This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF/E, CA/VO, AND INL/C/CP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CVIS KCOR KE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KIBAKI 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William Bellamy for reason 1 (c) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C)  I met alone with President Kibaki for 40 minutes 
October 19.  The meeting was prompted by the decision in 
Washington earlier this week to find Transport Minister 
Christopher Murungaru ineligible for entry into the U.S. 
under Presidential Proclamation 7750.  Advised of this 
decision early October 19, Presidential Permanent Secretary 
Ambassasdor Francis Muthaura insisted that I talk to the 
President immediately.  As soon as President Kibaki flew in 
that afternoon from Western Kenya, Muthaura summoned me to 
State House. 
 
¶2. (C)  After an initial chat about the rigors of campaigning 
during the referendum, I explained to Kibaki the decision on 
Murungaru.  I noted that we had no plans for a public 
announcement or statement but would respond briefly and 
factually if asked whether Murungaru has been excluded from 
the U.S. 
 
¶3. (C)  Kibaki was glum.  The U.S. decision was "most 
serious" he conceded.  The U.S. must have had good reasons 
for taking this action.  What specifically, he asked, were 
those reasons?  Beyond the Presidential Proclamation's 
general assertions on corrupt activity, what were the charges 
against Murungaru?  Kibaki said that were he to make a 
decision "on this man" he would need something more specific 
on which to base it.  Could the U.S. "help him a little" on 
this, he asked. 
 
¶4. (C)  I told the President that much of what we knew came 
from sensitive sources, or persons who would not want their 
identities revealed.  However, much of this same information 
was widely available within his own Administration.  (Kibaki 
disagreed, insisting that he did not have access to such 
information.)  I noted that privacy rules preclude us from 
providing specifics about visa decisions, even for 
individuals of Murungaru's stature.  I then recalled our 
one-on-one conversation last January.  At that time I had 
given him the names of five GOK officials and private 
businessmen involved in grand-scale corruption, including 
Murungaru.  As I had then, I again urged the President to 
examine the Anglo-Leasing scandal and other scandals related 
to it.  This exercise would certainly yield answers to the 
President's questions.  I also noted that I had suggested 
last January an audit of Murungaru's personal finances.  This 
exercise would also answer many of the President's concerns. 
 
¶5. (C)  Kibaki was unmoved by my suggestion that a little 
digging in his own back garden would unearth all the evidence 
he needed.  He returned two or three times to his appeal for 
more specific information and hard data on Murungaru.  He 
needed it, he said, not to confront Murungaru but just to be 
clear in his own mind so that he could take the necessary 
decisions.  I said I would check if additional information 
could be made available, but I cautioned that we would not be 
able to discuss the specifics behind our decision on 
Murungaru's exclusion. 
 
¶6. (C)  We parted on a cordial note. 
 
¶7. (C)  Ambassador Muthaura and Presidential Senior Adviser 
Stanley Murage lingered outside the President's office during 
the meeting.  When I debriefed them, they appeared 
disappointed at the President's indecisiveness.  Later, out 
of earshot of Muthaura, Murage confided that  "the President 
has plenty of evidence, he's just not acting." 
 
¶8. (C)  Muthaura and Murage appreciated the Embassy's low-key 
handling of this affair. 
 
¶9. (C)  Comment.  Action against Murungaru, who is widely 
perceived as the most obviously corrupt and corrupting of GOK 
ministers, would be a politically savvy move by Kibaki.  It 
would win accolades at home across the political spectrum. 
At a time when the Kibaki government is being battered by 
donors, international organizations and NGOs for its poor 
governance performance, sacking Murungaru would add a little 
lustre to Kenya's  tarnished credentials.  Yet, clearly, 
Kibaki is reluctant to act. 
 
¶10. (C)  It may be, as some suggest, that Kibaki simply can't 
bring himself to act against an old ally and fellow Kikuyu 
insider.  Or it may be that Kibaki, who abhors 
unpleasantness, just can't stomach the idea of a one-on-one 
showdown with tough guy Murungaru.  The worst-case scenario, 
and unfortunately not an implausible one, is that Murungaru's 
deep pockets are needed to win the current referendum 
campaign and, beyond that, to provide clandestine financing 
for the political realignments Kibaki's inner circle hopes to 
engineer in the run up to the 2007 elections.   End Comment. 
BELLAMY