This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 008140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA 
FOR DCHA/FFP, LAUREN LANDIS 
ANE BUREAU FOR ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR JIM KUNDER, DEPUTY 
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD, INDIA DESK OFFICER, 
EBONY BOSTIC, SUPERVISORY PROGRAM OFFICER, REBECCA COHN 
BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN 
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: NONE
SUBJECT: JAMMU AND KASHMIR EARTHQUAKE DISASTER AND NEEDS 
ASSESSMENT (CORRECTED COPY) 
 
THIS CABLE REPLACES NEW DELHI 00008122 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. Following a 7.4 earthquake that struck the Kashmir 
region on October 8, a Regional Advisor from USAID's Office 
of Foreign Disaster Assistance and a Disaster Management 
Specialist from USAID/Delhi deployed to the affected region 
in northern India October 12-16 to conduct a rapid needs 
assessment.  Preliminary findings indicate access is the 
main constraint to providing critical relief, and is 
directly correlated to complex security and logistical 
challenges. Shelter is of utmost priority, and with tents 
in short supply, alternative housing using existing debris 
and locally available material must be actively explored. 
Road closures due to inclement weather have already 
occurred en route to villages situated at higher 
elevations, indicating winter has arrived in parts of 
Jammu-Kashmir. Time is, therefore, of the essence to 
distribute aid in the region's scattered, remote villages. 
Army forces are taking the lead in facilitating relief 
efforts; however, security remains a paramount concern. 
 
¶2. USAID/OFDA provided an initial $100,000 to the Prime 
Minister's Relief Fund and Save the Children's Fund-UK 
(SCF) for emergency needs, including blankets, children's 
jackets and food.  An additional $500,000 will go toward 
relief efforts, and be channeled through reputable NGOs 
with presence on the ground and knowledge of the culture 
and operational context.   These funds will be programmed 
once submitted proposals undergo technical review. 
Programming will focus on immediate and interim shelter, 
blankets, winter clothing, emergency health and 
psychological-social care.  Modest cash-for-work programs, 
such as clearance of debris or shelter construction, will 
also be implemented.  Activities will be largely guided 
through community participation, and carried out in close 
coordination with USAID/Delhi, local and national 
government authorities, and the humanitarian relief 
community.  USAID/OFDA Regional Advisors will closely 
monitor programmatic opportunities and their development. 
 
¶3.  Additional support from the U.S. Government including 
U.S. Military should be considered.  Support is needed to 
transport supplies and services to very isolated regions of 
Kashmir and to provide winterized tents.  Mission is 
working with host government authorities to ensure the GOI 
requests such support  no action should be taken by the US 
military until such a request is formally received.   These 
contributions would greatly help alleviate suffering and 
also build goodwill among the people of Kashmir. 
 
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Current Situation 
----------------- 
 
¶4. On October 8, 2005, an earthquake of a 7.4 magnitude 
jolted Kashmir, with more than 50 subsequent tremors 
recorded in the affected region.  According to recent 
Government of India figures, casualties now surpass 1,400, 
and more than 6,000 are believed to be injured.  In 
addition, 32,000 homes are reportedly damaged or destroyed, 
and officially 160,000 people affected.  In many affected 
villages, it is believed that more than 90% of the homes 
have been damaged.  Within the humanitarian community, 
these figures are believed to be low estimates.  No 
significant migration down from remote areas has been 
reported at this time, however it was reported that the 
army has established 4 camps in Uri.  In days to come more 
assessment data will be compiled, however the situation 
remains highly fluid and needs are ever changing in this 
region of steep terrain, harsh winter climate and political 
tension. 
 
¶5. A USAID/OFDA Regional Advisor and a Disaster Management 
Specialist from USAID/India  traveled to Srinagar, Jammu- 
Kashmir from October 12-16 to ascertain the current 
emergency needs in Baraulla and Kupwara, the two most 
affected districts.  The team accompanied SCF to the 
village of Bandi, in the hills outside the border town of 
Uri, where USAID/OFDA-funded relief was distributed among 
its 22 families.  Blankets, food, and winter clothing were 
provided.  Locals were eager to show the extent of damage 
in their village from the earthquake; not one building the 
assessment team viewed was fully intact.  Back in Srinagar 
the team established contact with local authorities, relief 
organizations and community leaders.  They also took part 
in the first NGO coordination meeting on the October 15; 
other than ECHO which had a previously established presence 
in Kashmir, USAID was the first and only bilateral donor on 
the ground.  However, other donors have mobilized 
assessment teams over the past week. 
 
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Priority Needs 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  The priorities at this time include winterized tents, 
shelter and building supplies, blankets, medical care, warm 
clothing, and psycho-social counseling.  Transport of 
supplies and services is also a significant constraint with 
isolated villages, damaged roads and mountainous terrain. 
 
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Complexities of Shelter 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. With more than 32,000 buildings or homes believed to be 
damaged, there are not enough tents to support the 
requirement.  India's 3-4 primary vendors have increased 
production from a combined 350 tents/day to approximately 
1,000 tents/day.  Even with increased production, orders 
are back-logged. 
 
¶8. Lack of winterized tents will be problematic.  The more 
inaccessible disaster victims would not likely get tents as 
quickly as those closer to easy distribution routes. In 
Bandi, where villagers as of October 13 had not yet 
received any assistance, there was clear evidence of home 
owners taking initiative in sorting debris for future use. 
The NGO community will need to capitalize on this 
initiative and continue to explore ways to quickly find 
alternative solutions for winterized shelter.  Modest 
inputs, such as tin roofing, tarpaulin, and wood framing 
material, may be enough to prepare villagers for the first 
heavy snowfall.  USAID/OFDA will be encouraging NGOs to 
deploy mobile technical teams comprised of carpenters and 
masons to circulate among the more remote villages.  Cash- 
for-work opportunities will also be explored. 
 
¶9. There remains a concern that shelter damage has been 
significantly underestimated.  Many assessments have relied 
upon visual sightings of rooftops still in existence, 
concluding homes were sound.  Aerial or distant 
perspectives of the extent of damage can be deceiving, 
because even though wood frames and corrugated tin roofs 
are in place, cement or adobe foundations and interior rock 
walls are often cracked and damaged. 
 
¶10. The Government of India (GOI) has announced it will be 
providing each family 100,000 rupees ($2200) for damaged 
homes and would provide  an initial 40,000 rupees 
installment.   This compensation raises considerable 
questions in terms of accurate targeting; it is not unusual 
for family size to be 7-10 people, or for more than one 
family to reside in the same home.  In one case CARE 
interviewed a member of one household that was sheltering 
6 families-more than 50 people; 100,000 rupees is 
inadequate in these cases. 
 
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Poor Distribution Practices 
--------------------------- 
¶11. There are a multitude of varied perspectives 
circulating among the media and government officials with 
respect to emergency needs, based on visual images and 
extrapolations. Uri, one of the more severely hit towns on 
the border, is situated along a major road that is far more 
readily accessible to reporters and truck convoys than the 
villages located hours away.  This has resulted in 
misinformation.  For example, it has been reported that 
there are adequate blankets in place to meet needs and that 
the houses on the hillside "appear" to be fine.  The 
reality is quite different; blankets are piled up due to 
poor distribution capacity and flawed procedures that fail 
to distribute supplies equitably.  Some organizations were 
reportedly "dumping" goods en route to Uri to avoid angry 
crowds and time-consuming checkpoint delays. 
 
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Mental Health 
------------- 
 
¶12. All reports indicate the loss of lives is widespread 
throughout Baramulla, Kupwara and Poonch.  According to 
Save the Children, 16 orphaned children are currently 
registered with the Government of India, but it is clear 
that hundreds more have lost members of their immediate 
family, relatives, neighbors, and friends.  Similar to the 
trauma counseling that followed the tsunami, many NGOs and 
local volunteers are poised to address the special needs of 
children and youth and will do so through recreational 
activities and the resumption of schools.  Such activities 
simultaneously address child and youth protection issues by 
ensuring these vulnerable groups are accounted for, engaged 
in activities and, where possible, given opportunities for 
income generation in community-focused programs. 
 
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Additional Needs 
---------------- 
 
¶13. While food has not been widely reported as a pressing 
requirement, there are certainly areas in need.  The army 
has established free food kitchens known as "langhars" in 
the Uri area and has air-dropped commodities, however, 
given the lack of data on village conditions, it is 
imperative that continued assessments be done to determine 
evolving and site-specific needs.  Many villages, for 
example, are road accessible and therefore in a much better 
position to access markets than the villagers who rely on 
mule or transportation by foot to higher elevations.  Some 
farmers have already stored their summer harvest, while 
others have yet to clear their fields.  Corn and rice, 
among other items, are typically placed inside containers 
in the house for the winter months, so locals have 
suggested that much of this stock will be salvageable once 
the debris is cleared away.  Nonetheless, relief 
organizations have distributed food, such as rice, lentils, 
sugar and oil, to both meet emergency needs and ease the 
burden of recovery. 
 
¶14. While there are no major concerns regarding health or 
water and sanitation at this time, the situation needs to 
be closely monitored.  The national armed forces have been 
addressing the more serious injuries and providing 
medicine, with six medical and three surgical teams 
deployed.  State authorities have 21 medical teams on the 
ground with 15 ambulances, medicine, and IV fluids. NGOs 
are assisting these efforts. Catholic Relief Services, for 
example, deployed 50 medical teams to conduct initial 
assessments and render basic health care. The full extent 
of health needs is not yet known.  Nonetheless, in an 
effort to avoid serious public health risks, hygiene kits 
have been incorporated into many of the distributions, and 
public health training for communities is planned to ensure 
basic health services are available.  In terms of water and 
sanitation, water purification tablets are being 
distributed and there is much discussion regarding how to 
best approach latrine needs.  Many among the affected 
populations had latrines in their homes, while others 
traditionally use designated sites on hillsides.   Needs in 
these sectors will vary from village to village. 
--------------------- 
Impact on Livelihoods 
--------------------- 
 
¶15. Many have lost their means to generate income. For 
example there are numerous reports of loss of cattle. 
Similar to the aftermath of the tsunami, villagers will 
need time to rebuild their homes and lives.  Furthermore, 
Baramulla and Kupwara are characterized by widespread rural 
poverty, which often translates into few savings or assets. 
Cash-for-work programs are being explored to offer income 
opportunities that will address an immediate need for 
income, which in turn may be spent on the tailored needs of 
each family. 
 
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Coordination 
------------ 
 
¶16. The complex nature of this disaster will require close 
coordination among the humanitarian community, military, 
government officials, and community leaders.  The first 
coordination meeting among NGOs was held on Saturday, 
October 15, and was led by ActionAid.  Representatives from 
local and international NGOs were present, as was UNICEF. 
The meeting was a good opportunity for newcomers to better 
understand the context of the disaster from the viewpoint 
of long-standing NGOs, such as SCF-UK and OXFAM.  Further 
meetings are scheduled to ensure continued information 
sharing and collaboration, and will be led by UNDP. 
USAID/OFDA-funded grantees will be strongly encouraged to 
attend.  UNDP is also coordinating donor meetings in New 
Delhi. 
 
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Major Constraints to Relief Operations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. Security: Those NGOs with regional experience are 
hesitant to assume that humanitarian access will endure 
through the winter months. There is also concern among some 
NGOs about affiliation with armed forces.  However, some 
NGOs are working with the military forces to provide the 
necessary relief.  Those NGOs with longstanding presence in 
the area may elect to maintain their neutrality by not 
working directly with the military.. 
 
¶18. Access:  Restricted access is directly correlated to 
the security situation.  Army checkpoints and registration 
requirements have delayed the movement of commodities.  In 
addition, steep terrain and road blockages from landslides 
are compounding the problem of accessibility.  In many 
cases villages are so remote they can only be reached by 
foot. This issue has also resulted in a dearth of accurate 
assessment information to guide relief operations. While 
assessments are still underway by the Army and humanitarian 
community, many areas have yet to be visited by any outside 
party, and it is believed needs are great throughout the 
Tangdhar and Uri areas. 
 
¶19. Logistics: The aforementioned constraints have a direct 
impact on the ability to transport much needed relief to 
affected populations.  The Army appears to be in the best 
position to facilitate relief efforts under the 
circumstances; since the onset of the disaster it has been 
providing helicopter and truck support for aid 
distribution.  Many NGOs are reliant on their own vehicle 
transport, and there are some that are providing relief on 
foot.  While necessary, security measures at checkpoints 
have been the cause of delays in the provision of emergency 
relief. 
 
¶20. Time: Efforts to assist those in need are further 
aggravated by the need to move quickly with harsh winter 
weather on its way.  According to locals, much of the 
region becomes impassable in winter, and traditionally 
communities prepare to be isolated for months at a time 
during this season.  Already the main road to Tangdhar was 
closed temporarily due to snowy conditions.  There may be a 
short window of opportunity for intervention to many 
isolated areas.  By early December, winter will arrive in 
full force. 
 
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Conclusion 
---------- 
 
¶21. USAID/OFDA and USAID/Delhi are in close contact with 
the relief community and government officials, and will 
continue to monitor the situation.  Five proposals are 
under collaborative technical review provided by 
USAID/OFDA's Regional Advisor, USAID/OFDA's Response 
Management Team, and the USAID/Delhi team.  There is an 
opportunity to alleviate the suffering in Kashmir and to 
further strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation 
between India and the United States through prompt and 
coordinated action on the ground.  Additional logistical 
support provided by the U.S. military would be a welcome 
complement to USAID/OFDA assistance, but such support 
should not be sent until we receive an official GOI request 
which post is seeking. 
 
BLAKE