This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002576 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
DRL 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA 
DS/DSS/ITA 
DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA MINUSTAH
SUBJECT: RELATIONS AMONG MINUSTAH, HNP LEADERS NO 
IMPEDIMENT TO ACTION 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Timothy M. Carney, reasons 1.4 (B) and 
 (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH and HNP command rotations have 
injected a new set of personalities into top-level security 
decision-making in Haiti: Incoming MINUSTAH military forces 
commander Bacellar is more thoughtful and methodical than the 
excitable former General Heleno; UNPOL Commissioner Muir is 
more outgoing but less operationally assertive than former 
Commissioner Beer; and Haitian National Police Director 
General Andresol is more effective and dependable than former 
DG Charles. Relations between the three new commanders have 
developed unevenly. Muir and Andresol are close partners 
while Bacellar, although cordial with both, has limited his 
personal and professional ties to the other two. Although the 
lack of rapport between Bacellar and Muir/Andresol has 
affected the character of joint missions, it does not seem to 
have encroached on operational success, although Bacellar 
remains reticent to take on Cite Soleil. Mutual trust at the 
top between UNPOL and HNP is a promising development, though 
both forces still struggle to put their strategic plans into 
action. End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Andresol told Poloffs October 7 that he did not yet 
have a close relationship with Bacellar. He said they had 
collaborated on occasion for joint missions and briefings, 
but that Bacellar did not seek his counsel or cooperation 
often. The DG said he would welcome more contact with the 
General, but he recognized that MINUSTAH increasingly 
preferred to conduct military operations without HNP 
assistance (as in the recent effort to capture General Toutou 
in Gran Ravine) in order to protect secrecy. He added that 
the HNP stood ready to hold the ground in Cite Soleil 
whenever MINUSTAH decided to move in. 
 
¶3. (C) In contrast, Andresol said that he meets frequently 
with Muir and that the two work as a team on many topics. 
Poloffs have participated on several meetings jointly chaired 
by Muir and Andresol and Muir has become a fixture in HNP 
internal planning sessions. Muir told Poloffs October 10 that 
his relationship with the DG has only improved with time. 
While UNPOL co-location with the HNP in the field remains 
disappointing, co-management in key divisions (Judicial 
Police, SWAT, training) and joint command of special 
operations is increasingly entrenched. Muir and Andresol both 
claim to share a common vision for the development of the HNP 
and are struggling only in their ability to command their 
respective forces to make the vision a reality. 
 
¶4. (C) Sources close to Bacellar report that there is no bad 
blood between Muir and Bacellar, but rather different 
mandates and management styles. Operationally, as MINUSTAH 
has more fully deployed and the security situation is no 
longer red hot, targeted military incursions are increasingly 
carried out by MINUSTAH military alone, freeing UNPOL to 
return to its original mandate of assisting the HNP with 
police field training. Stylistically, Muir is fond of 
planning and strategy while Bacellar tends to focus on 
operational detail and implementation, the sources said. As a 
result, Muir's preference for flowcharts and focus on 
strategic planning has had an impact on joint military-UNPOL 
operations. An UNPOL regional commander told Poloff that 
Muir's relative inexperience and weakness operationally has 
allowed Bacellar to take control on the ground of joint 
operations. Whereas under former Commissioner Beer joint 
maneuvers were regularly co-commanded on equal terms by UNPOL 
and military commanders, Bacellar's officers have asserted 
greater control while Muir has ceded it. In practice, the 
shift in relative power does not seem to have had a 
detrimental effect on morale or mission efficacy, and some 
MINUSTAH sources say the unified command is an improvement. 
 
Comment 
 
¶5. (C) Bacellar has not sought the counsel or friendship of 
either Muir or Andresol (or apparently anyone else), and 
clearly he prefers not to share control of operations that 
have a predominant military component. The General maintains 
an effective if aloof professional relationship with both. 
The limited rapport between Bacellar and the others has not 
impeded operational effectiveness and is an improvement over 
the testy and erratic bond displayed between General Heleno 
and DG Leon Charles. Regardless of the Bacellar's attitude, 
MINUSTAH military forces have visibly improved their 
performance on the ground (Cite Soleil excepted). 
 
¶6. (C) Meanwhile, Muir and Andresol have an amiable personal 
connection and work together far more closely (and more 
often) than Leon Charles did with Commissioner Dave Beer. 
Although UNPOL does not yet have officers in every HNP 
station, joint operations between UNPOL and HNP are more 
numerous and successful than before. But the success is due 
in large part to internal improvements in the HNP and a more 
normalized UNPOL deployment rather than Muir-Andresol 
camaraderie. Andresol has made good on pledges to crack down 
on kidnappings, arrest corrupt officers, cleanse the ranks of 
the top brass, and conduct internal investigations. After two 
months Muir has focused more on planning than implementation. 
His weakness is already apparent and is likely responsible 
for Bacellar's preference to go it alone and/or remain in 
charge of joint military/UNPOL operations. Our own USG police 
reform program requires UNPOL cooperation, and while we too 
enjoy friendly relations with Muir, we have been stymied thus 
far by his focus on organizational structure rather than 
execution.  End comment. 
 
CARNEY