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Viewing cable 05KINSHASA1641, LRA UPDATE: FARDC DEPLOYMENTS, CONTACTS WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05KINSHASA1641 2005-10-03 10:41 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kinshasa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001641 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV KPKO UG CG
SUBJECT: LRA UPDATE: FARDC DEPLOYMENTS, CONTACTS WITH 
KAMPALA, PRETORIA, AND THE EU 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 1626 
 
     B. KAMPALA 2118 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Deployments 
----------- 
 
1. (C) MONUC Divisional Commander Gen Cammaert confirmed 
October 1 separately to the Ambassador and PolCouns that 
MONUC was initiating during the weekend the transport of 
FARDC troops already in Aru (Ituri District, Orientale 
Province) to Aba (Haut-Uele District, Orientale Province) to 
deal with the LRA troops in the area.  These troops will join 
others already arrived from the Ninth Military District sent 
by General Padiri.  Other troops are en route from various 
points, all apparently to be routed via Aru.  Cammaert told 
the Ambassador the deployment plan is to ferry the troops 
over the roughly 130 km. distance from Aru to Aba by 
helicopter.  Trucks will attempt to deliver heavier support 
supplies over the "track" that remains of the road to Aba. 
Cammaert estimated road transport time at about 9 - 10 hours, 
barring breakdowns or vehicles mired in the mud. 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador asked about supply needs for the 
deployed FARDC troops.  Cammaert confirmed this is a serious 
problem, especially food rations.  He indicated that he had 
given orders for MONUC forces to push as far as possible 
within their authority to ensure adequate food rations to the 
deployed FARDC forces.  (Comment: Cammaert strongly implied 
that in fact MONUC would go beyond that point. Cammaert 
pointed out that the troops have to eat and no effective 
operations can be expected from starving soldiers.  End 
comment.) 
 
Contacts 
----------- 
 
3. (C) Presidency Ambassador-at-Large Antoine Ghonda told the 
Ambassador Monday morning, October 3, that GDRC 
representatives Presidential Private Secretary Kikaya and 
Ambassador-at-Large Katumba were just in Pretoria to talk 
with President Mbeki about the situation in northeastern DRC. 
 According to Ghonda, Mbeki indicated that he would get in 
contact with Uganda President Museveni to urge, among other 
points, that the Tripartite mechanism be used as the primary 
vehicle for consultation and coordination regarding the LRA 
problem, as well as in regard to ADF elements and Ituri 
warlord militias, all on the bilateral Uganda/DRC agenda 
regarding northeastern DRC.  That is the reason for existence 
of the Tripartite process.  Kikaya and Katumba will go soon 
on to Addis Ababa for consultations with the African Union. 
 
4. (C) Ghonda reported that a number of people in the GDRC 
believe that Museveni is attempting to manipulate the 
situation with the LRA to deflect attention from Uganda's 
continuing active support of warlord militias in Ituri 
District.  In its most extreme version, this thesis holds 
that Museveni recognizes that the LRA troops in Aba represent 
little threat to Uganda.  The Ambassador countered that the 
thesis appears misplaced.  While Museveni certainly seeks to 
advance his own interests, he and the Kampala government 
generally have ample reason to consider the LRA a threat. 
While the LRA combatants in Aba are not/not on the Uganda 
border (note: Haut-Uele District borders Sudan, not Uganda. 
end note), the Uganda government has been pursuing a long and 
sustained campaign against the LRA who bear the 
responsibility for a great many civilian killings and 
suffering. 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador encouraged Ghonda to explore direct 
bilateral contacts from Kinshasa with Kampala as well.  In 
particular, it would be useful to have operational 
coordination between FARDC operational commanders and Ugandan 
commanders in charge of troops reportedly currently deployed 
across the border in Sudan.  Ghonda took the suggestion on 
board.  (Comment: Ref B noted that Kabila and Museveni spoke 
on Thursday, September 29, although Ghonda made no reference 
to the conversation.  Cammaert told the Ambassador he had a 
report that General Padiri was holding a meeting with UPDF 
officers also during the weekend, but had no further 
information as to what may have been discussed, if in fact 
the meeting took place.  End comment.) 
 
6. (C) Comment: All GDRC contacts of the Embassy confirm that 
the Congolese leadership would like nothing more than to be 
rid of the LRA.  The Congolese have deep suspicions regarding 
Museveni, based on the ongoing activities of the Ituri 
militias as well as Uganda's past involvement in northeastern 
DRC which produced widespread death and destruction.  For the 
same reason, they are desperately anxious to avoid any excuse 
for a reentry of UPDF troops into Congolese territory.  The 
building troop presence around Aba represents the opportunity 
for meaningful action, but undoubtedly as the number of FARDC 
troops increase, the de facto demands for MONUC support, 
including food, will multiply.  End comment. 
MEECE