This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 003179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015 
TAGS: MARR PREL CA NORAD
SUBJECT: CANADA:  NORAD AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND I 
 
Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (U) On September 21, 2005 in Ottawa, a U.S. negotiating 
team led jointly by the Departments of State and Defense met 
with Canadian counterparts in the first round of discussions 
to renew the Agreement for the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), due to expire on May 12, 2006. 
 
U.S. delegation (USDEL): 
 
Terry Breese, Director, WHA/CAN, State 
James Townsend, Principal Director, OASD/ISP/European and 
NATO Policy, DOD 
Felix Hernandez, WHA/CAN, State 
David Sullivan, L/WHA, State 
COL(P) Frederick S. Rudesheim, USA, J-5, DOD 
CDR Stephen McInerney, USN, OASD/ISP, DOD 
Lt Col Patricia Dees, USAF, J-5, DOD 
Col Robert Leary, USNORTHCOM 
Patricia Jacubec, OASD/Homeland Defense, DOD 
Patricia Kim-Scott, Embassy Ottawa (notetaker) 
 
Canada delegation (CANDEL): 
 
Paul Chapin, Director General (DG), International Security 
Division, FAC 
RAdm Drew Robertson, DG, International Security Policy, DND 
Janet Graham, Director, Continental Defense Division, FAC 
Barbara Martin (ADD TITLE) 
Michael Bonser, Defense & Security Relations (IDR), FAC 
Sabine Nolke, Legal Affairs Bureau (JLH), FAC 
Col Mike Hache, Western Hemisphere Policy, DND 
CDR Mark Chupick, Western Hemisphere Policy, DND 
Claude LeBlanc, Policy Development, DND 
Kelly Anderson, Canadian Embassy in Washington 
 
NORAD observers: 
 
Col Marc Dippold, USAF 
Col Eric Stevens, Vice Director of Plans 
 
¶2. (C) Both sides agreed that completion of NORAD renewal in 
a timely fashion was the first priority; the future of the 
Bi-national Planning Group (BPG - co-located with but not 
part of NORAD) needed to be addressed because its expiration 
was coterminous with the NORAD Agreement; and discussion of 
broader defense cooperation should proceed in parallel, but 
would require more time.  Additionally, Canadian negotiators 
indicated that they wanted to reach agreement on NORAD no 
later than the end of October.  They had tentatively 
scheduled a Cabinet review for the new agreement for 
mid-November and have further Cabinet time reserved in 
mid-December.  The next round of talks is set for October 12 
ahead of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense meeting in 
Winnipeg.  The U.S. delegation volunteered to prepare a 
"draft Agreement" drawing on the day's discussions, as well 
as a discussion paper to address raising defense relations to 
the next level.  END SUMMARY. 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND POSITIONS 
 
¶3. (C) In opening remarks, DG Chapin noted the transformed 
security environment in the United States as a result of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks.  While changes in Canada might not be 
as "dramatic," he said, they were "cumulatively close" to 
those that took place in the U.S.  Chapin cited Canada's 
first-ever national security policy, released in 
2004; C$9 billion in expenditures covering new 
security-related structures in the Prime Minister's Office 
(PMO) and elsewhere; the active engagement of Canadian Forces 
in Operation Enduring Freedom, sustained in subsequent ISAF 
deployments; and "indirect" support for Iraq, notably through 
aid contributions and elections support.  Moreover, he said, 
a great deal had been achieved collectively by the U.S. and 
Canada, including the Smart Border Declaration and related 
action plan, the 2002 launch of the Bi-national Planning 
Group (BPG) as an adjunct to NORAD, a joint statement last 
year by President Bush and Prime Minister Martin to pursue an 
agenda on border, economic and security and defense issues, 
and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of last March. 
 
¶4. (C) Chapin said that the United States and Canada faced 
three tasks: renewal of the NORAD Agreement, incorporating 
any changes deemed necessary; deciding the future of the BPG; 
and exploring and recommending additional ways to enhance 
U.S.-Canada security and defense cooperation.  The Canadian 
Cabinet had given a negotiating mandate with a view to all 
three of these tasks. 
 
¶5. (C) Chapin referred to Canada's May 2005 non-paper on 
enhanced defense cooperation, which was intended to provide a 
frame of reference for discussion, and drew on the work of 
the Bi-national Planning Group.  He noted that there was no 
arrangement between the United States and Canada to ensure 
coordinated responses between Navies and Coast Guards, no 
training of fleets for mutual defense, and added that the 
land operations order (OPORD) was not up to date.  Canada, he 
said, valued the U.S.-Canada defense relationship, of which 
NORAD was the cornerstone.  NORAD was uniquely bi-national, 
enabled combined responsiveness in a critical timeframe, and 
was fundamental to a layered defense of the continent. 
 
¶6. (C) Bi-nationally, Chapin proposed that NORAD be expanded 
to include maritime surveillance and warning, and the 
Aagreement should be of no fixed term.  Additionally, the BPG 
planning function should be maintained.  Bilaterally, he 
noted, the United States and Canada should: discuss how to 
enhance maritime defense, explore how to develop bilateral 
military-to-military support for civil authorities, and 
explore training opportunities to test and evaluate existing 
plans for defense of the continent. 
 
¶7. (C) Admiral Robertson stated that he and Rear Admiral 
Sullivan, USN, Joint Staff Vice Director for Policy and 
Planning, had met in July to look at military-to-military 
cooperation.  Robertson said that bilateral plans needed to 
be revised and that there was a need to review maritime 
threats.  He noted that military-to-military assistance after 
Hurricane Katrina was coordinated through NORTHCOM.  A lot of 
work was yet to be done at the national level, including 
development of a national operations plan.  The creation of 
Canada Command (CanCom) would bring dedicated staff to Ottawa 
to address these issues.  He added that the existence of 
CanCom had not been anticipated in the Cabinet mandate for 
NORAD negotiations. 
 
¶8. (C) In his introductory remarks, WHA/CAN Director Breese 
reaffirmed the USG view that NORAD remained a vital component 
of the common defense of North America and said that the U.S. 
had taken essentially the same approach as Canada in 
preparing for negotiations.  Exploring defense support to 
civilian authorities (DSCA) was particularly relevant in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; moreover, 
military-to-military support to civilian authorities was an 
excellent example of U.S.-Canadian cooperation and 
interoperability.  Breese reiterated President Bush's 
gratitude for Canada's generous outpouring of assistance. 
The U.S. agreed, Breese continued, that the future of the BPG 
must be addressed in timely fashion, though what that future 
might be remained unclear.  Other issues needing resolution 
included the future of the Military Cooperation Committee, 
and how the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) fit into 
the continental defense equation.  The evolution of U.S. 
Northern Command and the birth of Canada Command had changed 
the equation and created new realities. 
 
¶9. (C) In brief remarks, OSD Director Townsend expressed 
appreciation for Canadian assistance in dealing with the 
devastation from Hurricane Katrina. The U.S.-Canada defense 
agenda was "huge" -- more than NORAD and more than 
continental defense.  He shared his view that the United 
States and Canada must take their security relationship "to 
the next level."  The two countries were natural allies 
beyond the continent, and could "do more, in a stronger way." 
 NATO, he said, had a Pacific view.  The United States and 
Canada had Pacific interests; however, Europeans did not 
necessarily see this yet. 
 
¶10. (C) While he acknowledged that Canada had not consciously 
paid attention to the defense of Canada in the past, Chapin 
stated that Canada had been given a "bum rap" on defense.  He 
noted that Canada had been "coming back for five to seven 
years."  Canada, he stressed, was ready to play a substantial 
role abroad. 
 
 
THE RENEWAL PROCESS 
 
¶11. (C) Discussing the renewal process and related timelines, 
the U.S. side clarified that its mandate was for negotiation 
only, and that separate Circular 175 authority would be 
required to "conclude" the Agreement.  The U.S. noted that 
because the NORAD Agreement was not a treaty, U.S. Senate 
approval would not be required.  However, congressional 
consultations might be desirable. 
 
¶12. (C) Graham stated that, in Canada, an exchange of notes 
containing legally binding obligations had the "effect" of a 
treaty and thus Canadian Cabinet approval of a draft text 
specifically was required.  The uncertain status of the 
"minority" government notwithstanding, negotiators had 
anticipated a Cabinet review for mid-November.  This would 
require negotiations to be concluded by the end of October. 
Chapin said there was always a small possibility that the 
Government might decide that the issue should be debated by 
Parliament, and did not rule out the possibility that the 
Government might engineer a debate in Parliament of the ad 
ref text.  It was noted that debates were a way of putting 
issues in the public domain and that then Foreign Minister 
Axworthy spoke about the 1996 NORAD Renewal text in 
Parliament (a "take note" debate).  Moreover, in their 
current predicament, the Liberals likely were sensitive to 
criticism that past Liberal Governments had failed to 
adequately "consult" Members about important matters such as 
continental defense.  That said, Chapin stressed the positive 
Canadian attitude toward NORAD. 
 
CANADIAN DRAFT TEXT 
 
¶13. (C) In a discussion document entitled "All Domain NORAD 
Draft Text," derived from the 1996 NORAD renewal text, the 
Canadians outlined an approach to NORAD that was consistent 
with U.S. Circular 175 authority, including addition of 
maritime warning to NORAD's mission.  Working through the 
text USDEL posed a number of questions, indicating several 
points where it might seek revisions.  For some of these, 
USDEL proposed devising a preamble that would provide general 
context and thus avert some potentially time-consuming 
semantic bartering.  Canada accepted the U.S. offer to 
prepare a draft text of an international agreement (replacing 
the exchange of notes used previously) based on the Canadian 
draft. 
 
¶14. (C) In presenting its text, the Canadian delegation 
pointed out issues of particular importance.  References to 
information sharing were included to send an "important 
signal" and stress the need for information exchange.  On 
maritime warning, it was important to develop a complete 
maritime picture at NORAD.  Responses to maritime threats 
would be through bilateral channels.  "Land warning" was 
added to "flesh out the all-domain awareness concept."  It 
helped, the Canadians noted, to ensure a "real-time, full 
picture" of threats.  References to a five year renewal were 
removed in this draft to allow for an indefinite term. 
Language was added to formalize an amendment process. 
Language ensuring the continued existence of the BPG was 
added as there was a need to "define modalities for improving 
planning."  The language was bracketed, however, because the 
modalities were open. 
 
¶15. (C) The U.S. delegation raised specific questions about 
the draft Canadian text.  Breese noted that it was important 
to be specific about activities associated with drug 
trafficking to ensure they are within NORAD's roles (Preamble 
paragraph 4 of the Canadian text). 
 
¶16. (C) Paragraphs I.8 and III.8 of the Canadian text 
referred to the need for enhanced "information sharing," 
seeking the explicit commitment of both governments to 
"ensuring the effective sharing of information and 
intelligence relevant to the defense of North America." 
USDEL acknowledged the importance of sharing information 
relevant to NORAD's specific mission but voiced reservations 
about generalizing a need for information sharing in this 
Agreement. Information sharing between the U.S. and Canada 
was a major issue that was being handled outside of the 
current discussion, and one that political leaders already 
had discussed as a field to explore.  Chapin noted that the 
BPG had told of complications in planning and practice due to 
lack of information sharing. 
 
¶17. (C) With respect to the Canadian addition of a "land 
warning function" the U.S. delegation asked for clarification 
on what that function meant.  Breese noted that such a 
function could get "very political" in both countries and 
asked for more details.  He added that it was a subject that 
could mature through NORTHCOM and CanCom. Col Hache explained 
that Canada added land warning "for completeness" because 
Canada did not want a gap in continental domain coverage.  He 
explained further that the Canadian delegation "automatically 
assumed" that land warning referred to defense support for 
civilian authorities.  Martin added that it was critical to 
have a shared picture of threats and suggested that NORAD 
could, for example, track the unloading of a container from a 
ship to a truck that was headed toward the border.  Chapin 
responded that land warning got to the issue about the 
essence of NORAD in the future.  No one wanted a 
"blockbuster" NORAD that did everything, but NORAD did need a 
broader set of eyes and ears.  It was imprudent, he thought, 
to go from one plan to another.  Rather than worry about 
"imposing boundaries" on the mission, the focus should be on 
having the ability to sort out the threat.  Citing the 
absence of "big picture" clarity on 9/11, he said there was 
great value in enabling an integrated and shared threat 
picture for North America.  Breese agreed, remarking however, 
that this touched upon transition from NORAD to appropriate 
law enforcement entities, i.e. DHS/PSEPC. 
 
¶18. (C) On the maritime warning mission Breese asked for an 
explanation of Canadian references to internal waterways 
(paragraph II.13 of the Canadian draft).  Col Hache answered 
that there was a clear delineation here between warning and 
"control".  He acknowledged that looking at the internal 
waterways moved into the realm of law enforcement, but noted 
that "appropriate warning would trigger the appropriate 
response."  If NORAD, he suggested, identified a situation 
involving the St. Lawrence Seaway or the Great Lakes, it 
could notify NORTHCOM or the appropriate responder.  USDEL 
sought clarification on definitions of "warning," 
"surveillance," and "control," observing that each held 
specific meanings in the U.S. military lexicon. 
 
¶19. (C) Regarding information operations (paragraph II.15 of 
the Canadian draft) Breese asked why such this was included 
by Canada as a mission for NORAD.  Information system defense 
was an inherent part of any command's functions and was a 
"task" more than a "mission."  Lt Col Dees noted that the 
Department of Defense was eliminating "defensive information 
operations" as a term in draft joint doctrine because the 
line between defense and offense was often blurry.  The U.S. 
delegation noted that it would be desirable to articulate the 
defensive nature of information operations and agreed to 
include it in the preamble to the Agreement. 
 
 
¶20. (C) In paragraph III.3 Canada included a statement that 
"NORAD shall remain a distinct headquarters with a distinct 
chain of command."  Breese inquired as to the reason for 
insertion of the sentence.  Chapin explained that it was 
added because NORTHCOM was new since the last Agreement.  He 
stressed Canada's view that NORAD must be protected as an 
institution, referring to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's 
testimony to congress in which the Secretary spoke about 
NORAD being subsumed (by NORTHCOM).  A more difficult 
alternative, Chapin said, would be "to explain NORAD in the 
context of NORTHCOM and CanCom." 
 
¶21. (C) The Canadian draft included language regarding 
potential/prospective "new partnerships for the defense of 
North America."  The U.S. delegation noted that inclusion of 
such language was problematic since it would be inappropriate 
to name countries and such broad language might encourage 
other countries not viewed as appropriate partners by the 
U.S. or Canada to apply for membership.  Chapin agreed that 
such language was not needed as the NORAD amendment process 
would allow for any possible future expansion. 
 
 
THE BI-NATIONAL PLANNING GROUP 
 
¶22. (C) The U.S. delegation questioned Canadian draft 
language affirming that a BPG function would continue to 
exist.  Col Rudesheim acknowledged the value of the BPG's 
contributions but noted that "realities had changed" since 
the BPG's inception.  Townsend expressed the desire for more 
of a strategic focus to the BPG.  Breese noted that that 
there were several missions for the BPG now: updating 
bi-national plans; coordinating global planning; and "big 
sky" thinking beyond continental defense.  Possible options 
for the future of the BPG were: maintain the status quo; 
direct NORTHCOM and CanCom to devote resources to conduct 
planning cooperatively; and locate BPG functions in a "think 
tank" venue, perhaps at the National Defense University in 
Washington, D.C., not tied to either Northern Command or 
Canada Command, to do "big sky" thinking.  The latter would 
feed into DoD and DND. 
 
¶23. (C) Chapin said that maintaining distinction between 
function and use was critical.  The BPG was designed to 
achieve modest objectives quickly.  It had examined the 
current nature of joint plans and found a plethora of 
treaties, MOUs, and informal arrangements that were not 
necessarily practical.  Because of its composition and 
mandate, the unit was able to develop and test scenarios that 
identified work to be done in joint response.  Without the 
BPG, both sides would lose the pro-active dimension of its 
function for long-term strategic planning.  The planning 
functions of the BPG meshed well with functions of the PJBD 
and MCC.  Moreover, if BPG planning functions were to revert 
to national commends, bi-national efforts would be vulnerable 
to national schedules and tasks.  A valuable proactive 
dimension in bi-national planning would be lost.  Admiral 
Robertson asked that the bi-national planning function not be 
allowed to be captured by the "commanders' whim-of-the-day" 
or other priorities. 
¶24. (U) Both sides agreed to hold the next round of talks on 
November 12 in Winnipeg, just before the 216th meeting of the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defense (November 12-14) and to 
brief the Board on the status of negotiations. Additionally, 
the U.S. delegation agreed to provide comments on the 
Canadian draft by the end of the week of October 3, 2005. 
For its part, the Canadian delegation agreed to draft and 
share a paper on options for bi-national planning before the 
week of October 3, 2005. It was further agreed that the U.S. 
delegation, through Mr. Townsend, would prepare a non-paper 
on enhanced defense cooperation beyond the NORAD Agreement. 
 
¶25. (U) This message has been cleared by heads of USDEL. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS