This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL TH LA CB ECON EINV BM ID VN
SUBJECT: ASEAN PERSPECTIVES ON BURMA: PART II 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1053 
     ¶B. RANGOON 973 
 
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassadors of Thailand, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, like their ASEAN colleagues (ref 
A) encourage U.S. engagement with the Burmese regime, but 
share generally negative views on the current situation and 
prospects for progress in Burma.  Of this group, only the 
Thai Ambassador appears to be making any effort to actively 
engage the GOB.  His focus appears narrowly limited to 
keeping the Burmese in Burma.  End Summary. 
 
THAILAND:  KEEP THE BURMESE IN BURMA 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Suphot Dhirakaosol, posted to Burma for 
about a year and a half, told the Charge during a 
mid-September call that a 2,000 km common border is a primary 
concern that drives Thailand's policy of engagement with the 
Burmese regime.  If the political crisis in Burma persists, 
Suphot said, those who flee Burma won't go to China or India, 
they will head straight for Thailand.  Therefore, Thailand 
wants to help Burma develop in order to reduce current and 
potential border problems.  The Charge observed that not all 
issues respect borders, such as disease and narcotics, and 
encouraged Thailand to seek real, meaningful reform in Burma. 
 He described a plan to establish hospitals on the Burmese 
side of the border that met Thai standards.  Unfortunately, 
he rued, the GOB had expressed little interest. 
 
¶3. (C) Suphot said that Thailand had concluded it could only 
encourage gradual progress in Burma.  "We can't change 
everything in one day," he said, acknowledging that the 
Burmese military was intent on keeping power by denying the 
population the opportunity to access information and to 
develop.  He described ongoing efforts to bring Burmese 
military officers to Thailand, but said the senior leaders 
would not permit subordinates to travel.  Even senior leaders 
would not travel, like their ASEAN counterparts, he said, 
"because they never change."  He demurred when the Charge 
asked if Thailand saw any results from its Burma policies, 
but added that the RTG only made "suggestions" to Burma 
because "the generals don't respond to pressure."  Suphot 
added that Thailand tried not to do anything that the regime 
would consider as interference, "since we must avoid causing 
problems that will send more refugees, and spread insecurity, 
into Thailand." 
 
¶4. (C) The Charge said that Thailand has many important 
lessons to offer Burma, particularly having shifted from 
military to civilian rule.  She encouraged Suphot to note to 
his GOB interlocutors that all the other ASEAN countries had 
opened up to the outside world, and yet Burma remained closed 
and therefore increasingly impoverished.  Suphot agreed, 
noting that he would encourage the Minister of Agriculture 
and Irrigation  "to give the Burmese people opportunities." 
He subsequently told Charge that Thailand had proposed to 
establish plantations in Burma, where Thai wages would be 
paid to keep Burmese in Burma.  However, he acknowledged that 
the Thai private sector was reluctant to invest here without 
guarantees because of the bad investment climate.  Asked if 
the GOB would honor any guarantees, he admitted that was a 
problem. 
 
INDONESIA: HAVE PATIENCE 
 
¶5. (C) Indonesian Ambassador Wyoso Prodjowarsito, in Rangoon 
for over two years, urged "patience" in dealing with the 
Burmese regime, referring repeatedly to the regime's road map 
to democracy and related assurances regarding an eventual 
political transition.  "We must wait for a draft constitution 
to emerge from the National Convention process," he urged. 
Prodjowarsito also said the international community needed to 
wait for a referendum on the constitution, "which should 
include all Burmese people."  He added, however, that "of 
course, Aung San Suu Kyi should be released" and bemoaned his 
perceived inability to effect change.  "Everything," 
Prodjowarsito predicted, "will be the same after two days, 
two months, two years." 
 
¶6. (C) Prodjowarsito said that (former Indonesian Foreign 
Minister) Ali Alatas had been pleased with his meetings with 
regime leaders during an August visit to Burma (ref B).  The 
Ambassador said, however, that Alatas had come only on UN 
reform business; it was "not good timing" to bring up 
democracy issues.  The Charge noted the relevance of 
Indonesia's successful experience in adopting democracy 
through multiparty elections.  Suggesting that the GOI could 
offer a helpful model to the GOB, the Charge noted that the 
Indonesian military, like the SPDC, had once claimed that 
only the armed forces could keep the country together.  On 
advice of former President Megawati, replied Prodjowarsito, 
he had himself offered Indonesia's help during his meetings 
with the GOB.  They just smile, he said, and say "thank you." 
 
¶7. (SBU) According to Prodjowarsito, Indonesia has only three 
investment projects in Burma and a small amount of trade. 
Indonesia does not need to do business in this difficult 
environment, he said, because of its own big domestic market. 
 Furthermore, constantly changing economic policies and 
limited  bank relationships create a challenging business 
climate.  Besides, he added, Indonesian businessmen have 
"never heard of Myanmar, they only know Burma."  The Charge 
asked if the GOI sponsored any training, and Prodjowarsito 
replied, "Who would we send? There is no Parliament here." 
 
VIETNAM: WE CAN'T, YOU SHOULD 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Tran Van Tung, a recent arrival in Burma, 
warmly welcomed Charge referring to improved relations 
between the US and Vietnam, as reflected by the recent visit 
of the Vietnamese Prime Minister to the U.S.  Charge noted 
that Vietnam had become a growing, dynamic economy that could 
offer useful lessons to Burma.  He responded that the 
international community had helped Vietnam, and urged the 
U.S. to make the first move--"if the U.S. is not willing, 
then the military will not be either."  He added that 
punishing the Burmese serves no useful purpose.  He 
acknowledged that the regime's focus on political stability, 
posed many difficulties and that too much fear over change 
usually results in nothing being accomplished. 
 
¶9. (C) When queried about Vietnamese messages to the Burmese 
leadership, Ambassador Tung cited visits by Vietnam's Prime 
Minister and former President.  He said that they urged the 
regime to open up citing Vietnam's own experience with 
sanctions.  Vietnam had decided to open up to the outside 
world and then the international community responded. 
Vietnam, he averred, would only move forward; Burma should 
follow suit and become part of the international community. 
Beyond visits, the Ambassador indicated relations were 
minimal.  Since both are basically agricultural nations, 
trade has been modest.  Although it has potential, "business 
in Burma is difficult." 
 
¶10. (C) Tung said he had had a 30-minute meeting with SPDC 
Chairman Than Shwe rather than the usual 15 minutes, but 
offered no details, and agreed with Charge that the Cabinet 
Ministers appeared to have little influence.  He insisted 
that high-level Burmese officials understood the need for 
their country to open up and know they cannot develop 
otherwise.  When urged to repeat that message to the regime, 
he replied that the U.S. is the appropriate country to send a 
message.  He said that Vietnam would be willing to share its 
experiences with the GOB, but expressed doubts that Burma 
would use his country as an example. 
 
LAOS: "WE DON'T CARRY GUNS INTO TEMPLES" 
 
¶11. (C) Lao Ambassador Chanthavy Bodhisane, an almost 
invisible member of the diplomatic corps during his four 
years in Burma, indicated that he spends most of his time 
playing golf.  Admitting he rarely sees any GOB officials, he 
relies on his household staff for information about current 
events.  He said his staff was very loyal because he gave 
them rice.  There is little bilateral trade, he said, and no 
bilateral counternarcotics cooperation.  (Note: DEA Rangoon 
recently participated in a major heroin seizure in 
cooperation with Lao, Chinese, and Burmese authorities.  End 
Note.)  The strongest tie between the two countries is 
Buddhism, which results in a modest number of Laos traveling 
to Burma.  Asked to compare the two countries, Bodhisane 
offered, "we don't carry guns into temples," referring to the 
common practice observed by many Burmese military officers of 
always wearing weapons. 
 
CAMBODIA:  LOWEST PROFILE OF ALL 
 
¶12. (C) While the Charge has yet to call on Cambodian 
Ambassador Hul Phany, she has already met him socially on 
numerous occasions.  He never has anything to say about 
current events in Rangoon, but is always quick to volunteer 
to sing at any event.  Numerous of his staff, including his 
own son, want visas to the U.S. for their children. 
 
COMMENT:  COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
¶13. (C) Each of the ASEAN Ambassadors advocates engagement 
with the Burmese regime, while admitting they have little to 
show for it.  Of this group, only the Thai Ambassador has 
made any real effort to reach out beyond former PM Khin 
Nyunt, deposed over a year ago.  The rumor mill has it that 
Ali Alatas did not even bother to debrief the Indonesian 
Ambassador about his visit.  While it is true that Thailand's 
pragmatic approach has, for example, achieved an uneasy peace 
along its common border with Burma, the SPDC has dismissed 
all Thai efforts aimed at political reform (the regime's 
rejection of the Bangkok Process comes to mind). 
Nonetheless, we believe that the ASEANS have a comparative 
advantage in being able to demonstrate to the Burmese regime 
that opening up can bring increased prosperity, and that 
stability can be maintained as militaries yield to civilian 
governments.  End Comment. 
Villarosa