This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 004400 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC, INR/EC, DS/ITA 
LONDON FOR TSOU 
ENERGY FOR MWILLIAMSON, JGELSTHORPE, AWOMACK 
NSC FOR CHASE HUTTO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2015 
TAGS: EPET ETRD EWWT KHLS PTER ASEC KU OIL SECTOR
SUBJECT: KUWAIT: VULNERABILITY OF KEY FOREIGN OIL SUPPLIERS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 182688 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Matthew Tueller for reason 1.4 ( 
b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary and Comment:  The flow of oil from Kuwait 
remains vulnerable to disruption by terrorist attack, 
accident or natural disaster, with the off-shore loading 
platforms and facilities being the most vulnerable.  The 
onshore Mina Al-Ahmadi facilities are considered a restricted 
zone and are somewhat protected, while the offshore loading 
platform and piers remain highly vulnerable, despite the 
existence of an offshore "no-entry" zone.  A Single Buoy 
Mooring (SBM), located about three miles offshore from Mina 
Al-Ahmadi, is in a restricted area but is vulnerable to an 
attack by small boats. 
 
¶2.  (S) The GOK coordinates protection of its oil 
infrastructure through a Vital Installations Security Group, 
headed by the Director General of Kuwait State Security and 
comprised of representatives from various GOK ministries and 
the oil sector.  A disruption to Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery 
would stop approximately 440,000 bpd of crude from being 
refined each day.  An attack on the export facilities at Mina 
Al-Ahmadi would take approximately 2 million bpd of crude and 
refined product off the world market.  Other vulnerable 
facilities include the other two refineries, the pipelines 
connecting the oilfields to the refineries and export 
terminals, the gathering centers, the tank storage farms, the 
petrochemicals plants and desalination plants. 
 
¶3.  (C) Comment:  The proximity of oil infrastructure 
facilities to U.S. military facilities in Kuwait should 
remain an issue of concern and calls for increased vigilance 
over security plans by the GOK for its oil infrastructure.  A 
number of accidents over the past few years have demonstrated 
that neglect is perhaps a bigger danger than attack, but the 
real possibility of an attack on Kuwait's oil facilities 
remains.  It is clear that the GOK has incident plans and has 
done vulnerability assessments, but the real questions are 
how often these plans are tested, how prepared the GOK would 
be for a real incident, and how seriously it takes the 
recommendations of any assessment.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
Vulnerability Assessments: An Inside View 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Econ Officer met October 11 with Kuwait National 
Petroleum Company (KNPC) Manager for Safety, Health and 
Environment Mohammed Al-Ramadhan and KNPC Coordinator for 
Safety at the Mina Al-Ahmadi Refinery AbdulHameed Al-Awadi. 
They explained that the GOK conducts vulnerability 
assessments on a regular basis, and that these assessments 
include the Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery and export facilities. 
The assessments have been undertaken internally by KNPC, by 
the parent Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), and by outside 
consultants, including Global Village Strategies 
(http://www.gv-s.com) and AustroConsult 
(http://www.austroconsult.at).  The challenge for Kuwait 
seems to remain in actually implementing any recommendations 
that follow such assessments. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Although the assessments are not publicly available, 
the two KNPC employees did share the fact that all 
vulnerability assessments performed thus far agree that the 
point most vulnerable to attack is from the sea.  The piers, 
the refineries and the offshore loading platforms are all 
highly vulnerable to an attack by small boat.  This 
assessment tracks with what we have consistently heard from 
other sources. 
 
¶6.  (S) In July 2005, RSO was provided with a verbal briefing 
from a contact at the British Embassy.  The contact passed an 
assessment performed by a British security firm that had 
conducted a security survey for the Kuwait Oil Company in 
June 2005.  The security company found that much of the KOC 
infrastructure - including the fields, pipelines and 
buildings - was either badly protected or not protected at 
all.  The report assessed that Kuwait's oil infrastructure 
was extremely vulnerable to terrorist attack.  The specific 
physical security problems cited in the report included: 
 
-- Security Fences: varied greatly in quality and standard of 
maintenance. 
-- Buildings: Security of doors and windows is poor, enabling 
easy penetration. 
-- Access Control:  Current access control systems are widely 
circumvented or abused. 
-- Intruder Detection: Lack of effective intruder detection 
systems. 
-- ID Cards: Current ID cards have no expiration date, 
allowing former employees access to KOC premises. 
-- CCTV: Very few CCTV systems, many of those in place did 
not work due to lack of maintenance. 
-- Guards: Only 14 of the 373 sites in a database of KOC 
sites had full-time guards. 
-- Pipelines:  Much of the pipeline is totally unprotected. 
The North-South pipeline, for example, which carries 800,000 
bpd, and the Western pipeline, which carries potentially 
lethal levels of hydrogen sulfide, are both unprotected. 
 
¶7.  (S) The security firm report noted that there would be no 
effective changes in the security posture of KOC until there 
was effective apportionment of responsibility between the 
Ministry of Energy, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), 
and KOC.  The report assessed KOC overall security to be 
"extremely weak," and indicated that an attack could easily 
be mounted, with little organization or training, against the 
pipelines.  It continued that a more organized and determined 
group might prefer to attack the Single Buoy Mooring (SBM), 
destroying or damaging not only the tankers and buoy, but 
also the under-sea pipeline. 
 
Preventive Actions Taken: Committees, CCTV Upgrades, No-Entry 
Zones 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8.  (S)  Preventive actions include the formation of a number 
of committees, upgrading of physical security procedures and 
equipment, establishment of a no-entry offshore zone, and the 
formation of a new security services company under the KPC 
umbrella.  Most preventive actions appear to be in response 
to risk assessments that have been conducted, while some 
actions appear to be responding to attacks on oil company 
facilities in Saudi Arabia, threats from Iraq, and other 
external factors.  "The budget is there," one KNPC contact 
told us, but it is our opinion that Kuwait needs to find the 
will to implement the necessary changes and may not fully do 
so until after an attack or accident. 
 
¶9.  (S) The GOK has established a Vital Installations 
Security Group (VISG), which is ultimately responsible for 
protection of all vital oil industry facilities.  The Group 
is headed by Kuwait State Security Director General Othbi 
Fahd Al-Ahmad Al-Fahd Al-Sabah, brother of the Minister of 
Energy.  The VISG is part of an inter-ministerial committee 
which reports to the Council of Ministers on protection of 
the oil infrastructure.  According to Al-Ramadhan of KNPC, 
the VISG patrols some of the oil facilities.  Within KPC, he 
explained, each subsidiary is responsible for its own 
security, meaning that KOC is responsible for the upstream 
security, while KNPC is responsible for the downstream, and 
the other subsidiaries are responsible for the security in 
the areas under their purview.  Al-Ramadhan explained that 
there is an office at the parent KPC organization that tries 
to coordinate security among all the oil companies, and that 
the security officers at each company get together for 
monthly meetings.  A new security services subsidiary company 
of KPC would be formed before the end of the year, he added, 
and this company would take over all security functions of 
the entire GOK-owned oil sector. 
 
¶10.  (S) Al-Awadi and Al-Ramadhan of KNPC said that a number 
of recommendations from the AustroConsult security audit were 
being carried out now, with a number of ongoing projects. 
CCTVs are being installed around all the refineries, they 
explained, with over 250 new cameras to be installed and 
monitored from a central control room.  New road barriers and 
entrance barriers would be installed at critical entrances. 
The Ministry of Interior currently conducts background checks 
on new employees, but the two KNPC officers implied that 
these background checks were only done on foreigners "with 
Arab names."  One of the security consultants, Global Village 
Strategies, was being given a new contract to provide 
additional security training for KNPC personnel. 
 
¶11.  (S) According to Al-Ramadhan (and other sources), a 
no-entry zone has been established in the port and offshore 
area, including the north and south piers, the "Sea Island", 
and the Single Buoy Mooring.  Al-Awadi showed Econ Officer a 
map of this zone, with clear path outside the zone for 
fishing and commercial vessels that need to reach the nearby 
ports.  They explained that the Kuwait Coast Guard currently 
patrols this zone and makes arrests when people violate the 
no-entry order.  The Coast Guard currently uses boat-based 
radar, but radar will now be installed on a number of buoys 
in the no-entry zone in order to automatically detect 
intrusions.  The KNPC officials said that fishermen and 
recreational boaters were aware of the no-entry zone and, for 
the most part, steered clear.  They added that a new patrol 
team equipped with Zodiac boats is being set up in the nearby 
Mina Al-Abdullah area and that these boats would patrol the 
entire no-entry zone. 
 
Impact of a Disruption at Mina Al-Ahmadi 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The Mina Al-Ahmadi facilities include a refinery, 
the north and south loading piers, the Sea Island loading 
platform, the Single Buoy Mooring (SBM), pipelines, storage 
facilities, and office buildings.  Mina Al-Ahmadi is located 
about 45 km south of Kuwait City.  The refinery contains 
three crude oil distillation units with a total capacity of 
442,000 bpd.  It also contains a number of other units of 
smaller capacity for other uses, including benzene treatment, 
sulfur elimination, vacuum distillation, hydrogen cracking, 
coefficient cracking, Eocene crude distillation, asphalt 
production, and removal of acidic gasses.  The refinery was 
originally built in 1949 and was upgraded in the 1980's.  Any 
attack or accident at Mina Al-Ahmadi would stop about 430,000 
bpd of crude being refined each day, the actual average daily 
amount passing through the refinery over the past two years. 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The bigger impact would be a disruption in the 
export capabilities of Kuwait through the facilities at Mina 
Al-Ahmadi.  Given the agreement that Kuwait is most 
vulnerable to an attack from the sea, this is a serious 
concern.  The south pier at Mina Al-Ahmadi has eight berths 
varying in depth from 12 to 15 meters, and the north pier has 
four berths with a depth of 18 meters.  The Sea Island is a 
loading platform with six docking platforms with a 30 meter 
depth, and the SBM is connected by undersea pipeline to the 
Sea Island.  Industry contacts and other sources estimate 
that with these facilities, Kuwait can export almost 2 
million bpd.  Al-Ramadhan and Al-Awadi of KNPC assured Econ 
Officer that Kuwait could find other means of export if these 
facilities were damaged, including the use of tanker trucks. 
(Comment: We remain skeptical.) 
 
¶14.  (SBU) A network of pipelines transfers crude oil to the 
storage centers in Ahmadi and these pipelines are, for the 
most part, unprotected.  From the southern reservoir farm in 
Ahmadi, crude is supplied to the Ahmadi Refinery via 24 inch 
pipeline.  The refinery has 3 reservoirs for temporary crude 
storage with a capacity of 600,000 barrels, and export 
reservoirs with a capacity of 6 million barrels. 
 
Other Vulnerable Facilities 
--------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Besides the refinery at Mina Al-Ahmadi, there are 
two other existing refineries in Kuwait - Mina Abdullah and 
Shuaiba Refinery.  We doubt that either of these facilities 
has any additional protection beyond what is available at 
Mina A-Ahmadi.  The pipelines running throughout the country 
remain highly vulnerable to attack, as do the gathering 
centers and other facilities.  The tank farms and other 
storage facilities are also vulnerable.  Within Kuwait's 
growing petrochemical industry, the EQUATE petrochemical 
plant and associated facilities will be a point of concern, 
as will be two new petrochemical plants scheduled to come 
online by 2008. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Recent incidents on Kuwait's northern border with 
Iraq highlight the need for Kuwait to improve its security 
for the northern oilfields and its cooperation with Iraq 
security forces in securing the border.  The desalination 
plants, while not directly part of the oil industry, could be 
easily affected by any offshore oilspill and could seriously 
impact Kuwait's supply of fresh water.  Additionally, there 
is little protection to KPC and subsidiary company buildings 
throughout the country, and it is quite easy to walk into 
some of them without being stopped.  We have seen some 
improvement in this area over the past year, but more needs 
to be done. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Finally, the facilities in the divided zone 
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Mina Saud facilities, 
remain vulnerable to potential attacks, especially from the 
sea.  These facilities include the Wafra, South Fuwaris, 
South Umm Gudair and Humma oilfields, the pipelines 
connecting these fields to the gathering center, 50 km of 
pipeline connecting Wafra to Mina Saud, ten storage tanks, 
and the undersea pipeline and offshore loading platform.  The 
divided zone oil facilities are run by a joint operation 
between the Kuwait Gulf Oil Company and Saudi Arabian Texaco 
Inc. (SAT), a division of Chevron which operates the Saudi 
portion of the joint operation on behalf of the KSA.  We have 
spoken numerous times with SAT officials about the security 
of their facilities, including the residential compound 
housing about 40 American families.  SAT utilizes radar to 
detect any vessels on the water in the area.  /SAT has a good 
internal security program, but is trying to get the GOK to do 
more to secure the area outside of the SAT compound.  Thus 
far, however, they have been largely unsucessful.  The RSO 
met with several officials at SAT and Chevron, discussing 
these vulnerabilities at length.  Resource shortfalls and 
lack of committment to mitigate these risks plagues efforts 
to address these concerns. 
 
View from the IOCs 
------------------ 
 
¶18.  (C) Econ Officer has spoken with numerous Kuwait-based 
executives of international oil companies (IOCs) concerning 
Kuwait's preparedness for any natural disaster or attack 
involving its oil infrastructure.  None of the executives 
found Kuwait's preparation for any such event particularly 
impressive, and most said that Kuwait would quickly turn to 
the IOCs for help in the aftermath of any incident.  One 
contact declared that he and his company would definitely not 
rely on any plans developed by the GOK or KPC for the safety 
of himself and his colleagues, and that he had an alternative 
plan ready.  He also said that, when IOCs are asked for 
recommendations on safety and security procedures and provide 
such advice, no feedback or follow-up questions come from the 
Kuwaitis.  Other IOC executives have told us that some people 
within the GOK operate under the assumption that the U.S. 
Navy is protecting Kuwait's offshore oil facilities 
 
Kuwait Oilfield Maps 
-------------------- 
 
¶19.  (U) Numerous oilfield maps of Kuwait are available on 
Embassy Kuwait's SIPRNet site: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/).  Please visit our 
site and in the "Picture Galleries" box on the left side of 
the page, scroll down in the box and click on "Oilfield Maps". 
 
********************************************* 
Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website 
********************************************* 
LEBARON