This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 002619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS BIC SORT
SUBJECT: BIC-IV:  (U) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE MOSCOW 
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION BRIEFINGS, OCTOBER 27, 2005 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 2618 (BIC-IV-02) 
 
     ¶B. STATE 196407 (BIC-IV-GUIDANCE) 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 12026 
     ¶D. STATE 92722 
     ¶E. GENEVA 1300 
 
Classified By:  DAS Karin L. Look, Acting U.S. Representative 
to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is BIC-IV-003. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  October 27, 2005 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:20 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The U.S. and Russian Delegations met the morning of 
October 27, 2005, to provide answers to questions that arose 
from briefings (REF A) delivered the previous day on the 
status of implementation of the Moscow Treaty (MT).  The 
Russian Delegation suggested that the Parties consider 
delivering plenary statements that would provide a common 
definition for strategic nuclear warheads (SNW). 
 
¶4.  (C) The U.S. Delegation reiterated the U.S. position that 
the MT permits each Party to count "strategic nuclear 
warheads" its own way, consistent with its operational 
practices.  The United States had developed its own 
definition that accounted for unique aspects of how U.S. 
forces were deployed and operated, and the United States 
would prefer that Russia use its own definition that 
reflected how its forces were deployed. 
 
¶5.  (C) The U.S. Delegation received clarifications on the 
Russian definition and how it had counted the MT SNW in the 
briefing provided at the previous meeting (REF A). 
 
¶6.  (C) The U.S. Delegation provided answers to the Russian 
questions that had been asked on October 26, 2005 (REF A). 
The U.S. also asked additional questions on the Russian 
briefing on its Strategic Nuclear Forces. 
 
----------------- 
RUSSIAN QUESTIONS 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Look opened the morning session, then gave the floor 
to the Russians in order to ask questions on the U.S. 
briefing delivered during the previous meeting. 
 
¶8.  (C) Fedorchenko, referring to Slide 2 of the briefing, 
asked what was meant by "Deactivating Trident I SLBMs?" 
Mullins responded that, during the preparation of the 
briefing, the United States was not sure when the final 
missile would be removed.  He added that the last Trident I 
SLBM had, in fact, been removed.  Artyukhin, also referring 
to Slide 2 of the briefing, asked what was meant by "Removing 
some warheads from operational status?"  Mullins responded 
that, to reach the 1700-2200 Moscow Treaty warhead limit, 
downloading of more Minuteman ICBMs, for example from three 
warheads to one warhead, and downloading other systems would 
possibly be necessary.  Artyukhin asked what was meant by 
"Downloading," to which Mullins replied that it was the 
removal of warheads from missiles.  Artyukhin queried whether 
the downloading procedure would be used on Trident II SLBMs, 
to which Mullins replied that it may be considered in the 
future, but no decision had been made. 
 
------------- 
HEAVY BOMBERS 
------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Fedorchenko, referring to the phrase "In context of 
this Treaty...." on Slide 6 of the briefing, asked whether 
the United States would have a combination of nuclear and 
conventional warheads on its missiles.  Look responded that 
the question was irrelevant to the MT and, therefore, not a 
question for the BIC.  Fedorchenko wanted to know why the 
word "or" instead of "and" was used when describing nuclear 
warheads located at bomber bases on heavy bombers or weapon 
storage areas. Look responded that the United States used the 
word "or" to mean that the warheads would be either in one 
place or another and the aggregate number of warheads would 
be those in both locations.  Kamenskiy, referring to the B-1 
bomber's conventional role on Slide 2, asked whether nuclear 
weapons would ever be stored at B-1 bases.  Look responded 
that the United States would study the question and respond 
later during this BIC Session. (Begin comment:  At an 
informal meeting on October 28, 2005, Mullins, accompanied by 
Smith, provided Fedorchenko and Kamenskiy the following 
answer: 
 
   - The B-1 has not had a nuclear role since 1995. 
 
   - The Weapon Storage Areas at the two B-1 bases were 
decertified for nuclear weapon storage in 1997. 
 
   - The requirement for the B-1s to be able to return to a 
nuclear capability was rescinded before 2002.  The Russians 
thanked the U.S. Delegation for its answer.  End comment.) 
 
¶10.  (C) Artyukhin queried whether the U.S. Navy portion of 
the aggregate number of warheads provided during the briefing 
was deployed only on 12 SSBNs.  Smith responded that yes they 
were. 
 
---------------- 
B-2 TRANSPARENCY 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Fedorchenko, again referring to Slide 2, wanted to 
know the maximum number of warheads that could be loaded on a 
B-2 bomber.  Look responded that this was not an MT question 
and that the Treaty was not about the number of warheads on a 
given system.  Ul'yanov countered that the question was 
related to the Treaty.  Look replied that speculating on the 
number of warheads was not the subject matter of the MT.  She 
said that the strength of the Treaty was that it considered 
actual warheads deployed, therefore the actual threat. 
Artyukhin commented that the question came from the U.S. 
briefing that there would be 21 B-2 bombers.  Look responded 
that the Slide he referred to described how many B-2 aircraft 
the United States plans to have in the strategic nuclear 
force structure in 2012.  Artyukhin said that the United 
States should provide transparency for strategic nuclear 
forces since Russia does not have information on U.S. plans 
for the B-2.  Look responded that the U.S. side noted 
Russia's concern on the B-2, but the transparency was that 
the United States provides information on force structure. 
 
------------------------------- 
CAN YOU BREAK THE NUMBERS DOWN? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Ul'yanov, referring to the difference between the 
aggregate warhead numbers provided earlier in the year and 
yesterday's number, wanted to know where the reductions came 
from.  Smith responded that the changes occurred in all three 
systems, SLBMs, ICBMs and in heavy bombers.  He highlighted 
that the majority of reductions occurred in SLBM systems. 
 
------------------------ 
WHY THE QUOTATION MARKS? 
------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (C) Kuehne responded to Russia's question posed during 
the previous meeting on why there were quotation marks around 
the word "nuclear" on Slide 6 of the briefing.  He said that 
the language came from two places:  the Letter of Submittal 
and the Article-by-Article analysis.  He said that, as Look 
had stated the day before, he believed the author's intent 
was to highlight that the Moscow Treaty referred to nuclear 
reentry vehicles which was different from START.  He noted 
that when the Moscow Treaty was presented in 2002, the U.S. 
Senate was familiar with START which captures all reentry 
vehicles on strategic systems, and the intent of the 
quotation marks was to alert the Senate to the difference 
under the Moscow Treaty. 
 
¶14.  (C) Look added that the United States would study the 
possibility of removing the quotation marks in future 
briefings. 
 
------------------------- 
ADDITIONAL U.S. QUESTIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Buttrick, referring to Slide 5 of the Russian 
briefing, asked whether Russia meant that new production 
SS-N-23 SLBMs would be loaded on Delta IV SSBNs or just 
modernized existing missiles. 
 
¶16.  (C) Fedorchenko responded that a recent NRRC 
notification had informed the United States of the beginning 
of SS-N-23 elimination at Krasnoyarsk.  He said that Russia 
continued to produce new SS-N-23 missiles and that, in 
October, Russia had notified the START Parties that Yagelnaya 
received six new missiles of this type.  They are the same 
type of missiles that are currently installed on the Delta IV 
SLBM.  There could be some improvements to the missile, but 
the technical characteristics of the new missile are the same 
as those listed in the START Memorandum of Understanding. 
 
------------------------ 
RUSSIA SEEKS IDENTICAL 
"NATIONAL STATEMENTS" ON 
THE DEFINITION OF ODSNWs 
------------------------ 
 
¶17.  (C) Ul'yanov reiterated the Russian desire to have a 
common understanding for how the sides count SNW.  He hoped 
that the work accomplished during the last two BIC sessions 
could be completed during this session in the form of 
coordinated plenary statements on a common definition of SNW. 
 He provided the U.S. side a revised draft coordinated 
plenary statement on defining SNW, as follows. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                     Official Translation 
 
                                     Draft Proposed by 
                                     the Russian Side 
                                     October 2005 
 
                          STATEMENT 
 
     At the October 27, 2005, Plenary Meeting on a Definition 
of the Term "Strategic Nuclear Warheads" for Purposes of the 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty), 
     (Name of the Party) regards the "strategic nuclear 
warheads," referred to in Article I of the Moscow Treaty, to 
be the reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) in their launchers, the reentry vehicles on 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their 
launchers on board submarines, and the nuclear armaments 
loaded on heavy bombers or those stored in weapons storage 
areas at heavy bomber bases. 
 
End text. 
 
¶18.  (C) Ul'yanov noted that the phrase "operationally 
deployed" was not in the proposed definition because this 
phrase was not in the Treaty.  He also noted that the Russian 
proposal would include all bomber warheads located on heavy 
bomber air bases, including spares, in the aggregate count 
toward the 1700-2200 number.  He hoped that the U.S. side 
would review Russia's proposal and respond back. 
 
¶19.  (C) Look said that the United States would review the 
proposal and respond at a later date.  She went on to comment 
that the Parties had discussed the issue of a definition for 
SNW at previous BIC sessions.  She noted that today's Russian 
proposal reflects how the United States deployed its forces, 
but not how Russia deploys its forces.  Look said that one of 
the main aspects of the MT, unlike START, was to reflect 
reality. 
 
¶20.  (C) Look added that the Parties had already achieved the 
goal that they had been seeking.  She noted that the 
briefings provided during the meeting the previous day 
described -- and used -- each side's definition.  She said 
that the briefings describe how each sides' systems were 
counted.  She noted that a formal plenary statement would not 
improve anything since the information is already on the 
table in our briefings. 
 
¶21.  (C) Look added that, while the United States plans to 
continue to use the same definition for the duration of the 
Treaty, both sides should remain flexible so that a side 
would not be constrained should it decide to change its 
method of counting SNW. 
 
¶22.  (C) Masterkov made a soliloquy on how Look's comments 
frightened him because changing a definition had the 
potential of changing the Treaty itself.  He said that there 
should be stability in the implementation of the Treaty and 
that any changes a side made should be based only on 
extraordinary circumstances.  Masterkov reiterated the 
Russian position on having a common understanding of SNW to 
ensure that each side was reducing the same things.  He said 
that the Russian-proposed draft text is close to what was 
needed and emphasized that the sides needed to come to 
closure on a definition of SNW.  He then apologized for 
"lecturing" the U.S. side. 
 
¶23.  (C) Look responded that there was no need to apologize 
since his comments were part of a good discussion of each 
other's viewpoints.  She agreed that both sides should seek 
stability in this relationship, but noted that we have 
different views of how to achieve that stability.  Look 
reiterated that the briefings provide a clear understanding 
on each other's SNW reductions and the Russian-proposed 
document was not required.  She said that the United States 
would study the proposal, however, and asked the Russian side 
to consider that the continued inclusion of "definitions" in 
the briefings achieve the necessary understanding of the SNW 
reductions and thus a sense of stability. 
 
¶24.  (C) Ul'yanov stated that other countries would ask for 
agreed definitions as a common international practice.  He 
asked if the Russian proposal did not negatively affect U.S. 
national security, why not accept it?  He noted that Russia 
considered U.S. concerns and expected the United States to do 
the same.  He reiterated that Russia was not comfortable with 
the U.S. description of its SNW definition, highlighting that 
it had redundancies and items not contained in the body of 
the Treaty.  He asked the United States to remove this 
irritant from our relationship. 
 
¶25.  (C) Look said that a one-size-fits-all definition would 
not work because our forces are different.  She noted that 
the briefings that contain a definition were the right 
approach.  Nonetheless, Look said the United States would 
consider whether each side should make a formal statement of 
its own national definition. 
 
¶26.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Draft Plenary Statement of Strategic Nuclear Warheads, 
dated October 27, 2005. 
 
¶27.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
DAS Look 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Singer 
Col Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Ul'yanov 
Mr. Artem'yev 
Gen Maj. Artyukhin 
Col Fedorchenko 
Col Kamenskiy 
Amb Masterkov 
Mr. Mezhennyy 
Ms. Sorokina 
Ms. Vodopolova 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
¶28.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley