VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSK #1328/01 3041301
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311301Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3256
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0725
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS MINSK 001328 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PARM KNNP MNUC BO
SUBJECT: MFA Arms Control Raises Old Issues 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: On October 14, Ambassador Krol met with 
MFA Arms Control and International Security Director 
Alexander Baichorov before Baichorov's trip to the U.S. to 
participate in the UN First Committee.  Baichorov provided 
the Ambassador with information on a proposed First 
Committee Resolution on the prohibition of new weapons of 
mass destruction, reiterated Belarus's desire to become a 
member of the Zangger Committee, and passed documents on 
the OSCE project to dismantle conventional weapons in 
Belarus.  In addition, Baichorov relayed to the Ambassador 
an episode about a Belarusian minister who was invited to 
the U.S. for a training program, but was immediately 
recalled by the GOB for failure to receive prior permission 
to travel to the U.S.  The minister blames his own 
government for this, highlighting the value of continued 
outreach.  End Summary. 
 
 
----------------------- 
GOB Wants No New WMD... 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Baichorov passed the proposed Belarusian 
resolution on the "Prohibition of the Development and 
Manufacture of Types of WMD and New Systems of Such 
Weapons."  Belarus has attempted to put this resolution on 
the First Committee agenda for several years, but with no 
success.  Last year the resolution was left off the agenda 
completely due to a "technical glitch" which Baichorov 
asserted was a deliberate action of the U.S.  He surmised 
that the U.S. did not want to see the resolution on the 
agenda, let alone support it.  However, Baichorov relayed 
to the Ambassador that he hoped the U.S. would not obstruct 
the inclusion of the resolution on this year's agenda. 
Baichorov even asked the U.S. to consider supporting the 
resolution on its merits and in recognition of Belarus' 
sincere interest in combating the development of new WMD 
technology.  [Note: Post understands this resolution 
subsequently passed.] 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ambassador replied that he had no official 
position to convey.  He added that after Lukashenko made 
Belarus' official position toward the U.S. quite clear at 
the opening of UNGA, there is little desire in Washington 
to support any Belarusian efforts in the U.N. or anywhere 
else.  The atmosphere Lukashenko has created by his hostile 
statements and actions alone would make it difficult for 
the U.S. to cooperate with Belarus.  [Comment: Now that the 
resolution has passed, Belarus is likely to portray itself 
as an ardent proponent of non-proliferation and to accuse 
the U.S. of being a threat to world peace and security. 
End Comment.] 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
...And Zangger Committee Membership 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Baichorov presented another non-paper on a 
different perennial issue - Belarus' desire to join the 
Zangger Committee.  The paper recounted Belarusian 
Ambassador to the U.S. Mikhail Khvostov's recent meeting on 
Zangger at the Department, and complained that "US- 
Belarusian cooperation in the field of nonproliferation is 
being taken hostage by extraneous issues."  The non-paper 
stressed the GOB supports USG nonproliferation efforts, 
including PSI.  Baichorov further speculated what the U.S. 
position would be if Belarus actually ratified the Missile 
Technology Control Regime. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador reminded Baichorov that the U.S. 
support for Belarusian membership on the Zangger Committee 
would probably only come about once Belarus changed its 
overall policy approach to international cooperation and 
cooperation with the U.S., including respect for human 
rights and conducting a responsible arms sales policy.  If 
Belarus had taken steps to improve its record, the USG 
would have a very different attitude to Belarus' membership 
on the Zangger Committee and other groups.  Baichorov 
simply smiled. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
GOB Seeks Support for OSCE Weapons Destruction Project 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Finally, Baichorov shared with the Ambassador a 
copy of the latest version of the OSCE project to support 
the destruction of excess SALW in Belarus.  Baichorov 
opined the U.S. delegation to Vienna would support the UK's 
lead on this project.  Ambassador concurred with 
Baichorov's assessment and added the USG was considering 
supporting this project through the OSCE since it serves 
everyone's interest.  [Note: Post will report septel on 
recent problems with this project.] 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Reaching Out to GOB Officials Still Useful 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) As the Ambassador was leaving, Baichorov related 
to him an episode involving Minister for Emergency 
Situations Enver Bariyev.  Bariyev, who at the time was a 
deputy minister, had attempted to participate in a U.S. 
Army sponsored training program in 2004.  He traveled to 
New Hampshire with the rest of his delegation only to 
receive an urgent phone call from Minsk informing him that 
he did not have permission from on high to travel to the 
U.S.  With great embarrassment, Bariyev had to turn right 
around and fly out that very day.  [Comment: Bariyev does 
not fault the U.S.  When Bariyev greeted a recent U.S. 
Department of Energy delegation, he was most cordial.  This 
episode and Bariyev's reaction demonstrate the usefulness 
of reaching out to GOB officials and letting the leadership 
take the blame for rejecting engagement.  End Comment.] 
 
KROL