterrorism cooperation 
and identify ways in which we can expand the relationship. 
 
Sense of Vulnerability 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Singapore has an acute sense of its vulnerability to a 
terrorist attack and the severe damage one could cause to its 
society and economy.  While Singapore has not yet experienced 
an attack, the GOS uncovered a plot in December 2001 by 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to set off a series of truck bombs 
against western targets here, including the U.S. Embassy. 
Under the broad powers of the Internal Security Act (ISA), 
the GOS has detained the plot members and required them to 
undergo a program of religious counseling designed to 
encourage cooperation and eventual rehabilitation.  Several 
of the detainees have proven difficult to "bring around." 
GOS officials view a terrorist attack as inevitable and see 
an externally planned and launched attack as the most likely 
threat scenario.  It maintains a high degree of readiness, 
including by deploying armed soldiers in the subway system 
and in major shopping areas and regularly launching civic 
awareness campaigns. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) The GOS senior leadership is concerned about the 
ability and will of Indonesia to combat terrorism. 
Singapore's intelligence services -- small but highly 
professional -- closely monitor the situation there.  The GOS 
remains concerned with the training and operational 
experience being gained by terrorists in the southern 
Philippines and is increasingly concerned that external 
forces could radicalize the conflict in southern Thailand. 
Singapore's security forces work well with their Malaysian 
counterparts and believe they have the situation there in 
hand.  The GOS tracks developments in Singapore's ethnic 
Malay/Muslim minority community and monitors the activities 
of certain foreigners in the country. 
 
A Strong Partner 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Singapore has been a reliable and highly capable 
partner in the Global War on Terrorism.  In addition to 
providing support in Iraq and Afghanistan, the GOS 
participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative, the 
Container Security Initiative, Megaports and several other 
counterterrorism and border security programs. 
 
¶5. (C) Counterterrorism intelligence cooperation has been 
close; sharing of information gleaned from respective 
detainees has led to further capture of terrorist suspects 
around the region.  The GOS, however, is loathe to allow such 
information to be used in legal proceedings. 
 
Terrorism Finance 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Singapore is a regional financial center and therefore 
an important participant in the effort to stop terrorist 
financing in Southeast Asia, although it has yet to identify 
and freeze any terrorist assets.  It is in the process of 
revising its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist 
Financing (AML-CTF) regulations for banks and other financial 
and non-financial institutions to conform to FATF 
recommendations (Ref B.)  We are working to address 
shortcomings in Singapore's terrorist finance controls.  For 
example, Singapore's bank secrecy laws, its Financial 
Intelligence Unit's inadequately small database of names (Ref 
A), and lack of routine currency reporting requirements could 
be exploited. 
 
Message for GOS 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Your interlocutors will be eager to share perspectives 
on regional terrorism developments.  In addition, you should 
stress that: 
 
(S) -- We appreciate Singapore's close counterterrorism 
cooperation and productive intelligence exchanges. 
 
(S) -- (With ISD) We welcome the opportunity to share the 
knowledge and expertise Singapore has gained in its 
successful efforts against regional terrorist groups -- 
especially Jemaah Islamiyah -- and look forward to building a 
closer, operational relationship with you. 
 
(U) -- Singapore should strengthen its terrorist finance 
controls.  In particular, Singapore should adopt a 
declaration system for cross-border transportation of 
currency to enable law enforcement to monitor movements of 
cash. 
(U) -- Singapore's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) should 
expand its database to capture more Suspicious Transaction 
Reports (STR's) and better track terrorist financial flows. 
By comparison, Hong Kong's FIU gathered more than eight times 
as many STR's in 2004 than Singapore.  (Singapore had 1,760 
in 2004 while Hong Kong had 12,006 in the first ten months of 
2004.) 
LAVIN