This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 GENEVA 002618 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS BIC SORT
SUBJECT: BIC-IV:  (U) U.S. AND RUSSIAN BRIEFINGS ON STATUS 
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOSCOW TREATY, OCTOBER 26, 2005 
 
Classified By:  DAS Karin L. Look, U.S. Representative to 
the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is BIC-IV-002. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  October 26, 2005 
                Time:  3:00 - 4:00 p.m. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶3.  (C) The U.S. and Russian Delegations each provided 
briefings on the status of implementation of the Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the "Moscow 
Treaty" (MT)) as of October 2005.  The Russian Delegation 
said, as of November 1, 2005, the aggregate number of Russian 
warheads accountable under the Treaty would be 2,913.  The 
U.S. Delegation said as of September 30, 2005, aggregate 
number of U.S. operationally-deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads (ODNSW) was 4,073.  The Parties also asked questions 
to clarify the briefings that were presented. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Russian Delegation's responses to U.S. questions 
indicated that Russia continues to count the reentry vehicles 
on ICBMs and SLBMs in launchers, as well as heavy bomber 
weapons on bombers and in storage areas on bomber bases as MT 
strategic nuclear warheads.  They confirmed that none of 
Russia's heavy bomber weapons are included in the aggregate 
number of 2,913 strategic nuclear warheads. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Russian Delegation again asked for an explanation 
of why the United States used quotation marks around the term 
"nuclear" in the U.S. definition and why the United States 
referred to "nuclear" reentry vehicles and nuclear armaments 
in its briefing?  Should nuclear be used inside quotation 
marks, carried over from the MT Letters of Transmittal, in 
both places?  The U.S. Delegation explained that the 
quotation marks carried over from the MT Letters of 
Transmittal and were only meant to highlight that this Treaty 
applied to only nuclear warheads.  When the Treaty was 
submitted to the U.S. Congress, the Executive Branch wanted 
to make this point clear. 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Ul'yanov stated that progress had been made during 
the previous BIC meeting on the definition for strategic 
nuclear warheads and he hoped to resolve the issue by the 
spring 2006 BIC meeting.  He expected the BIC to provide an 
opportunity for transparency discussions and to move closer 
to the effective implementation of the MT. 
 
¶7.  (U) DAS Look began by noting her pleasure at seeing so 
many familiar faces on the Russian side, and added that Dr. 
Look was sorry he was unable to head this BIC meeting in 
order to say good-bye and to help in the transition for the 
new JCIC representative.  She commented that she had been 
working issues related to the control and reduction of 
missiles for 20 years and said that the relationship between 
the United States and Russia had changed significantly in 
that time, and that the change had been for the good.  The 
way the Parties talk about issues and the tools at our 
disposal have also changed.  The MT is emblematic of the new 
relationship and offers a different way to work as partners. 
She also noted that the BIC had been a useful form for 
discussion.  Ul'yanov said that he was sorry to see Dr. Look 
leave the BIC, as he had established a positive relationship 
with him.  He agreed with DAS Look's assessment of the MT, 
but did not think that the BIC itself was a good benchmark. 
It needs to be more substantive. 
 
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U.S. BRIEFING 
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¶8.  (U) After opening comments, the U.S. and Russian 
Delegations each provided briefings on the status of 
implementation of MT, as of October 2005. 
 
¶9.  (U) Paragraph 11 contains the slides and notes from the 
U.S. presentation on Strategic Nuclear Forces delivered at 
the Russian Mission on October 26, 2005.  Hard copies of the 
briefing slides, without the narratives, were provided to the 
Russian Delegation.  Paragraph 13 contains the official 
translation of the Russian briefing. 
 
¶10.  (U) Mullins presented the U.S. briefing and clarifying 
text, which included the updated U.S. ODSNW number of 4,037, 
as of September 30, 2005. 
 
¶11.  (U) Begin text (U.S. Briefing): 
 
--------- 
Slide One 
 
                 U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces 
              Bilateral Implementation Commission 
                         October 2005 
 
Narrative for Slide One: 
 
- This will be a short briefing that will provide you an 
update on our plans for strategic nuclear forces. 
 
- You will notice that this briefing has not changed much 
since the last session. 
 
- This briefing will summarize actions we have taken and 
long-range plans for these forces. 
 
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Slide Two 
 
            U.S. Plans for Strategic Nuclear Forces 
 
- Reduce total operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads to 1700-2200 by 31 December 2012: 
 
   -- Remove some delivery systems from service; and 
 
   -- For delivery systems retained, remove some warheads 
from operational missiles to reduce the number of 
operationally deployed nuclear warheads. 
 
- Completed actions: 
 
   -- Removed 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service. 
 
   -- B-1B conventional role only. 
 
   -- Deactivated 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs 
 
- Ongoing actions: 
   -- Removing some warheads from operational missiles. 
   -- Modifying 4 Trident I SSBNs to carry Trident II SLBMs. 
 
   -- Deactivating Trident I SLBMs. 
- Baseline 2012 Strategic Nuclear Force Structure: 
 
   -- 14 Trident II SSBNs 
   -- 21 B-2 Bombers 
 
   -- 500 Minuteman III ICBMs 
 
   -- 76 B-52H Bombers 
 
Narrative for Slide Two: 
 
- Our existing strategic nuclear force structure, with the 
reductions mentioned during previous briefings, will remain 
in service at least through 2020. 
 
   -- Minuteman service life is projected through 2020. 
 
   -- Ohio class ballistic missile submarines have been 
extended in life and the oldest of the remaining 14 is 
planned to be operational beyond 2025. 
 
   -- Our oldest bomber, the B-52, has had numerous upgrades 
and, along with the B-2, should remain operational for 
several decades. 
 
- We have underway, or in the planning stages, life extension 
programs to ensure that these systems remain reliable and 
safe and incorporate modern electronics. 
 
- In addition, we are just beginning to examine options to 
replace these weapon systems when each reaches the end of its 
service life. 
 
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Slide Three 
 
                 October 2005 Update on ICBMs 
 
ICBMs -- Deactivate all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs 
 
- Status:  As of 19 September 2005:  50 Peacekeeper missiles 
removed from strategic service. 
 
    -- All 50 missiles deactivated. 
 
    -- Silos will remain START accountable and inspectable. 
 
Narrative for Slide Three: 
 
Intercontinental ballistic missiles: 
 
- Our entire force of Peacekeeper missiles has been 
deactivated. 
 
   -- The first missile was deactivated in October 2002. 
 
   -- On 19 September 2005, we completed deactivation on all 
50 missiles. 
 
   -- Peacekeeper silos will remain START accountable and 
inspectable. 
 
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Slide Four 
 
                 October 2005 Update on SSBNs 
Modification of 4 SSBNs to SSGNs 
 
- Status:  Four Trident I SSBNs have been removed from 
strategic service and have begun refueling overhauls and 
modification to SSGNs. 
 
- All launchers will remain START accountable and inspectable 
 
- There are no plans to return Trident I SSBNs to strategic 
service 
 
 
Modification of 4 Trident I SSBNs to Trident II 
 
- Status:  Two submarines have been converted from Trident I 
to Trident II; a third has begun conversion and the fourth 
will begin conversion in early 2006. 
 
- Trident I SLBMs are being deactivated. 
 
Narrative for Slide Four: 
 
Ballistic missile submarines 
 
- Our plan to remove 4 Trident I ballistic missile submarines 
from strategic service and to modify them for other roles is 
on track. 
 
   -- All four of the submarines have already been withdrawn 
from strategic service.  The ballistic missiles have been 
removed from all 4 of the submarines. 
 
- We plan for Initial Operational Capability of the four 
SSGNs to begin in 2007. 
 
- Launchers will remain START accountable and inspectable. 
 
- Our plan for the other four Trident I submarines is to 
modify them to carry the Trident II SLBM. 
 
   -- Two of these modifications are complete; a third has 
begun modification and the fourth and final modification will 
begin in early 06. 
 
---------- 
Slide Five 
 
                    October 2005 Update on 
                        Heavy Bombers 
 
Heavy Bombers - No Change 
 
Narrative for Slide Five: 
 
Heavy Bombers 
 
- There are no changes in our heavy bomber force since the 
last meeting of the BIC. 
 
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Slide Six 
               Total U.S. Operationally Deployed 
                  Strategic Nuclear Warheads 
 
- For purposes of the Moscow Treaty, the United States 
considers operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads 
to be: 
 
   -- reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles 
in their launchers, 
   -- reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles in their launchers onboard submarines, and 
 
   -- nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in 
weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. 
 
   -- In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear 
warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at heavy 
bomber bases. The U.S. does not consider these warheads to be 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. 
 
   -- In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only 
"nuclear" reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are 
subject to the 1700-2200 limit. 
 
- As of September 30, 2005, the aggregate number of U.S. 
Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads was 4037. 
 
Narrative for Slide Six: 
 
- As we have stated previously, this is the U.S. definition 
of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. 
 
- The aggregate number of U.S. operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads as of September 30, 2005, was 4037. 
 
In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear 
weapons (including spare ICBM warheads and bomber weapons) 
are located in the weapon storage area at a heavy bomber 
base. The U.S. does not consider these warheads to be 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. 
 
In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only 
"nuclear" reentry vehicles on ballistic missiles in their 
launchers, as well as nuclear-armed cruise missiles or bombs 
at heavy bomber bases or loaded on bombers, are subject to 
the 1700-2200 limit. 
 
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Slide Seven 
 
                            Summary 
 
- U.S. strategic nuclear force reductions remain consistent 
with previous briefings. 
 
- Current and planned strategic nuclear force structure and 
activities are consistent with the new strategic environment. 
 
Narrative for Slide Seven: 
 
- In summary, our strategic nuclear force plans remain 
unchanged from the plans we presented to Defense Minister 
Ivanov in 2002. 
 
   -- Our actions to date have been consistent with those 
plans. 
- As you have seen, we have a number of activities in 
progress related to sustainment of these forces and 
implementation of our defense strategy. 
 
- These activities, and our strategic nuclear forces, are 
consistent with the new strategic environment. 
 
- Our intention is to continue to provide transparency and 
predictability on our activities and forces through actions 
such as this briefing. 
 
End text. 
 
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RUSSIAN BRIEFING 
---------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Fedorchenko delivered the Russian briefing by 
reading most of the text and clarifying that the number of 
Russian strategic nuclear warheads, as of November 1, 2005, 
was 2,913.  In addition, on slide Four, he remarked that 
Russia had not yet decided whether to put the road-mobile 
SS-27 into service.  On slide Five, he added that Russia is 
replacing existing SS-N-23 SLBMs with new ones. 
 
¶13.  (U) Begin text (Russian Briefing): 
 
                    BIC 
                    Briefing by the Russian Delegation 
                    October 26, 2005 
 
                                  Official Translation 
 
Title Page:  Status of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces and 
Results of their Reduction in 2005.  Briefing in the 
Bilateral Implementation Commission for the Treaty on 
Strategic Offensive Reductions, October 2005 
 
Page 2 
 
Total Number of Strategic Nuclear Warheads 
 
  -- Within the framework of the Treaty on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions, for purposes of counting nuclear 
warheads the Russian Federation considers the following: 
 
  -- nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs; 
 
  -- nuclear warheads on deployed SLBMs; 
 
  -- nuclear warheads on deployed heavy bombers and those 
located in storage depots of airbases (airfields) where heavy 
bombers are based. 
 
As of November 1, 2005, the aggregate number of warheads of 
the Russian Federation that are accountable under the Treaty 
on Strategic Offensive Reductions will be 2913. 
 
Page 3 
 
Russian Federation's Plans to Reduce Strategic Nuclear Forces 
 
OBJECTIVE:  By the end of 2012, reduce the total number of 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200. 
 
AREAS OF IMPLEMENTATION: 
 
  -- removal from service of missile complexes, submarines, 
and heavy bombers that have reached the end of their 
warranted service life; 
 
  -- elimination of strategic offensive arms that have been 
removed from service; 
  -- conversion of ICBM silo launchers, SSBN launchers, and 
heavy bombers into new reduced-armament strategic offensive 
weapons; 
  -- developing and putting into service the newest 
land-based and sea-based strategic missile complexes. 
Russia's plans to reduce its strategic nuclear forces have 
not changed since the previous session of BIC. 
 
Page 4 
 
Future Development of the SRF 
 
¶1.  MC (Missile Complex) with SS-18 ICBMs - Scheduled removal 
from service at end of service life; elimination of missiles 
and silo launchers. 
 
¶2.  MC with SS-19 ICBMs - Scheduled removal from service at 
end of service life; elimination of missiles and conversion 
of silo launchers. 
 
¶3.  MC with SS-25 ICBMs - Scheduled removal from service at 
end of service life; elimination of missiles and road-mobile 
launchers. 
 
¶4.  MC with SS-24 ICBMs - Completion of elimination of 
missiles and rail-mobile launchers. 
 
¶5.  MC with SS-27 ICBMs for silo launcher - Scheduled 
introduction into service, using converted ICBM SS-19 silo 
launchers. 
 
¶6.  MC with SS-27 ICBMs for road-mobile launcher - Continued 
flight and design testing. 
 
Prior to 2013 the Russian Federation does not plan to build 
new silo launchers or to develop new rail-mobile launchers. 
 
Page 5 
 
Future Development of the Strategic Forces of the Russian Navy 
 
¶1.  Delta III-Class Submarines with SS-N-18 SLBMs - Scheduled 
removal from service at end of service life, elimination of 
missiles, launchers, and submarines. 
 
¶2.  Delta IV-Class Submarines with SS-N-23 SLBMs - 
Modernization of the weapons system. 
 
¶3.  Typhoon-Class Submarines with SS-N-20 SLBMs - Removal 
from service and elimination of missiles and submarine 
launchers. 
 
¶4.  New-Generation Submarines - Development, testing, and 
preparations for putting into service. 
 
¶5.  Development of new SLBM (RSM-56). Continuation of 
flight-design testing of the missile. 
 
Page 6 
 
Future Development of Russia's Strategic Aircraft 
 
¶1.  Bear Heavy Bomber - Removal from service of heavy bombers 
that have reached the end of their service life. 
Modernization of weapons systems. 
 
¶2.  Blackjack Heavy Bomber - Modernization of weapons systems. 
 
Page 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Russian Federation is implementing its plans to reduce 
its strategic nuclear forces with an aim to fulfilling its 
obligations under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions.  The Russian Federation is independently 
determining the structure of its SNF guided by national 
security interests and the maintenance of strategic stability. 
 
End text. 
 
¶14.  (C) Look observed that both briefings reflected that 
both the United States and Russia were on glide paths to 
lower ODSNW numbers.  Both sides were willing to discuss the 
actual status of their forces and, while there was always 
room for improvement, the sides need to remember that the 
dialogue had come a long way toward openness.  Ul'yanov 
replied that he shared Look's assessment, but that there is 
always room for perfection and additional transparency.  Look 
responded that perfection is in the eye of the beholder. 
 
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RUSSIAN QUESTIONS 
----------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Ul'yanov stated that he appreciated the inclusion in 
the briefing of the aggregate number of U.S. ODSNW and hoped 
that the number would continue to be exchanged at least twice 
each year.  He suggested that the sides ask questions today 
and the answers be provided on Thursday.  He asked why the 
U.S. ODSNW definition continued to use the word nuclear in 
quotation marks.  Look replied that she had noted that this 
question had been asked at the previous BIC meeting and had 
asked her delegation for an answer.  She continued that, in 
her view and that of her delegation, the quotation marks had 
been added for emphasis to reflect the difference from how 
START accounted for reentry vehicles when the Treaty had been 
forwarded to the U.S. Congress. 
 
¶16.  (C) Artyukhin asked about the difference between 
"nuclear" reentry vehicles and other nuclear armaments. 
Mullins answered that the words "other nuclear armaments" 
were used to distinguish bombs and cruise missile warheads 
from nuclear reentry vehicles for ICBMs and SLBMs.  Artyukhin 
indicated he still did not understand the sentence as 
rendered in the Russian language and asked for a 
clarification.  Look agreed to look into whether the text 
could be made clearer. 
 
¶17.  (C) Ul'yanov stated that the United States had reduced 
543 ODSNW since the last briefing and he believed that this 
was partially based on the deactivation of 70 Peacekeeper 
warheads.  He asked how the remainder of the U.S. reductions 
were made.  Could the U.S. Delegation provide a breakout of 
the reductions by ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers? 
 
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U.S. QUESTIONS 
-------------- 
 
¶18.  (C) Look referred to the repeated reference to service 
life for Russian strategic systems in the Russian briefing 
and asked whether there was a specific end of service life 
for each type of Russian system.  Fedorchenko answered that 
each system had a specific service life, but the service life 
could be extended.  He believed both the United States and 
Russia used the service life concept. 
 
¶19.  (C) Siemon asked whether the strategic nuclear warhead 
number presented in the Russian briefing was calculated using 
the definition provided by Russia in March 2005.  Fedorchenko 
responded that the Russian definition was described on slide 
Two of the Russian presentation and the United States would 
see the definition when the briefing was translated. 
 
¶20.  (C) Smith asked whether Russia had included any heavy 
bomber weapons in its strategic nuclear warhead total. 
Artyukhin responded that Russia only counted heavy bomber 
weapons located on heavy bomber bases.  Since Russian 
practice did not locate heavy bomber weapons storage 
locations on heavy bomber bases, no heavy bomber weapons were 
counted. 
 
¶21.  (C) Singer asked whether there were any SLBM warheads 
attributed to SLBM launchers that did not contain missiles. 
Fedorchenko answered that, with respect to ICBMs and SLBMs, 
the Russian aggregate 2,913 number only related to launchers 
actually containing missiles with warheads on them.  He added 
that the Typhoon SSBN converted for RSM-56 missiles and the 
Typhoon awaiting elimination did not count because there were 
no missiles in the launchers. 
 
¶22.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- Briefing on Strategic Nuclear Forces, dated October 
2005 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Briefing on Nuclear Strategic Forces, dated October 
26, 2005. 
 
¶23.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
DAS Look 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Singer 
Col Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Ul'yanov 
Mr. Artem'yev 
Gen-Maj Artyukhin 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Kamenskiy 
Amb Masterkov 
Mr. Mezhennyy 
Ms. Sorokina 
Ms. Vodopolova 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
¶24.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley