This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002645 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM ETRD EINV ECON VM CM APEC WTO RELFREE HUMANR
SUBJECT: AMB/VFM BANG: CAMBODIA, CPC, CHINH, TRUONG, SHIP 
VISITS, APEC, WTO ACCESSION 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an October 7 meeting with Vice Foreign 
Minister Le Van Bang, the Ambassador raised the following 
subjects: 1) Sam Rainsy's return to Cambodia; 2) Hoang Minh 
Chinh's activities in the U.S.; 3) timing of the Country of 
Particular Concern (CPC) designation and International 
Religious Freedom report rollout; 4) Pastor Truong's 
release; 5) the Proliferation Security Initiative; and 6) 
future USN ship visits.  The Ambassador also delivered two 
demarches reported septel.  For his part, VFM Bang raised 
GVN concerns about APEC and WTO accession. End Summary. 
 
Cambodia / Rainsy 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Noting that the United States shares Vietnam's 
desire for regional stability, the Ambassador observed that 
the possibility of Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy's 
return to Cambodia in the near future is a key component for 
the continued development and prosperity of Cambodia, and 
hence regional stability.  During Prime Minister Hun Sen's 
upcoming visit to Hanoi, the Ambassador suggested that the 
GVN encourage Hun Sen to facilitate Rainsy's return.  VFM 
Bang noted that Cambodia is now "almost an equal partner in 
Southeast Asia" and that it is consequently hard for the GVN 
to persuade them to do anything.  He added that the United 
States has a strong Ambassador in Cambodia, implying that 
this might be a more appropriate source of pressure on this 
issue.  The Ambassador replied that actually Vietnam "has a 
lot of strength" and that a "quiet word" from the GVN might 
be very effective. Bang remained non-committal, but 
concluded that Vietnam may have some influence and commented 
cryptically "we'll see if Mr. Rainsy supports Vietnam when 
he returns." 
 
¶3. Comment: Given Bang's hesitance, it is not likely that 
the Vietnamese will exert much pressure on Prime Minister 
Sen over Rainsy's return, however they may raise the issue. 
Post will seek a readout of these meetings from the MFA. End 
Comment. 
 
Hoang Minh Chinh 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Raising GVN concerns about Hoang Minh Chinh's 
political activities during his visit to the United States, 
the Ambassador reiterated that we take the GVN's comments 
seriously.  After noting that we respect Vietnam's 
sovereignty, the Ambassador expressed concern that some in 
the GVN may wish to prevent Chinh's return to Vietnam.  He 
suggested that forcing Chinh into exile would be counter- 
productive and would give ammunition to those protesting 
Vietnam's human rights record.  The Ambassador pointed out 
that Chinh is 87 years old and has limited impact as an 
activist.  Conversely, readmitting Chinh to the country 
would send a clear signal about the improvement of the human 
rights situation in Vietnam. 
 
¶5. (SBU) VFM Bang replied that the GVN cannot accept these 
arguments.  He noted that Chinh went to the United States 
for medical treatment, but he undertook political activities 
once there, actions that Bang claimed endanger state 
security.  Bang said that the GVN takes such matters very 
seriously and that this could be the last humanitarian visit 
allowed because of this experience, and quietly added that 
he was not saying that the GVN would prevent Chinh's return. 
The Ambassador said that he understood Vietnam's views, but 
preventing such trips would be counterproductive as freedom 
of travel is an important part of human rights.  Bang 
replied that the United States was at a different stage of 
development where that might be true, however in Vietnam 
security concerns are more important.  The Ambassador 
concluded discussion on this issue by noting that he did not 
know if Chinh intended to stay in the United States or 
attempt to return to Vietnam. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: This is a particularly sensitive issue for 
the Vietnamese and they are not happy that Chinh has been 
outspoken while visiting the United States.  However, they 
have generally kept their complaints at a lower level which 
may indicate that they intend to finesse the issue of his 
return.  End Comment. 
 
CPC Designation and Pastor Truong's Release 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Moving on to other human rights issues, the 
Ambassador informed the Vice Foreign Minister that CPC and 
IRF report rollout was delayed until October 17 at the 
earliest.  The Ambassador noted that he had had a good 
discussion with Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA) 
Director Thi about broadening our bilateral dialogue on 
religious freedom.  For his part, Thi had already sent 
people to the provinces to investigate alleged violations, 
which was a positive development.  The Ambassador further 
noted that the recent release of Pastor Truong from 
confinement in a mental hospital was also a welcome 
development, however, Troung had to sign a document 
acknowledging that he had a mental illness as a pre- 
condition of his release.  This made Truong vulnerable to 
future official action against him.  The Ambassador 
expressed the hope that Truong would be allowed to enjoy the 
same rights as other Vietnamese citizens.  Bang did not 
reply. 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Following up on past discussions concerning PSI, 
the Ambassador asked if there was any progress in GVN 
consultations on the issue, emphasizing that Vietnam would 
not be obligated to do anything by agreeing except to take a 
public, principled stand.  Bang replied that the GVN is 
still considering its position. 
 
Ship Visits 
----------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Turning to the issue of ship visits, the Ambassador 
noted that the last visit by a US Navy ship to a Vietnamese 
port was in May.  He reminded the Vice Foreign Minister that 
we had asked to schedule the next visit for the USS 
Blueridge for sometime in Mid-March, however the Ministry of 
National Defense said that this would be too close to the 
CPV Party Congress and that sometime mid-summer would be 
better.  To date, the schedule of the Party Congress had not 
been announced so it was hard to judge whether this visit 
would overlap.  Our goal was to make ship visits more 
routine and less high profile, the Ambassador emphasized. 
Bang said that he needed to research the issue further, as 
he did not know whether an earlier visit would be better. 
He added that he would prefer it to be earlier. 
 
 
APEC and WTO 
------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) VFM Bang turned to his desire to follow up on the 
visit of Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to Washington and to 
bring U.S.-Vietnamese relations to a higher level.  The GVN 
wants to work with the United States on next year's APEC 
meetings with the hope that Vietnam will be able to maintain 
or even increase the momentum of this year's APEC summit in 
Busan, Korea.  Bang also emphasized the need for both sides 
to prepare public opinion for the visit of President Bush 
during the 2006 summit.  In that connection, he raised his 
concerns about Vietnam's bid for WTO accession and the 
growing perception that the United States is "blocking" 
Vietnam's accession for political reasons. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Even without WTO membership, Vietnam's integration 
into the global economy continues; trade, investment and 
official development assistance are also increasing, Bang 
stressed.  However, WTO accession has important symbolic 
significance for Vietnam and following the Prime Minister's 
visit, the Vietnamese people expected WTO negotiations to be 
concluded rapidly.  The GVN wants to maintain momentum and 
is willing to send a delegation, headed by Trade Minister 
Truong Dinh Tuyen, to Washington to make a last ditch effort 
to conclude the bilateral negotiations this year.  Bang 
asserted, however, that if negotiations drag on, the failure 
to conclude a bilateral agreement on WTO accession will 
damage U.S.-Vietnamese relations and the reputations of 
those who have been working closely with the United States. 
He warned that in the run-up to next year's Tenth Party 
Congress, there will be significant jockeying for influence 
between conservative and moderate party members, and the 
failure to successfully conclude WTO negotiations will be 
used against the moderates. The CPC designation decision 
could also cause problems for those who want a deeper 
relationship with the United States, he added. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Ambassador agreed that if one looks only at 
WTO negotiations and CPC, one might think that relations 
between Vietnam and the United States were stagnating. 
However, if one looks at the broader picture, there is 
substantial progress in the bilateral relationship, as 
evidenced by strong cooperation on HIV/AIDS, Avian 
Influenza, ethnic minority issues, refugee resettlement and 
MIAs.  The United States is committed to working with 
Vietnam to make APEC 2006 a success.  As for WTO, we can 
conclude bilateral negotiations by the end of the year if 
both sides are flexible, the Ambassador stressed. More 
importantly, the reforms that Vietnam has undertaken as part 
of the WTO accession process are creating a favorable 
environment for business; finishing that work is vital 
whether or not Vietnam joins WTO.  The Ambassador emphasized 
that it is not a question of whether, but when Vietnam joins 
the WTO and predicted that if we can finish bilateral 
negotiations by the end of this year, then Vietnam could 
join by mid-2006.  The Ambassador also welcomed the idea of 
the Minister of Trade going to Washington at the appropriate 
time for further negotiations on WTO, but said the Minster's 
trip would only be useful if the necessary preparatory work 
has been done beforehand. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment:  While VFM Bang's suggestion that lack of 
WTO accession will be used against moderates at the upcoming 
Party Congress is something we have heard before, the fact 
that he raised it, along with the other political factors, 
indicates how much the Vietnamese still think WTO 
negotiations are truly a political issue.  In a year where 
bilateral trade reached record levels (more than 6.4 USD 
billion in 2004), his assertion that the bilateral 
relationship is "stagnating" misses how critical real trade 
concessions and a better investment climate are to Vietnam's 
future, as well as its relationships with other countries. 
 
MARINE