This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  DUSHANBE 001729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, SA, DRL 
NSC FOR MERKEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/25/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN:  SWIMMING AROUND IN AUTHORITARIAN MOLASSES 
 
REF: A) DUSHANBE 0670  B) DUSHANBE 1702 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy 
Dushanbe. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Trying to do the U.S. Government's business in 
Tajikistan has never been easy, in part because of 
under-staffing and low capacity at many of the ministries. 
Further, the authoritarian desire to micromanage, as well as the 
inclination to buck even minor decisions up to a minister or to 
the President himself for fear of making the "wrong decision," 
slows things down, sometimes to the point of paralysis.  Since 
the "color revolutions" and subsequent pressure from Moscow to 
control the Western presence in Tajikistan, these tendencies 
have grown stronger and more aggravating.  Embassy Dushanbe has 
relatively easy access in areas that the Tajik Government sees 
as beneficial to its interests - especially the Tajik Border 
Guards, the Drug Control Agency, and some parts of the defense 
establishment like the National Guard and even the Interior 
Ministry.  But anything that smacks of "political" can be 
dragged out nearly ad infinitum.  The result is sometimes lost 
programs and lost opportunities.  In the end, this paranoia and 
rigidity could be self-defeating for the current Government of 
Tajikistan.  It may think it is maintaining political stability, 
but it's the false stability Moscow trumpets as the be-all and 
end-all for Central Asia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Tajikistan has long required that meetings with 
ministers be requested via Diplomatic Note to the Foreign 
Ministry.  In an efficient, smoothly running government, this 
would be merely an irritant.  However, too frequently initial 
diplomatic notes require several follow-up phone calls to the 
ministry in question, then a follow-up call to the MFA, and then 
a second diplomatic note weeks later to remind about the first 
request. 
 
¶3.  (C) We know that most MFA offices include Ministry of 
Security (MB) personnel, and the Protocol Office is no 
exception.  We can almost imagine the MB clerk in Protocol 
sorting dip-note requests for meetings into three stacks: 
"probably OK," "maybe later," and "when hell freezes over." 
 
¶4.  (C) The April 14 MFA directive that embassies and NGOs 
inform the MFA by diplomatic note - in advance - of any activity 
planned (reftel), was never fully implemented.  And, in fact, 
Western Embassies and a number of NGOs, under U.S. leadership, 
agreed to ignore it.  Nevertheless, this directive may have had 
a chilling effect, because lower-level bureaucrats, especially 
outside of Dushanbe, sometimes resist giving permission for 
programs and projects without an explicit go-ahead from the 
central government.  As a result, it sometimes seems 
increasingly difficult for NGOs, international organizations, 
and embassies to carry out their missions in Tajikistan. 
 
THE UNITED STATES NOT THE ONLY TARGET 
 
¶5.  (C) Organizations such as the UN and International Committee 
of the Red Cross have observed a slowing down or stopping of 
their usual activities while they wait for government 
"facilitation."  Independent training programs and conferences 
have been delayed without the proper "permissions."  The UN 
Tajikistan Office for Peace Building reports that without a 
month's advance notice, visiting delegations cannot get courtesy 
calls on partner ministries. 
 
¶6.  (C) In the last two months, Post has frequently faced a dead 
end trying to arrange things as simple as a courtesy call on a 
secondary ministry, let alone a demarche on Avian flu or a 
 
high-level visit.  On truly pressing issues, such as Secretary 
Rice's October 13 visit, Post's last resort and only point of 
contact was to call on First Deputy Foreign Minister Aslov, and 
ask him to deal with low-level issues such as motorcade 
placement and parking-gate access.  Something is wrong when the 
number two in a Foreign Ministry does the work of a desk 
officer, even if he is gracious and a good problem-solver. 
 
BOULDER'S INTERNET AND INFORMATION CENTER AT RISK 
 
¶7.  (C) The City of Dushanbe risks losing a $5 million internet 
center from its sister city Boulder because the Mayor's office 
will not make a decision on a contractor, and avoids meetings 
with embassy staff.  Mayor Obaidulloyev and his office are 
notoriously difficult, and he has made clear that he is not much 
interested in this project - even though Boulder has given him 
the right to choose the local contractor, which undoubtedly 
would mean money in his own pocket from the kick-back.  In fact, 
he bumped the project site from a prominent downtown location to 
the far suburbs because he "didn't like the architecture."  We 
surmise that the mayor and his Moscow cronies simply do not want 
an American "information center" - i.e., a "nest of spies" - in 
Dushanbe. 
 
PERVASIVE CORRUPTION MAY SOMETIMES PLAY A ROLE 
 
¶8.  (C) Even programs and projects distinctly in Tajikistan's 
interests can get held up unconscionably long.  The Ministry of 
Energy ignored repeated e-mails and instructions from the U.S. 
Trade and Development Agency to help coordinate a hydropower 
feasibility study, and risked losing this important opportunity 
that they themselves had requested.  We surmise that this may 
have been ineptitude or, possibly, irritation at having to do 
business by international standards instead of cutting deals and 
filling pockets behind closed doors.  (COMMENT:  The simple role 
of all-pervasive corruption cannot be over-estimated.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TURNS RECALCITRANT 
 
¶9.  (C) The paralysis stems in part from the fact that few Tajik 
officials, even deputy ministers, want to take responsibility 
for making a decision for fear of making the "wrong" decision. 
ABA/CEELI has been trying to implement a Human Rights course in 
law schools, but no law faculty will entertain the idea until 
written permission comes from the Ministry of Education. The 
Deputy Education Minister Irina Karimova refused to discuss the 
project, and demurred until the Minister could decide.  When the 
DCM was able to get a meeting, the Minister declared that 
ABA/CEELI's previous Memorandum of Understanding was invalid, 
because his predecessor had signed it.  He required ABA/CEELI to 
resubmit its proposal for the Ministry to re-evaluate before any 
instruction would be given to the law faculties.  Meanwhile the 
same Deputy Minister Karimova cancelled another successful 
ABA/CEELI project and refuses to discuss the matter with the NGO 
or the Embassy. 
 
¶10.  (C) Part of this problem is that ministers, in general, 
only want to meet with Ambassadors.  This creates a vicious and 
inefficient cycle, because in "normal" countries, all embassy 
officers conduct the daily work of the Mission with their 
host-country counterparts.  By imposing their own standards that 
"only the top has authority," the Tajiks mire themselves ever 
deeper into inaction. 
 
¶11.  (C) More darkly, we speculate that ABA/CEELI's problems 
stem from the Tajik Government's Kremlin-influenced instructions 
to prevent a "color revolution" in Tajikistan.  It should not be 
forgotten that following the April 14 directive to pre-inform 
about foreign activities, MB instructed all universities and 
E 
 
public associations that they were required to report all 
approaches by "foreigners" and to turn in the names of all 
Tajiks - students, faculty, and association members - who have 
contacts with foreigners. 
 
OSCE WHISTLES IN THE DARK 
 
¶12.  (C) Some observers see nefarious forces at work, reflecting 
the influence of a few MB-influenced and self-interested 
insiders in the Presidential apparat determined to strictly 
control diplomatic and civil-society activities.  However, a few 
optimistic Western diplomats see the current paralysis simply as 
a young government's growing pains.  Ricard Lepri, Deputy 
Director of OSCE, posited that the current go-slow in the MFA 
represents Tajikistan's attempts to have better oversight over 
all international activities, not an intent to block activities. 
 We judge this as an overly charitable view.  (COMMENT:  We 
would note that the current OSCE Tajikistan leadership adamantly 
rejects any step or public statement that might give offense to 
the Government of Tajikistan.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶13.  (C) COMMENT:  In response to the difficulties of working in 
Tajikistan, many shrug and say, "It's just the way they are." 
But the current practice of bucking every decision to the top 
does not give evidence of a government comfortable with 
democratic practices and responsive to its citizens.  It creates 
paralysis for Western interests.  Coupled with the increased 
regulation and scrutiny of Western NGOs, the current situation 
suggests a paranoid rigidity that could become self-defeating, 
even though it creates the false stability that Moscow trumpets 
as the be-all and end-all for Central Asia.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
HOAGLAND 
 
 
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