This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 002880 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S/WCI AMB PIERRE PROSPER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER KAWC YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: YEMENIS REMAIN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT GTMO DETAINEES 
 
REF: PROSPER-KRAJESKI E-MAILS OF 9/27 AND 9/28/2005 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS KRAJESKI, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  President Saleh and his Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Interior have made clear in recent 
meetings that the ROYG will not accept repatriation of 
detainees from Guantanamo Bay who are designated as "enemy 
combatants."  Yemeni officials have stated that the ROYG has 
enough problems dealing with the terrorists who are already 
in Yemen.  These officials do not readily believe USG 
assurances that we will not criticize the ROYG if it decides 
to release the returnees, or that we will not ask that they 
be detained indefinitely.  It may be necessary to contemplate 
third-country resettlement of Yemeni detainees.  Post 
welcomes further thoughts on the issue, and will support the 
visit of a high-level delegation to talk with President 
Saleh, but it appears that his mind is made up on this 
matter.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C)  During a discussion with Homeland Security Advisor 
Fran Townsend in early September, President Saleh said that 
the ROYG "did not want" repatriations of Yemeni detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay who are designated as enemy combatants because 
Yemen was "full up with terrorists now."  In subsequent 
meetings with FonMin al-Qirbi and MinInt al-Alimi, Ambassador 
discussed the inappropriateness and unacceptability of that 
response, stressing that the USG required an immediate 
written response from the ROYG about whether or not it would 
accept Guantanamo Bay detainees.  Thus far, post has not 
received a response from either ministry.  (NOTE:  Yemen 
accepted one detainee in August who was designated as a 
"no-longer enemy combatant" and may be willing to accept 
further such detainees, but there have been no clear 
indications from the ROYG to that end. END NOTE) 
 
¶3.  (C)  In addition to Saleh's concern about bringing 
terrorists back to Yemen, al-Qirbi and al-Alimi added that 
they did not fully trust the USG's assurances that we would 
not demand that the ROYG indefinitely detain returnees from 
Guantanamo.  They were equally apprehensive about dealing 
with possible criticism from the USG if they released the 
detainees, and international criticism if they kept them in 
detention without trial. 
 
¶4. (C)  COMMENT:  It is not clear to us at this point how to 
change Saleh's mind on this issue.  Post is not optimistic 
that a high-level USG delegation would allay the Yemenis' 
concerns and convince them to accept repatriation of their 
own countrymen.  At this point, it may be worthwhile to 
contemplate third-country resettlement options in the event 
that we are unable to move President Saleh off of his 
position.  END COMMENT 
Krajeski