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DE RUEHSK #1232/01 2801052
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071052Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3127
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0695
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 MINSK 001232 
 
SIPDIS 
 
KIEV FOR USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/15 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR EAID PREL BO
 
SUBJECT: BELARUS: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES 
 
Refs: A) Minsk 1206   B) Minsk 1162 
 
MINSK 00001232  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  The Lukashenko regime is engaged in a clear and 
comprehensive effort to continue and deepen Lukashenko's 
dictatorial rule over Belarus. The regime has created a 
climate of fear in the country and is attempting to 
eliminate any possibility for democratic change through an 
aggressive anti-opposition, anti- U.S., pro-Lukashenko 
propaganda campaign and employment of its comprehensive 
levers of control and intimidation over all elements of 
Belarusian society.  The regime's relentless use of fear 
and intimidation may, however, be undermining its support 
in society. In response to the worsening situation in 
Belarus but cognizant of possible regime brittleness, the 
Deputies Committee recently agreed on a long-term 
democratization strategy for Belarus.  The strategy focuses 
on highlighting regime abuses, robustly promoting 
democratic values and the democratic process and 
strengthening international pressure on the regime.  The 
strategy calls for active engagement with allies and 
possibly Russia in a joint effort toward promoting 
democratic change in Belarus while focusing on the 2006 
presidential elections as a near-term opportunity to 
catalyze Belarusian society against Europe's last 
dictatorship. End Summary. 
 
 
Context 
------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Since coming to power in 1994 Aleksandr Lukashenko 
has relentlessly endeavored to establish total control over 
Belarusian society and restore Soviet era values and 
institutions antithetical to democratic values and 
institutions.  Through force and fear and inducements he 
has marginalized his political opposition and isolated 
Belarus from international influence and leverage.  The 
command economy he has promoted has brought a veneer of 
economic stability to the country, but that stability rests 
on a shaky financial foundation and heavy energy subsidies 
from Russia. 
 
¶3.  (C) Presidential elections are scheduled to take place 
in 2006. In October 2004, the regime conducted a rigged 
referendum to allow Lukashenko to run again.  Since then, 
Lukashenko is making every effort to ensure he will remain 
in power.  The regime has ratcheted up its pressure and 
inducements on all elements of society to support the 
dictatorship while increasing repression on all independent 
and opposition elements.  It is waging a virulently anti- 
U.S. and anti-opposition propaganda campaign to frighten 
people into opposing democracy and the opposition as 
threats to their economic and social well-being.  The 
regime has created a climate of fear throughout society. 
These policies have strengthened Lukashenko's control over 
society but may be undermining his support as more 
Belarusians, especially among the ruling elite, may be 
becoming less comfortable with Lukashenko's harsh tactics 
and policies. Most Belarusians, however, remain politically 
apathetic especially as economic conditions remain stable. 
 
¶4. (C) On October 2, a congress of the largest registered 
(and de-registered) political parties and pro-democracy 
NGOs voted for NGO leader Alexander Milinkevich to run 
against President Lukashenko in the upcoming 2006 elections 
(ref A).  The selection process culminating in the 
nomination congress served as a positive, unifying 
development in the opposition movement.  Nevertheless, the 
opposition as a whole remains internally weak, starved of 
resources, deprived of domestic media access and continues 
to be unpopular among many Belarusians.  Other contenders 
within the opposition may also emerge during the 
presidential race, especially if Milinkevich fails to build 
up support. 
 
 
Democracy Deficits/Desired Outcomes 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
MINSK 00001232  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Extremely Limited Access to Independent 
Information.  The government is committed to maintaining 
control of all forms of information, including the media 
and education, to control the populace's thoughts and 
choices.  Regime propaganda has had a profound impact on 
many Belarusians' attitude towards the West and towards 
universal values of democracy and human rights, as well as 
convinced most Belarusians that their current dictatorial 
form of government is both effective and desired. 
 
-- Desired outcome: independent national and regional 
newspapers have enough resources to continue their work; 
national and regional newspapers increase their 
circulation; an increasing number of Belarusians listen to 
and/or watch programs created by Belarusians and broadcast 
from neighboring countries.  More Belarusians, particularly 
students and opinion shapers, are able to travel to the 
West and see a clear alternative to dictatorship and a 
command economy. 
 
¶6.  (C) Flawed Political Process.  The Lukashenko regime 
has carefully crafted a series of laws and executive 
decrees that severely restrict the influence of pro- 
democracy political parties, human rights and democracy 
activists, independent media, and independent trade unions. 
The GOB has marginalized civil society almost to the extent 
that their activities are generally ignored or frowned upon 
by the general public. 
 
-- Desired Outcome: NGOs, independent media, and political 
parties are able to operate effectively and shape opinions 
despite GOB repression. 
 
¶7.  (C) Fraudulent Electoral Process.  Since the 
presidential elections in 1994, the OSCE has judged all 
presidential, parliamentary and local elections as 
systematically flawed.  In October 2004, President 
Lukashenko fraudulently changed the constitution to remove 
presidential term limits. 
 
-- Desired Outcome: The GOB is keenly aware of U.S., EU, 
OSCE, and perhaps Russian interest in a fair and free 
electoral process.  The GOB responds to some of the major 
concerns of the international community, such as the 
registration of all the democratic candidates, elimination 
of problematic early voting, and complete access to the 
voting centers by national and international observers. 
 
¶8.  (C) Lack of exposure to the outside world.  The regime 
has taken drastic measures to limit the contact of the 
country's opinion leaders, such as key GOB personnel, 
journalists, and students, with the West.  The government 
has made it difficult Q and in some cases impossible Q to 
continue professional and student exchange programs, as 
well as democracy-oriented seminars held in the country. 
The government has portrayed American policy as something 
against the people of Belarus, rather than against the 
Lukashenko regime. 
 
-- Desired Outcome: The GOB agrees to be more flexible on 
the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program.  The government 
does not shut down exchange programs.  The GOB allows more 
government officials to participate in various seminars at 
the George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies. 
 
¶9.  (C) Poor Human Rights Record.  The climate of fear and 
repression in Belarus has considerably intensified this 
year.  The number of harassed activists in civil society, 
including pro-democratic cartoonists, has increased. 
Public demonstrations are severely restricted and 
occasionally violently dispersed. The government has also 
cracked down on a number of Evangelical churches. 
 
-- Desired Outcome: The GOB exercises more restraint 
towards civil society organizations and leaders. 
 
 
Six-Month Strategy 
------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Post's short-term strategy can be divided into 
four fundamental activities: 1) empower Belarusians with 
independent, objective information; 2) pressure the regime 
 
MINSK 00001232  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
to conduct a more open and fair electoral process; 3) 
coordinate policy and actions with important countries and 
institutions, such as Belarus' neighbors, the EU and the 
OSCE; and 4) speak out against a growing number of gross 
human rights violations. 
 
¶11.  (C) An Empowered Belarusian Society 
 
-- Continue to support the activities of local pro- 
democracy and human rights NGOs through Democracy 
Commission funds (approximately USD 800,000 annually), 
USAID's new Civil Society program and its small grants 
component, and through grants to NGO implementing partners 
(such as NED, IRI, NDI, and through e-PINE).  (PAS, 
POL/ECON, USAID, EXEC) 
 
-- Increase financial support to independent newspapers 
through the new independent media fund ($250,000), which we 
expect to receive in December 2005, and through existing 
Democracy Commission channels. 
 
-- Continue to host a series of events and receptions for 
key groups in society, including teachers, historians, 
foreign policy professors at the state universities, and 
athletes. (PAS, POL/ECON, EXEC) 
 
-- Open up more American Corners around the country. Within 
one month, we will have 11 such corners in libraries. 
(PAS, EXEC) 
 
-- Enhance Embassy's direct contact with society by 
increasing the number of visits to large and small cities 
throughout the country.  Officers will speak at schools and 
universities, hold interviews with local newspapers, and 
engage local GOB officials, political parties, NGOs, 
business leaders.  (POL/ECON, PAS, EXEC) 
 
-- Continue to prepare the America newsletter, a quarterly 
product designed to offer the Belarusian public information 
on Embassy educational and cultural programs as well as on 
important developments in the United States. The newsletter 
is uploaded to the Embassy's website, and we will also 
distribute it via the American Corners located throughout 
the country.  (PAS, EXEC) 
 
-- Engage officials within GOB structures on a selective 
basis to expose them to democratic and professional values 
as a means of building up internal support for democratic 
change Work with the GOB to allow more GOB officials, from 
a greater variety of ministries, to participate in George 
¶C. Marshall Center courses and conferences.  In FY2005, 16 
Belarusians attended various Marshall Center programs.  We 
plan on successfully recruiting eight to nine Belarusians 
officials, and perhaps local journalists, over the next six 
months to attend Marshall Center programs.  (DAO, EXEC) 
 
-- Continue and expand humanitarian assistance program, 
which includes the renovation of hospitals and the donating 
of medical equipment to hospitals, particularly in the 
Chernobyl-affected regions. As 2006 is the twentieth 
anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy, organize a highly 
visible and significant delivery of humanitarian aid from 
the U.S. and other activities to counter the regime's anti- 
U.S. propaganda. (DAO, PAS, EXEC) 
 
-- Organize several DVCs to broaden contact between local 
and Western opinion leaders.  DVCs currently being planned 
include an exchange of views between Western and Belarusian 
academics and between U.S. and Belarusian university 
students.  We will post the transcripts of the DVCs on the 
Embassy website, and we are exploring the possibility of 
loading the DVC transcripts and videos onto DVDs and 
distributing them to the American Corners.  (PAS, POL/ECON, 
EXEC) 
 
-- Continue to engage the GOB to allow students to 
participate in the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program, 
including making direct appeals to the Ministers of 
Education and Foreign Affairs.  Closely monitor possible 
GOB attempts to shut down existing academic and 
professional exchange programs.  (PAS, EXEC) 
 
-- Build the capacity of local NGOs to provide social 
services to those segments of the population most likely to 
 
MINSK 00001232  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
contract HIV/AIDS.  (USAID) 
 
-- Continue to support orphans and vulnerable children 
(USAID) 
 
-- Increase our visits to U.S. NGO offices located in 
Vilnius and Kiev to ensure planned projects, such as 
bolstering external broadcasting into Belarus, are in line 
with realities on the ground.  (USAID, POL/ECON, PAS, EXEC) 
 
¶12.  (C) A More Legitimate Electoral Process 
 
-- Continue to encourage the government to make lasting, 
positive changes to their Electoral Code (POL/ECON, EXEC) 
 
-- Monitor and sharply denounce egregious attempts by the 
GOB to rig the elections (such as by arbitrarily 
eliminating candidates during the registration process, or 
by preventing the opposition candidates from holding 
rallies).  Try to increase contacts with GOB officials that 
may be able to influence positively the way elections are 
run.  Observe elections.  (POL/ECON, PAS, EXEC) 
 
-- Maintain international spotlight on Belarus' electoral 
process by holding DVCs with opposition leaders, GOB 
officials, Belarusian journalists, and Foreign Press Center 
in Washington. (PAS, POL/ECON, EXEC) 
 
-- Increase financial and technical support for democratic 
political process, including strengthening democratic 
political parties, voter education, exit polling, 
international/domestic observers (USAID, PAS) 
 
¶13.  (C) A United Stance on Belarus 
 
-- Take a leadership role in coordinating the activities of 
the EU embassies.  We will, among other things, hold 
monthly meetings with our EU colleagues at the 
ambassadorial and working levels to share information on 
assistance projects and present a united front to the 
Lukashenko regime.  (POL/ECON, USAID, EXEC) 
 
-- Encourage the OSCE mission in Minsk to take an active 
role in democracy promotion in the country.  (POL/ECON, 
EXEC) 
 
-- Encourage the Ukrainian embassy to work more closely 
with the EU and U.S. embassies on our democracy promotion 
efforts meeting more regularly with Ukrainian diplomats in 
one-on-one and group meetings. (POL/ECON, EXEC) 
 
-- Build stronger relations with Russian embassy in an 
effort to influence Russian perception of the political 
situation in Belarus.  (POL/ECON, EXEC) 
 
¶14.  (C) Spotlight on GOB Human Rights Record 
 
-- Monitor government actions against political party 
leaders, independent newspapers, independent trade unions, 
churches, and human rights groups.  (POL/ECON, EXEC) 
 
-- Attend the court trials of politically persecuted 
activists.  (POL/ECON, EXEC) 
 
-- Raise the cases of political prisoners in bilateral 
exchanges and embassy and department statements and in 
joint statements with the EU. (POL/ECON, EXEC) 
 
-- Continue to hold the government publicly accountable for 
repressing civil society and political parties; selectively 
impose travel restrictions on violators; publicize and 
commend positive steps by the government. (PAS, POL/ECON, 
EXEC) 
 
 
Major Needs from the Department 
------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The Embassy sent in a cable requesting EUR 
assistance in receiving funding for two new positions in 
the Public Affairs Section (ref B).  These two positions 
will help ensure that Post's public diplomacy initiatives 
and overall mission objects are realized in fiscal year 
2006 and into the future. 
 
MINSK 00001232  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Post encourages CODELs and ranking Administration 
officials traveling in the region to meet with Belarusian 
democrats and to highlight U.S. interest in credible 
electoral process.  Visitors to neighboring countries 
should raise Belarus with host official and speak out on 
abuses in Belarus.  In light of the existing selective 
engagement policy, we also encourage appropriate USG visits 
to Belarus to reinforce the democracy message in the 
country. 
 
¶17.  (C) Encourage Department press spokesman and 
principals to make statements shining light on Belarusian 
abuses and use every opportunity to raise Belarus and 
promote the democratization strategy in meetings with 
European and Russian officials. 
 
¶18.  (C) A fast, cheap, and effective approach to breaking 
the GOB monopoly on information in the next six months in 
the run up to the 2006 presidential would be to bolster 
support for traditional print media (including newspapers, 
flyers to be placed in mailboxes, internet sites, etc.). 
The new media fund ($250,000 annually) for independent 
newspapers is a step in the right direction, but more 
resources should be devoted to the print media project. 
Efforts to develop radio and television broadcasts into 
Belarus are important elements of the strategy to provide 
Belarusian society with independent information and need to 
be started ASAP.  However, such efforts may take time and 
considerable resources and refinements before they can 
affect much of the Belarusian population. 
 
 
Major Impediments 
----------------- 
 
¶19.  (C) The Belarusian Government.  Clearly, the 
Belarusian government serves as the biggest obstacle to 
implementing our democracy strategy.  Although the regime 
would like a better relationship with the West, it remains 
fundamentally at odds with the universal values of 
democracy and respect for human rights. Thus, our policy of 
engagement is likely to be met with skepticism and, worse, 
open hostility.  Post efforts to pressure or "shame" the 
regime into taking the right course of action could 
adversely affect our ability to connect with society. 
 
¶20.  (C) Critical Counter-Intelligence Environment.  Due to 
the tense relationship between the USG and GOB, the 
Belarusian regime goes to great length to keep track of our 
activities, including tapping Embassy and home phone lines 
and surveilling our movements in the country. 
Occasionally, the regime has resorted to blatant forms of 
interference, such as marked police following Emboffs on 
trips to the countryside, interrupting meetings with local 
civil society leaders, and filming and broadcasting Emboffs 
leaving meetings with civil society groups. 
 
 
Key Areas of Democracy Promotion Supported by GOB 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶21.  (C) Post can safely assert that the government has 
done nothing to promote democracy in recent years.  The GOB 
has only moved backwards on its bilateral and international 
democracy and human rights commitments.  The government has 
yet to eliminate completely the opposition, but Post 
believes this approach allows the GOB to argue it is a 
member of the community of democracies. 
 
 
Consequences of Pursuing Reform Agenda In Belarus 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶22.  (C) Post's six month and longer term strategy for 
building democracy in Belarus is focused on a concerted 
effort to expose the hearts and minds of Belarusians to 
democratic values and supporting embattled civil society, 
the democratic opposition, independent media and the 
democratic process during the elections while shining a 
constant light on regime abuses. Post will work to build a 
strong alliance with EU partners and neighbors to make 
democracy building strategy in Belarus a truly joint trans- 
Atlantic effort. Increased U.S. and international pressure, 
 
MINSK 00001232  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
criticism of the regime and our constant activism among the 
population and support for the opposition may result in a 
regime crackdown on Embassy activities, contacts and staff. 
But no active democracy program is without risk in a 
dictatorship.  Time and history is ultimately on the side 
of democratic change.  Active engagement and reaching out 
to Belarusian society will build long-term domestic support 
for democratic change while focusing attention on the 
upcoming elections may induce democratic progress in the 
short-term. 
 
KROL