VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSK #1316/01 3011115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281115Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3239
INFO RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3400
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3183
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1443
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3064
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2966
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0714
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 001316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
KIEV FOR USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/15 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH APPEALS TO US AMBASSADOR FOR 
ASSISTANCE 
 
Ref: A) Minsk 1205 
 
Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: On October 26, Aleksandr Milinkevich 
discussed with Ambassador his campaign activities following 
the October 1-2 democratic congress (ref A).  He was 
relatively pleased with his efforts to pull together a 
unified campaign team, and was cautiously optimistic he and 
his team could present a formidable challenge to President 
Lukashenko's grip on popular support.  However, Milinkevich 
admitted the real purpose of his meeting with Ambassador 
was to stress the urgent need for quicker, more coordinated 
international financial assistance.  The presidential 
candidate felt embarrassed about having to make a special 
appeal to the U.S. Ambassador and stressed his gratitude 
for U.S. assistance thus far, but he pointed out the 
economic plight of his campaign demanded his immediate 
personal involvement.  End Summary. 
 
 
Focus Is Not On Electoral Victory, But Voter Support 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Aleksandr Milinkevich, 10+ coalition presidential 
nominee, told Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief the aim of his 
campaign is not to beat President Lukashenko in the 2006 
presidential elections.  He recognizes the President 
probably has already determined the election results. 
Milinkevich noted his focus remains almost exclusively on 
broadening popular support for democratic change, with the 
upcoming elections serving as a catalyzing event for mass 
protests.  Milinkevich believes the starting point for 
building popular support is a unified democratic alliance. 
 
 
10+ Leaders Offered Key Positions In Milinkevich Campaign 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Milinkevich pointed out that immediately after his 
nomination a crisis ensued in the coalition.  Sergey 
Kalyakin, leader of the pro-democracy Belarusian Party of 
Communists (BPC) and third-place finisher in the congress, 
and Anatoly Lebedko, head of the United Civic Party (UCP) 
and runner-up candidate, apparently were disappointed with 
the results of the congress.  To prevent the disintegration 
of the coalition, Milinkevich offered Kalyakin the position 
of campaign manager and Lebedko whatever position he wanted 
in the campaign (besides campaign manager).  Lebedko chose 
the position of head of the national committee, which is 
the policy group that will devise the coalition's principal 
strategy proposals and plans for Belarus as if it were a 
shadow government. 
 
¶4.  (C) Milinkevich said that he had hoped to have his 
close colleague Victor Karnyeneko as campaign manager but 
in the end made a compromise to maintain Kalyakin's 
support.  Karnyenko is now Kalyakin's deputy on the 
campaign team.  Milinkevich also agreed to have Belarusian 
National Front (BNF) leader Vintsuk Vyachorka, BPC member 
Aleksandr Dobrovolsky, and other party leaders serve as key 
members in the campaign. (Note: A more detailed report on 
the campaign staff and their particular responsibilities 
will be sent septel).  However, Milinkevich considers his 
greatest asset in the regions is the NGO community (from 
which he came), not the political parties. 
 
 
Further Consolidation of Democratic Forces A Difficult Task 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Milinkevich told Ambassador he is making every 
effort to unite the democratic forces behind his candidacy, 
but thus far the other presidential hopefuls remain 
elusive.  He said that former Agricultural Minister Vasily 
Leonov felt particularly slighted because Lebedko 
previously had offered Leonov the position of national 
committee head but Lebedko ultimately took the position for 
himself.  The Milinkevich team will try to persuade Leonov 
to take up the post as commander of the "Eastern Front," 
working his contacts in Russia to support the campaign. 
 
Milinkevich was not sure Leonov would accept the position. 
He noted former Parliamentary Speaker Aleksandr Voitovich 
might work with them, but Voitovich thus far has 
conditioned his support on financial compensation. 
(Comment: Voitovich suggested to Ambassador on October 12 
he is determined to convince Milinkevich to support a 
Voitovich candidacy, not the other way around.  More 
information on this conversation will be sent septel.) 
 
¶6.  (C) Milinkevich acknowledged former Belarusian State 
University Rector Anatoly Kozulin has refused to join the 
10+ coalition and had indicated he will run on his own. 
Milinkevich added that the "Free Belarus" coalition of 
Irina Krasovskyaya, Andrey Sannikov, Pavel Demesz and Bruce 
Jackson had always been somewhat hostile to the single 
candidate process but he has successfully won their support 
for his candidacy. 
 
 
No Question About It - Lukashenko Is A Worthy Opponent 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Milinkevich is under no illusion about President 
Lukashenko's power and talent as a politician.  The 10+ 
nominee even noted he will learn a lot from Lukashenko 
during the electoral campaign.  Milinkevich also recognized 
that the economic situation in Belarus is not dire: "most 
Belarusians realize they are economically better off than 
Ukrainians and Russians."  (Note: Post understands that 
average salaries in Ukraine and Russia are higher than in 
Belarus, but Milinkevich's general argument remains valid.) 
 
 
But There Is Room For Hope 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Milinkevich said he will try to convince voters 
that they would be much better off under a different 
political and economic system.  Moreover, he will argue 
that Lukashenko's version of stability is in fact 
unsustainable and undesirable.  He commented that even a 
cemetery is stable; that does not mean you want to live 
there.  Milinkevich knows many people are not happy with 
the climate of fear that Lukashenko has created in society. 
He hopes he can project himself as an attractive 
alternative to Lukashenko Q a candidate more in keeping 
with Belarusian character, which is to be part of the world 
and not defiantly challenging it. 
 
¶9.  (C) The 10+ presidential candidate was optimistic that 
despite all the financial and human resources Lukashenko 
has at his disposal, democratic forces can still make 
significant progress in leading Belarus towards democratic 
change.  Milinkevich stressed that Belarusians were the 
chief agents of political change in the country, but they 
could not do it alone.  He greatly appreciated the U.S. 
approach to shine a light on Belarus, suggesting that 
international attention has an effect on domestic 
developments and should not diminish. 
 
 
International Travel Will Be Limited To Key Countries 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Milinkevich recognized that he needs to 
concentrate on building popular support and therefore spend 
most of his time in Belarus.  However, he considered trips 
to a few key capitals necessary.  (Note: Milinkevich noted 
his recent trip to Prague was arranged in May, prior to his 
10+ nomination.  He felt it was necessary to fulfill his 
obligation.) 
 
¶11.  (C) The 10+ candidate plans to visit Moscow in 
November.  His team was trying to set up meetings for him 
with senior Russian officials, including with Deputy Prime 
Minister Surikov.  He also hoped to meet deputies in the 
Duma, as well as hold interviews with the Russian press. 
Milinkevich aims to convince his Russian audience that he 
stands for solid reliable relations with Russia.  (Note: 
Milinkevich thought Belarusian nationalist leader in exile 
Zenon Poznyak's recent statement that Milinkevich was not a 
 
nationalist helped his cause in Russia and in Belarus, 
where the description nationalist is often publicly 
associated with fascism.) 
 
¶12.  (C) He also hoped to travel to Brussels to meet EU 
officials, preferably during the November 7 General Affairs 
and External Relations (GAERC) Ministerial.  (Note: The UK 
Embassy in Minsk was trying to arrange for the 
participation of Milinkevich in the planned EU foreign 
ministers' discussion on Belarus.)  Milinkevich agreed with 
Ambassador's suggestion that it may be useful for the 10+ 
nominee to meet with senior U.S. officials who will be in 
Brussels for U.S.-EU meetings during the same time period. 
 
 
Lack Of A Cohesive PR Campaign Remains A Challenge 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶13.  (C) Milinkevich noted he has been unable to hire a 
good PR person with journalistic experience to develop the 
public relations strategy.  (Comment: Milinkevich campaign 
team member recently told Pol/Econ Chief Dobrovolsky was 
handling Milinkevich's relations with the press.  However, 
this position is likely a temporary responsibility for 
Dobrovolsky; his chief responsibility is campaign 
strategy.)  Milinkevich noted there are many who would like 
to work for him but they need financial compensation. 
 
 
Lack of Money Remains An Even Bigger Challenge 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶14.  (C) Milinkevich admitted his campaign was desperate 
for financial support.  In fact, he apologized to 
Ambassador that the urgent need for resources was the main 
reason for his visit.  Milinkevich said that his campaign 
has little money to launch voter outreach activities.  He 
noted that he can get funding from those who invite him to 
travel abroad but he does not have enough money "even for 
gas to travel to the outlying regions in Belarus."  Using 
the limited resources he does have available, Milinkevich 
plans to travel to the nearby city of Baranovichi in early 
November to meet with voters in local markets and conduct 
press interviews, but he said he could do nothing more with 
current levels of assistance. 
 
¶15.  (C) The candidate is afraid people will forget about 
him and the 10+ coalition if his travel around the country 
is so limited.  He noted some Belarusian businessmen have 
indicated their willingness to provide him financial 
support but only if his campaign gains traction with 
voters.  Although Milinkevich repeatedly expressed his 
gratitude for the monetary and technical assistance he has 
received from U.S. and other NGOs, he stressed the 10+ 
coalition required an immediate infusion of resources to 
launch effectively his campaign. 
 
 
More Coordination Among Donors Also Needed 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶16.  (C) Milinkevich also noted a lack of coordination 
among foreign donors.  He was concerned that all the 
resources to help the democratic cause in Belarus were 
going to a wide variety of programs and activities, but he 
perceived the foreign NGOs knew little about what the other 
foreign NGOs were doing.  He characterized the coordination 
issue as a serious problem that will significantly limit 
the opposition's prospects for promoting democratic change 
during the election.  Ambassador assured Milinkevich the 
USG is actively working on this issue. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17.  (C) Alexander Milinkevich won the 10+ coalition's 
nomination for contender to President Lukashenko in the 
2006 elections by just eight votes, and thus has had to 
work hard to keep the democratic alliance together.  For 
the most part, Milinkevich's decision to place his former 
 
competitors and their supporters in key positions in his 
campaign has paid off.  The opposition candidate has the 
backing of a relatively unified coalition, in addition to 
the support he already enjoys from the local NGO community. 
But he is also cognizant of the repressive political 
environment in which he is forced to operate and the need 
to build up sufficient popular support that could lead to a 
popular rejection of Lukashenko.  A key challenge for the 
Milinkevich team is resources, especially for the start up 
of the campaign.  Without domestic sources, the campaign 
will depend on external resources to attract domestic 
support and staff. 
 
KROL