This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINGSTON 002346 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR G, DRL, S/P, WHA/CAR AND WHA/PPC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/15 
TAGS: KDEM PHUM PREL JM
SUBJECT: JAMAICA - DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR WHA 
FOCUS COUNTRIES 
 
REF: A. STATE 169581 
     ¶B. STATE 187264 
     ¶C. STATE 156961 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas C. Tighe.  Reasons 1.4(b) and ( 
d). 
 
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Introduction 
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¶1. (C) P.J. Patterson, Prime Minister since 1992, has 
announced his intention to step down no later than March 
2006, and possibly as early as late 2005.  Four senior 
members of his ruling Peoples National Party (PNP) will 
contest an internal PNP election to succeed Patterson as 
party president and prime minister.  General elections must 
be held by October 2007, but under the Westminster system 
Patterson (or his successor) need not wait until then to call 
early elections.  On the other side of the political aisle, 
Leader of the Opposition Bruce Golding, who replaced former 
PM Edward Seaga at the helm of the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) 
only in May 2005 following Seaga's 30-year run as party 
leader, is attempting to position the JLP to win the next 
elections and form the national government for the first time 
since 1989. 
 
¶2. (C) Other important developments in the near term include 
the arrival at Post of our newly confirmed COM, Ambassador 
Brenda Johnson, in November, and the February 2006 scheduled 
transition from the IGOH to a new Haitian government.  A 
successful democratic transfer of power in Haiti will remove 
an issue that became a major bilateral irritant due to the 
Patterson government's suspicion of USG complicity in 
Aristide's departure from Haiti in February 2004. 
 
¶3. (C) Paragraphs 4 through 12 contain Post's responses to 
the questions set forth Ref raised Ref A. 
 
Key areas of democratic deficit and the 3-5 most important 
desired outcomes over next 6-8 months: 
 
¶4. (C) Though justly proud of its unbroken run of legitimate, 
democratic transfers of power since independence in 1962, 
Jamaica today faces serious problems that do not (yet) 
necessarily constitute a democratic deficit, but could lead 
to one.  Rampant corruption - from barely concealed 
interaction between PNP and JLP politicians at all levels 
with "businessmen", "community leaders" or "political allies" 
known or suspected to be involved in narcotics trafficking or 
other criminal activities, to the involvement in or 
toleration of illicit behavior by members of the Jamaica 
Constabulary Force - sustains a widespread perception among 
the electorate that both parties are bereft of real ideas and 
unable to take meaningful steps to address corruption. 
Violent crime is a major problem, and Jamaica currently 
boasts one of the top three per-capita murder rates in the 
world.  Public concern about violent crime, coupled with a 
widespread perception that the JCF and GOJ are unable to 
contain it, opens a "credibility gap" between government and 
governed.  Meanwhile, economic stagnation, rising oil prices, 
a decline in the agricultural sector due to the end of 
long-standing European sugar quotas, high levels of debt, and 
high unemployment/underemployment rate.  A sustained decline 
in Jamaica's all-important tourism sector due to a U.S. 
economic downturn could further exacerbate the situation. 
 
Six-month diplomatic and programmatic strategy: 
 
¶5. (C) Anticipating a change in the governing party's 
political leadership in early-to-mid 2006, as well as a 
simultaneous increase in political posturing in the run-up to 
the national elections due by late 2007, Post recommends: 
 
- more visible USG efforts to reinforce/support appropriate 
GOJ crime-fighting initiatives, with an emphasis on crime 
that directly or indirectly impacts U.S. society or 
interests, such as narcotics trafficking (with its attendant 
violence) and official corruption; 
 
- increasing our efforts to ostracize those engaged in 
official corruption by using INA 212(f) and other appropriate 
consular tools to cancel non-immigrant visas of corrupt 
police, businesspersons, and politicians.  The ability to 
travel to the U.S. for familial-, educational-, recreational- 
and other reasons is extremely important and/or desirable to 
most Jamaicans, making the potential loss of this privilege a 
source of considerable leverage. 
 
- coupling anti-crime initiatives with advocacy for 
legislation allowing for asset forfeiture, plea bargaining, 
etc.; 
 
- exploring ways of filling the Jamaica Defense Force's (JDF) 
officer training void (precipitated by recently announced, 
heavy UK and Canadian reductions in long-standing programs 
for initial officer training and aviation training of JDF 
personnel) to ensure that Venezuela, Cuba, or China do not 
exploit the situation; and 
- exploring ways to strengthen the judicial system with 
technological assistance, basic equipment (such as court 
stenography machines); training in the proper disposition of 
cases; vetting of personnel in sensitive positions, etc. 
 
¶6. (C) Because PM Patterson has for so long failed to act 
decisively against corrupt subordinates or associates, his 
periodic public utterances on the issue are often dismissed 
as lip service, and temporary public outrage at each new 
scandal is quickly replaced by resigned acceptance of the 
reality and inevitability of corruption.  In the sunset of 
his political life, mindful of his legacy and with no more 
elections to contest personally, Patterson could perhaps 
afford to act decisively against corruption now in a way he 
has never done; however, with what is projected to be a close 
general election looming on the horizon, he is unlikely to 
take meaningful steps out of concern that a truly impartial 
stance against corruption could complicate his party's 
chances of winning yet again.  JCF/JDF successes against 
violent, often politically connected criminal gangs in the 
coming months, followed by swift prosecution of suspects 
would increase public confidence in the justice system, the 
JCF, and the GOJ.  The end of the hurricane season should 
allow the GOJ to focus on addressing economic problems 
without worrying about every tropical storm reported over the 
horizon. 
 
Major needs from the Department or other parts of the USG, 
including resources, high-level visits, public 
diplomacy-related efforts, that would support accomplishing 
these objectives 
 
¶7. (C) Developments in more troubled neighboring countries 
rightly absorbing greater attention by senior Department and 
Washington officials, but USG actions and opinions carry 
great weight with the GOJ and the Jamaican public, even when 
they disagree with us.  Properly conceived and executed, more 
frequent public engagement on Jamaican issues (such as those 
described in Sections A and B, above) by senior USG officials 
would go a long way here, as was demonstrated in the 
trafficking in persons (TIP) arena.  Washington- and 
Embassy-based discussion of TIP initially met with 
considerable resistance from the GOJ, which did not 
understand the problem, and which initially viewed our 
efforts as unfounded and unjustly punitive.  By repeatedly 
engaging with officials, private sector contacts, and 
particularly the public diplomacy engagement via radio and 
television, however, G/TIP and Embassy efforts eventually 
resulted in a reluctant acknowledgment of the problem, public 
awareness of it, and a promising GOJ campaign to address TIP. 
 
 
Major impediments, including resource, political, or 
structural, to accomplishing these outcomes: 
 
¶8. (C) Apart from the Department's anticipated FY 2006 
resource constraints, possible and probable impediments are 
discussed in Paragraphs 9, 10, 12 and 13. 
 
Other countries, organizations or groups with significant 
influence on GOJ: 
 
¶9. (C) As a founding member of Caricom, the GOJ often looks 
first to fellow anglophone CARICOM states for political and 
moral support, particularly in coordinating its positions in 
a UN or OAS context.  Despite Caricom's notable lack of 
political agility - witness its months-long dithering on 
Haiti during the crisis surrounding Aristide's 2004 departure 
- due in large measure to the consensus principle on which it 
operates, the dream of ever increasing Caribbean integration 
is a strong one in Jamaica, and any conceivable future GOJ 
would be likely to continue at least to pay lip service to 
this ideal. 
 
¶10. (C) An able politician who came of age politically during 
mentor Prime Minister Michael Manley's economically 
disastrous 1970's experiment with "democratic socialism" 
(both the JLP and PNP grew out of the country's labor 
movement, but only PNP members still address each other as 
"Comrade"), Patterson's thinking has evolved considerably, 
and he well understands globalization, market forces, and the 
importance of the U.S. (as a major consumer of Jamaican 
goods, and as a source of tourists, foreign investment, and 
remittances) to Jamaica's economy, while maintaining a 
profound ambivalence about, even a mistrust of, the USG.  A 
staunch believer in multilateralism as the surest way for 
smaller states to ensure their voices (and votes) are heard 
by wealthier countries, Patterson in particular has sought to 
work with the G-77 countries (which Jamaica currently chairs) 
to enhance the UN's role and authority, and to make the UN 
more responsive to the types of "development" issues 
important to Jamaica.  Given the small size and relative 
paucity of energy resources in many CARICOM states (Trinidad 
being a notable exception), Patterson was the first CARICOM 
head of government to conclude a "PetroCaribe" petroleum 
agreement with Venezuela.  Mindful of USG concerns about GOV 
motives without ever specifically acknowledging them, 
however, Patterson publicly emphasized that there were "no 
strings attached" to his oil accord with Hugo Chavez. 
 
Key areas of democracy promotion supported by GOJ: 
 
¶11. (SBU) Despite serious disagreement with the USG over 
Haiti, the GOJ supports the planned elections in Haiti.  As a 
member of Caricom, the GOJ is attentive to and supportive of 
the protection of democracy in member states, but, outside of 
Caricom and UN fora, is often reluctant to speak strongly on 
such issues. 
 
Evaluate consequences of pursuing proactive reform agenda: 
 
¶12. (C) Some senior GOJ officials resent what they perceive 
as general USG neglect of the bilateral relationship 
interspersed with crisis-generated periods of engagement. 
For example, during his valedictory speech to PNP loyalists 
at the annual party conference in September 2005, on the eve 
of his departure for New York to attend UNGA, Patterson 
alluded derisively to telephone calls he received from 
numerous, unnamed world leaders (one of whom was the 
Secretary) to discuss the hectic final negotiations of UN 
 
SIPDIS 
reform issues.  Patterson and other senior GOJ officials have 
told us publicly and privately that they would welcome 
increased USG engagement - particularly within a CARICOM 
context. 
 
13 (C) At the same time, however, Patterson and some within 
his party might be inclined to suspect or resent a 
high-profile, USG-backed "reform agenda" given that the PNP 
has been in government since 1989, and in a position to have 
done more about Jamaican problems.  With elections looming, 
the JLP could be expected to attempt to exploit any 
indication that the USG viewed the PNP government with 
disfavor, particularly on corruption or competency grounds. 
Further complicating matters are troubling indications of 
serious corruption issues involving some prominent JLP 
figures, and their concern over the potential ramifications 
of increased USG attention to such matters is something of a 
wild card.  A "marriage of convenience" with similarly 
concerned PNP counterparts to oppose our efforts could not 
ruled out.  In any event, greater USG engagement in opposing 
corruption and strengthening the judiciary would have to be 
carefully crafted to avoid the perception that it was 
intended to influence the electoral outcome or otherwise 
violate Jamaican sovereignty. 
TIGHE