This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006938 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/SPG FOR SNYDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM ASEC KPKO PINR IV ZI LI SU FR
SUBJECT: PDAS VOLKER HEARS FRENCH VIEWS ON AFRICA 
 
REF: A. PARIS 6434 B. PARIS 6887 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt.  Reas 
 
ons 1.4b,d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTS:  EUR PDAS Volker met AF 
PDAS-Equivalent Barbier and DAS-Equivalent Le Gal October 6 
to discuss areas of converging interest in Africa.  Barbier 
struck a positive note of appreciation for ongoing 
cooperation and consultations.  France shared U.S. views on 
Sudan, including Darfur, and wished to be helpful.  Barbier 
said there was great interest in the notional U.S. suggestion 
for a Darfur conference aiming to build rebel cohesion. 
AMIS, she thought, would need to transition into a UN 
operation by summer 2006, but on terms acceptable to the 
African Union.  She said European partners had informed Paris 
of U.S. plans for an 10/12 D.C. meeting on planning for the 
future of AMIS, apparently restricted to the Troika-plus. 
She said France would like to attend, if invited.  Barbier 
also sketched French plans for the military reorganization of 
African bases and its relationship to French-EU capacity 
building through RECAMP. 
 
¶2.  (C) ACTION REQUESTS: 
 
-- Please provide guidance on the French request to 
participate in the 10/12 meeting in D.C. on planning for the 
future of AMIS. 
 
-- Please provide guidance to share with the Quai d'Orsay on 
thinking for a notional Darfur conference in the near term. 
 
END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTS 
 
¶3.  (U) EUR PDAS Volker and AF PDAS-Equivalent Elisabeth 
Barbier met October 6 to discuss areas of converging 
interests in Africa.  AF DAS-equivalent for East Africa 
Helene Le Gal and Sudan/Ethiopia/Eritrea Desk Officer Jeremie 
Robert also participated on the French side, as well as 
Political Minister Counselor Rosenblatt, Africa Watcher and 
visiting EUR/WE France Desk Officer Susan Ball.  AF 
A/S-equivalent Bruno Joubert was absent on travel, but 
Barbier expressed appreciation on his behalf for recent 
Washington meetings, as well as for continuing cooperation 
and consultations, noting in particular the digital video 
conferences on DRC and Mauritania. 
 
-------------- 
Sudan / Darfur 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On Sudan, Barbier emphasized Joubert's Washington 
exchanges were especially valuable and indicated a broad 
convergence of views.  France, like the U.S., was very 
concerned by Darfur, particularly because of the impact on 
Chad, which she described as "very unhappy."  France, Barbier 
claimed, had been in the vanguard of those sounding the 
alarm, long before ministerial visits to the region became 
routine, even "a la mode."  The fallout of John Garang's 
death could have been worse, she remarked; the North-South 
process, though slowed, remained on track, even if SPLM 
representation in the Government of National Unity was less 
significant than hoped.  However, Salva Kir, Garang's 
successor as First Vice President, was not taking much 
interest in resolving Darfur, she regretted. 
 
¶5.  (C) Barbier emphasized Joubert's interest in follow-up on 
a U.S. suggestion for a conference on Darfur aiming to create 
more cohesion among rebel factions.  France would be 
supportive, she said, however the U.S. wanted to proceed and 
whatever venue the U.S. should elect, including Chad.  The 
Abuja Peace Process was stalling; the SLM -- especially Mini 
Minawi -- was a "big spoiler."  France, like the U.S., had 
sought to apply pressure to the SLM, both directly and 
indirectly through Chad, but without tangible results (Ref). 
It may be time to threaten sanctions under Resolution 1591 
against individuals impeding the peace process.  Stern public 
discourse was needed by all, she said, given the worsening 
situation on the ground.  Le Gal lamented the failure at the 
Abuja talks even to reinforce and reiterate the ceasefire, a 
lapse that could directly impact on AMIS forces.  Security 
matters should take priority, she said, over deliberations on 
wealth and power sharing. 
 
¶6.  (C) Barbier said France lacked specific information on 
the cross-border attacks into Chad.  Such attacks were not 
infrequent, she added; their attribution to "Janjaweed" was 
imprecise.  Chad's diplomatic retaliation against Sudan was a 
significant reaction.  Barbier speculated on "one way of 
reading" the incident involving Chad's historically rocky -- 
even if recently outwardly calm -- relationship with Libya. 
She wondered if Khartoum had been unsettled by Chad's recent 
reconciliation with the JEM, which has close links to Libya, 
and whether the cross-border attack was meant as a reminder 
that N'djamena must not neglect its Eastern neighbor.  (Note: 
 Le Gal called attention in a previous meeting with Africa 
Watcher to Deby's September meetings with Qadhafi. Ref B.) 
 
¶7.  (C) Barbier said there were limits to the effectiveness 
of AMIS, because AU forces lack the means to "cover enough of 
Darfur."  More AU troops meant ever more donor money and she 
discounted the likelihood of AMIS ever growing to 12,000.  AU 
Chairperson Konare and Commissioner Djinnit were talking 
opening, she said, of possibly blue-hatting AMIS.  However, 
the AU hasn't yet decided, according to Konare, a point that 
Barbier underscored as a salient reminder that the AU would 
protect its prerogatives.  In the event of blue-hatting, 
"AMIS has to be seen as an African success," not as "a 
retreat."  Le Gal, who deemed June 2006 a likely target for 
the transition to a UN operation, noted that $200 million 
would still be necessary to cover interim costs.  She 
understood the U.S. might provide $100 million and she 
expected the EU would furnish the remainder. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Joint Petroleum Interests in Sudan? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Barbier suggested a further convergence in French 
and U.S. interests in the region, namely ensuring that Sudan 
abides by its earlier internal agreements on petroleum 
exploration and development.  She drew attention to the 
partnership between the Marathon Oil Company and Total in 
Sudan. 
 
------------------------- 
African Capacity Building 
------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) At PDAS Volker's request, Barbier elaborated on 
reports of a possible French military reorganization in 
Africa and the relation to the French RECAMP program for 
capacity building in Africa.  Cautioning no official decision 
had yet been taken, Barbier confirmed that France planned to 
reorient its military presence around core bases in Djibouti, 
Senegal and Gabon, each of which would provide military 
capacity training and logistical support to regional African 
organizations.  The rank for the commander in Dakar Senegal 
and Libreville, Gabon would rise from Colonel to Brigadier 
General, she said.  She noted that France had been trying to 
extend RECAMP's reach beyond West Africa, and had even begun 
training programs in English.  Such capacity training 
conformed to international goals articulated during the U.S. 
G-8 presidency. 
 
¶10.  (C) Noting U.S. initiatives through GPOI and ACOTA, PDAS 
Volker asked where Barbier saw possibilities of 
complementarity, for instance through NATO.  Barbier 
commented that Africa required such a degree of assistance 
that many different solutions should be tried; establishing 
training centers in Africa seemed the most cost-effective 
approach.  The core French bases would be training platforms, 
Barbier said, "focal points" for coordination with notional 
African Union standby forces.  (Note: AF "Crisis Management" 
Director Franois-Xavier Leger told Africa Watcher October 5 
that the French bases would include RECAMP training cells, 
that senior African Union and regional military officials 
would be seconded to the bases, as would EU officers.  RECAMP 
would take on an increasingly EU signature, Leger suggested. 
 He added that the reason for promoting the base commanders 
to brigadier general was simply to ensure parity of rank with 
senior Africans.)  The Abidjan base in Cote d'Ivoire was a 
different category, she said, and its life-cycle was tied now 
to Operation Licorne and UNOCI.  The military base on the 
French territory of Reunion would, however, play a supporting 
role in the reorganization and serve to coordinate with SADC. 
 
------------- 
Cote d'Ivoire 
------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) On Cote d'Ivoire, Barbier offered no specific plan 
of action.  France was watching ongoing African Union 
deliberations carefully.  Concerted international pressure 
would be imperative to facilitate a transition to "free, fair 
and proper" elections, possibly within 6-8 months.  France 
would look for U.S. help, she said, in formulating 
appropriate UNSC action.  Barbier noted that Senegal and 
Ghana -- specifically Ghana President Kufuor who visited 
France 10/3-10/6 -- were each calling for a stronger UN 
force, a proposal she recognized would likely not be 
well-received by the U.S.  She mentioned that French troops 
assigned to Operation Licorne in support of UNOCI would 
remain in Cote d'Ivoire so long as the UN retained its 
mandate and there is AU support. 
 
-------------------- 
Other African Asides 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) While maintaining that cooperation between the U.S. 
and France in Africa was positive overall, Barbier 
volunteered there was disagreement on how to proceed on 
Zimbabwe, stressing however that France was not pro-Mugabe, 
just not convinced that direct confrontation would open "a 
way out of this big black hole."  On Liberia, Barbier 
deferred explicitly to the U.S. lead.  However, there was a 
disconnect, she suggested, with certain parties in the U.S. 
Congress on how to pursue former Liberian President Charles 
Taylor in Nigeria.  France certainly agreed on the need for 
justice, she stressed.  However, President Obasanjo should 
have a say on the timing.  On DRC and Mauritania, Barbier 
expressed appreciation for past consultations by digital 
video conferences.  Barbier concluded the meeting with a plea 
for attention to the Central African Republic, a "forgotten 
crisis" which she described as "our pet project."  She 
suggested the U.S. could exert helpful influence on 
international financial institutions. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON