This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001662 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV KPKO CG UG
SUBJECT: LRA UPDATE: OVER 300 FARDC IN ABA BUT NO MISSION 
BEFORE WEEKEND 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1584 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
¶1. (C)  As a result of MONUC's efforts in transporting FARDC 
troops from Aru to Aba, there are now about 350 FARDC troops 
in Aba.  About 300 are in Aru, awaiting transfer via 
helicopter (25 troops per load) to Aba.  FARDC likely will 
have to ask MONUC for transport assistance for another 500 
troops from Kisangani to Aru, in the wake of the October 3 
crash in Aru of the FARDC Antonov aircraft which had been 
ferrying FARDC troops from various sites in the DRC to 
Kisangani and Aru.  Both pilots were killed in the crash and 
about a dozen soldiers injured, according to Congolese Air 
Force General John Numbi. 
 
¶2. (C)  Presidential National Security Advisor Samba Kaputo 
told PolCouns October 3 that, if all goes well (i.e., the 
weather holds up, the MONUC helicopters don't break down, 
etc), the FARDC could have what he called a "critical mass" 
of about 800 troops in the Aba area by Friday evening or 
Saturday morning, which could enable the Congolese to begin a 
military operation against the LRA.  Kaputo reiterated 
concerns shared by all, that the LRA will begin slipping away 
from the Aba area as it becomes clear that FARDC is massing 
troops (and there is no way to hide the arrival and departure 
of the MONUC helicopters).  He insisted, however, that even 
if the LRA do get into Garumba Park the Angolan-trained 
Congolese commandos are capable not only of tracking the LRA 
but can operate effectively against them even in that 
terrain.  Kaputo confirmed that Sixth Regional Military 
Commander General Padiri is in overall operational control of 
the planned mission, and said that Padiri is coordinating 
closely with both the Ugandan elements on the Sudanese side 
of the border and with MONUC. 
 
¶3. (C) PolCouns spoke October 4 with Padiri, who said that he 
is maintaining sporadic contact with Tabu, Otti and Kony in 
an effort to try to keep the LRA from leaving the Aba area. 
Likewise, he said, the supply trucks arriving in Aba are 
sharing rations with the LRA, again to try to encourage them 
to remain in place, but also to try to discourage any 
predation against Aba itself.  The military vision, he said, 
is for the FARDC to push the LRA to the Sudanese border where 
the combined SPLA and UPDF forces will capture/disarm or kill 
them.  MONUC will provide air cover for the mission with 
attack helicopters. (PolCouns confirmed this in a subsequent 
conversation with MONUC.) 
 
¶4. (C)  The degree of coordination reportedly taking place is 
encouraging. We caution, however, that, particularly in the 
rough terrain in which the forces will be operating, there 
are many variables which could keep even the best planned 
mission executed by well-trained and armed troops (which is 
not the FARDC) from being fully successful.  Nonetheless, it 
is clear that the DRC is responding to this incursion, and 
political elements in Kinshasa are following developments 
closely. 
MEECE