This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SR IN FR KO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS DISCUSS INDIA NONPRO, BALKANS, CENTRAL 
ASIA WITH RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1. 4 B/D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Burns met with Russian DFM 
Sergei Kislyak on October 19 in Paris to discuss, among other 
issues, India nonproliferation, the Balkans (especially 
Kosovo), and Secretary Rice's recent trip to Central Asia. 
Kislyak raised Russian concerns regarding access for its 
diplomats to the Green Zone in Baghdad, saying the current 
situation in which only the Ambassador and DCM received 
expedited access privileges was "absolutely unacceptable." 
On India nonproliferation, U/S Burns previewed his trip to 
India.  Both agreed that the U.S. and Russia shared the same 
interests in ensuring Indian acceptance of a civil/military 
nuclear separation.  U/S Burns reviewed his recent trip to 
Kosovo and Belgrade, emphasizing the importance of using U.S. 
and Russian influence to pressure parties involved in final 
status negotiations to compromise.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Under Secretary Burns met October 19 in Paris with 
Russian DFM Sergei Kislyak at the Russian Ambassador's 
Residence.  DAS Kramer, P staff Toby Bradley and Poloff Peter 
Kujawinski (notetaker) accompanied.  Kislyak was joined by 
Russian Embassy Political Counselor Leonid Kadyshev and two 
staffers. 
 
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INDIA NONPROLIFERATION 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Kislyak emphasized that Indian external and internal 
stability depended on access to a steady supply of energy. 
He speculated that in 5-10 years, India would be a "huge" 
presence in the market for fossil fuels, given its relative 
lack of domestic supply.  Given these pressures, India needed 
to increase its reliance on nuclear energy.  Kislyak added 
that he had been in India four months ago, and had encouraged 
the Indians to stop their "war against the NPT" although he 
understood their opposition.  Still, India had acted 
responsibly on WMD issues, said Kislyak.  They had introduced 
a number of changes in their legislation and had put into 
place substantial export controls. 
 
¶4. (C) Kislyak outlined three points regarding the Indian 
nonproliferation issue.  First, he said a Russian redline was 
that the case of India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
should be treated as an exception, and that all efforts 
should be made to dissuade other countries from following 
India's example.  He added that Pakistan's cooperation 
regarding nonproliferation was "terrible."  Russia wanted 
more information on Pakistan's clandestine networks, said 
Kislyak, but the Pakistani government had been "less than 
transparent."  Kislyak said Russia had developed an argument 
he hoped would convince other NSG members that India should 
be given an exception based on reasons of economic and 
political stability, as well as India's nonproliferation 
record.  He said Brazil, South Africa and Ukraine would be 
tough to convince, given that they had already renounced 
nuclear weapons.  Second, Kislyak said Russia did not support 
giving India nuclear weapon status.  He said the 
international community must invent an "exceptional status" 
for India.  Regarding verification, Kislyak proposed a 
"quasi-153" verification system that would be similar to the 
IAEA's 153 verification system for non-nuclear weapons 
states, but would only apply to India's civilian nuclear 
energy sector.  Third, Kislyak argued that India must clearly 
and credibly demonstrate its commitment to separating its 
civilian and military nuclear sectors before the NSG and the 
U.S. and Russian legislatures could move to grant India an 
exception. 
 
¶5. (C) U/S Burns agreed that India had acted responsibly 
regarding proliferation concerns.  He welcomed the Russian 
decision to discuss India nonproliferation during the Russian 
G-8 Presidency and said he hoped to hear concrete proposals 
from the Indians during his upcoming visit on how they 
planned to separate the civilian and military nuclear 
facilities.  Kislyak said Russia would have two distinct 
discussions on South Asia within the G-8; one on peaceful 
nuclear cooperation with India, and the other on the 
Pakistani/Indian nuclear competition.  Russia had no interest 
in mingling the issue of the Indian nuclear exception with a 
discussion of competition between Pakistan and India, said 
Kislyak.  U/S Burns said it would be helpful if both the U.S. 
and Russia proceeded on parallel tracks to encourage India on 
civil and military nuclear separation.  Kislyak agreed, and 
added that any Indian actions must be transparent and 
credible.  It is one of the few cases, said Kislyak, where 
the U.S. and Russia can easily reinforce each other. 
----------------------------- 
U.S.-RUSSIA C/T WORKING GROUP 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) U/S Burns said most C/T working groups were doing well 
and that S/CT Ambassador Crumpton had been in touch with his 
Russian counterparts.  However, he said the working group on 
bioterrorism had not met.  Kislyak replied that, for experts 
to meet, they must have a mandate of issues to discuss.  The 
two agreed that a step forward would be for Ambassador 
Crumpton to meet with Russian Special Envoy Anatoly Safanov 
to conduct exploratory talks aimed at laying a foundation for 
bioterrorism discussions. 
 
----------- 
THE BALKANS 
----------- 
 
¶7. (C) U/S Burns previewed USG plans to commemorate in 
Washington the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Accords.  The 
USG was focused, said U/S Burns, on convincing Muslim, Serb 
and Croatian stakeholders to decide at a political level to 
begin discussions on modernizing the Dayton structure through 
constitutional reform.  A modern Bosnian state would have a 
single President, a strong Prime Minister, and a more 
efficient parliament.  U/S Burns said he had discussed this 
with Bosnian Serb leaders, and was told they were open to 
committing to a political process.  U/S Burns also told 
Kislyak that he had expressed to Bosnian Muslim leaders USG 
concern about the continued presence of foreign Muslim 
fighters who had gone there in the early 1990s to fight.  He 
urged Bosnian Muslim leaders to pass tough citizenship laws 
that would restrict the citizenship requests and possibly 
revoke the Bosnian citizenship of these foreigners.  Kislyak 
said this was helpful and returned to the subject of the 
Washington 10th anniversary commemoration, asking whether 
Russia would be invited.  U/S Burns said the involvement of 
other Dayton participants, including Russia and the EU, was 
being discussed, and that he awaited further proposals from 
A/S for European Affairs Dan Fried.  Given the largely 
ceremonial nature of the event, U/S Burns said it might be 
easier if Washington-based Ambassadors were invited. 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to Kosovo, U/S Burns said he had spoken 
recently with UN SYG Kofi Annan and soon-to-be-named UN 
Special Envoy Martti Ahtissari regarding the importance of 
consultations with the Contact Group.  The U.S. planned on 
naming a mid-level diplomat to serve as a member of 
Ahtissari's expert staff and would also name a U.S. envoy to 
the final status discussions.  The envoy would support 
Ahtissari's work 100 per cent and would speak for the U.S. 
Kislyak asked what role U/S Burns envisioned for the U.S. 
envoy, especially in the event of any differences of opinion 
between Ahtissari and the USG.  U/S Burns said the U.S. envoy 
would wholeheartedly support Ahtissari's efforts, given that 
the U.S. had not prejudged the outcome of final status 
discussions.  He added that both the U.S. and Russia had 
particular influence in the region, and it was important for 
both countries to use that influence to move all parties 
closer to an agreement. 
 
¶9. (C) U/S Burns said his recent visit to the region had left 
him with a clear understanding of how difficult final status 
negotiations would be.  It seemed impossible that the Serbian 
government would support Kosovar independence, and the Serbs 
had not elaborated any further on their proposal for "less 
than independence, more than autonomy."  On the Kosovar 
Albanian side, the two most powerful leaders, the ailing 
President Rugova and accused war criminal Ramush Haradinaj, 
were not available to push for consensus, and the other 
leaders were not playing helpful roles.  U/S Burns said he 
had warned Kosovar Albanian leaders that they must compromise 
and take into account the need to safeguard Serb religious 
sites and the Serb minority presence.  Kislyak agreed that 
Serb Prime Minister Kostunica would not agree to Kosovo 
independence and added that no Serb government could agree to 
independence and expect to survive.  In a related final 
status issue, Kislyak said the paper on guiding principles 
was almost complete.  He suggested it be adopted by the UNSC 
as soon as it was ready.  U/S Burns said this was not a 
problem, but he suggested that Ahtissari be given a chance to 
review the paper before the UNSC adopted it.  Kislyak said he 
"did not disagree." 
 
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CENTRAL ASIA 
------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Kislyak said FM Lavrov and President Putin 
appreciated the Secretary's readout of her trip to Central 
Asia.  However, he had the impression that during her trip, 
the Secretary was advocating for a regional forum on 
cooperation, to include Central Asian countries and 
Afghanistan, that would clearly exclude Russia and China. 
Russia had a problem, given its significant interests, in 
regional cooperation that did not include it, said Kislyak. 
U/S Burns said the Secretary had focused on the need for the 
region to better its economic ties and to work with 
Afghanistan against narcotic flows.  However, the U.S. had 
not considered any formal grouping that would exclude Russia. 
 
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GREEN ZONE ACCESS FOR RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) At the end of the meeting, Kislyak raised Russian 
diplomat access to the Green Zone in Baghdad.  Coalition 
military authorities, said Kislyak, had recently told the 
Russian Embassy that only the Ambassador and the DCM would be 
allowed unimpeded access.  All other personnel would need to 
stay in a security line before entering.  This was extremely 
dangerous for Russian diplomats, said Kislyak, and was 
"absolutely unacceptable."  The Russian government had raised 
this with Ambassador Burns in Moscow and had been told 
subsequently that if the Russian Ambassador were accompanied 
by note takers, they could still be given unimpeded access to 
the Green Zone.  However, this did not help those Russian 
diplomats who had meetings that the Ambassador and the DCM 
did not attend.  Furthermore, said Kislyak, the DCM had still 
not been given a full access badge.  FM Lavrov asked Kislyak 
specifically to raise this with U/S Burns.  Russia has not 
gone public, said Kislyak, and wants to solve this problem 
amicably.  He noted as well that FM Lavrov had sent a letter 
to the Secretary 12 days ago regarding this issue, and had 
not yet received a response.  U/S Burns said he understood 
the seriousness of the issue, and would get back to Kislyak 
shortly. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON