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Viewing cable 05DUSHANBE1644, IIR 6 947 0005 06/CHINESE GIVE 32 VEHICLES TO TAJIK ARMED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DUSHANBE1644 2005-10-07 13:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Dushanbe
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L  DUSHANBE 001644 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/7/2015 
TAGS: MCAP TI CH
SUBJECT: IIR 6 947 0005 06/CHINESE GIVE 32 VEHICLES TO TAJIK ARMED 
FORCES (U) 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jonathan Edwards, DATT, USDAO Dushanbe, DIA. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b) 
 
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SERIAL:  (U) IIR 6 947 0005 06. 
 
COUNTRIES:  (U) TAJIKISTAN (TI), CHINA (CH). 
 
IPSP:  (U) IFC1590, IFC1950, IFC1510, IFC1513, IFC1510, IFC1540, 
IFC1500, 
 
SUBJECT: IIR 6 947 0005 06/CHINESE GIVE 32 VEHICLES TO TAJIK 
ARMED FORCES(U) 
 
WARNING:  (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY 
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.  REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL NO 
FOREIGN 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
DOI:  (U) 20050928 
 
REQS: (U) DHCD002124, DIAC156205002, DHCD002104, DHCD111055, 
GAIF116482402, DHCD111054, DIAC154107003, DHCD111050, 
DHCD111045, DHCD112051 
 
SOURCE:  A. (C) //MEMBER USDAO DUSHANBE//MEMBER OBSERVED ON A 
RECENT VISIT.  CONTEXT STATEMENT-MEMBER MAINTAINS REGULAR 
CONTACT WITH CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE.  MEMBER WAS IN CLOSE 
CONTACT WITH CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE THROUGHOUT THE 6 DAY TRIP. 
 
B.  (C//NF) //OTS 6 947 0001 06// MID-LEVEL HOST NATION officer 
with DIRECT AND INDIRECT access to the information.  RO DOES NOT 
HAVE AN ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP WITH SOURCE.  context statement 
- RO SPENT APPROXIMATELY 4 DAYS WITH SOURCE DURING TRIP.  SOURCE 
IS A CORRUPT MID-LEVEL OFFICER WITH LIMITED INTEGRITY. 
CREDIBILITY IS UNDETERMINED. 
 
C.  (c) //OTS 6 947 0005 06//MID-LEVEL HOST NATION OFFICER WITH 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT ACCESS TO INFORMATION.  RO DOES NOT HAVE AN 
ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP WITH SOURCE.  CONTEXT STATEMENT - RO 
SPENT ONE DAY WITH SOURCE DURING TIP.  SOURCE APPEARS CREDIBLE, 
BUT A LIKELY PARTICIPANT IN CORRUPT ACTIVITY IN REGION.  SOURCE 
MADE A NUMBER OF STATEMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTING CLOSE COOPERATION 
WITH THE UNITED STATES.  CREDIBILITY IS UNDETERMINED. 
 
d.  (C) //6 947 0022//SENIOR HOST NATION MILITARY OFFICER WITH 
DIRECT ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION.  RO HAS AN ESTABLISHED 
RELATIONSHIP WITH SOURCE.  CONTEXT STATEMENT - RO AND SOURCE 
MEeT ON A REGULAR LIAISON BASIS AS A RESULT OF RO AND SOURCE'S 
OFFICIAL DUTIES. SOURCE HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST. THIS WAS 
SOURCE'S FIRST VISIT TO THIS REGION.  SOURCE IS AWARE THAT 
INFORMATION WILL REACH U.S. INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AND COMMENTS 
MAY BE MEANT TO INFLUENCE AS MUCH AS TO INFORM. 
 
SUMMARY:  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF 
DEFENSE PROVIDED 32 VEHICLES TO THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AS 
PART OF THEIR ONE MILLION USD 2005 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE. 
HOWEVER, THE CHINESE HAVE MINIMAL INFLUENCE AND LIMITED 
RELATIONS WITH TAJIK MILITARY AND BORDER OFFICERS IN EASTERN 
TAJIKISTAN. ENCLOSURES. 
 
TEXT: 1.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) FROM 23 SEPTEMBER 2005 TO 
29 SEPTEMBER 2005, RO TRAVELED FROM DUSHANBE TO THE EASTERN 
 
 
TAJIKISTAN WITH THE CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE, COLONEL LEE, AND 
SOURCE D IN ORDER TO PICK UP 32 CHINESE VEHICLES, GIVEN TO THE 
TAJIK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. THESE VEHICLES ARE PART OF A ONE 
MILLION USD 2005 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE AGREED IN EARLY 
SEPTEMBER BETWEEN THE CHINESE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE TAJIK 
MINISTER OF DEFENSE. 
 
2.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) ON 26 SEPTEMBER SOURCE D STATED 
THAT EVERY YEAR SINCE 1995 THE CHINESE HAVE PROVIDED ONE MILLION 
USD IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE TAJIKS.  EACH TIME THE CHINESE 
SIMPLY ASKED THE TAJIKS TO MAKE OUT A LIST OF ITEMS THEY WANTED 
TOTALING ONE MILLION USD.  THE CHINESE THEN PROVIDE THE ITEMS 
WITH NO QUESTIONS ASKED.  SOURCE D STRESSED THAT THIS PROGRAM 
HAD NO OTHER REQUIREMENTS. 
 
3.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) ON 27 SEPTEMBER SOURCE D 
COMPLAINED TO RO THAT THE CHINESE WERE ONLY GIVING THE VEHICLES 
TO THE TAJIKS AND THE TAJIKS WERE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE MONEY 
FOR FUEL AND DRIVERS IN ORDER TO GET THE VEHICLES FROM THE 
CHINESE BORDER TO DUSHANBE.  SOURCE SHOWED RO A BAG FULL OF 
APPROXIMATELY 9000 TAJIK SOMONI; THE CURRENT EXCHANGE RATE IS 
APPROXIMATELY 3 SOMONI TO 1 USD.  SOURCE DID NOT KNOW HOW HE WAS 
GOING TO PAY FOR ALL THE CUSTOMS COSTS AND FUEL.  SOURCE STATED 
THE CHINESE SHOULD FOLLOW THE U.S. PROGRAM, WHICH DELIVERS 
EQUIPMENT TO DUSHANBE WITH NO COST TO THE TAJIKS. 
 
4.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) ON 27 SEPTEMBER SOURCE B TOLD 
RO THAT THE TAJIK MILITARY HAD A HARD TIME UNDERSTANDING THE 
CHINESE.  THE MILITARY IN THE GORNO-BADAKSHAN REGION, THAT 
BORDERS CHINA, HAD NO CONTACT WITH CHINESE MILITARY OFFICERS. 
HE SAID THAT THE CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE WAS THE FIRST CHINESE 
MILITARY OFFICER HE HAD MET.  HE NOTED THAT THE CHINESE TRADE IS 
INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN THE REGION AND HE SEES CHINESE CARGO 
TRUCKS TRAVELING THROUGH THE REGION NEARLY EVERY DAY.  SOURCE 
QUESTIONED WHY THE CHINESE DO NOT HAVE A BUSINESS PRESENCE OR 
ANY OTHER LEVEL OF ACTIVITY WITH THE CITY OF MURGHAB, 120 
KILOMETERS WEST OF THE TAJIK BORDER. [FIELD COMMENT: RO OBSERVED 
INDIVIDUALS LOADING CHINESE TRUCKS WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE 
LARGE SACKS AT A LOCATION APPROXIMATELY 4 KILOMETERS EAST OF 
MURGHAB, BEHIND SOME ABANDONED BUILDINGS.  IN ADDITION, RO MET 
THE MURGHAB POLICE CHIEF APPROXIMATELY 1 KILOMETER FROM THE 
SITE.  THE POLICE CHIEF SAID HE WAS WAITING FOR SOME CHINESE 
DIGNITARIES WHO WERE TRAVELING TO THE CELEBRATION IN KHOROG.  RO 
COULD NOT CONFIRM IF THE POLICE CHIEFS PRESENCE AND THE ACTIVITY 
WERE CONNECTED.  HOWEVER, GIVEN THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN 
MURGHAB, IT IS POSSIBLE.] 
 
5.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) ON 28 SEPTEMBER RO AND COLONEL 
LEE MET WITH THE DEPUTY COMMANDER, LTC MIRZOEV OF THE TAJIK 
BORDER GUARD OTRYAD IN MURGHAB.  LTC MIRZOEV NOTED THAT DESPITE 
THE LONG BORDER SHARED BY TAJIKISTAN AND CHINA, HE VERY SELDOM 
MEETS WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS FROM CHINA.  HE COMPLAINED THAT THE 
TAJIK BORDER GUARDS AND CHINESE BORDER GUARDS HAVE NO WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP.  COLONEL LEE TOLD LTC MIRZOEV THAT IF THE TAJIKS 
HAD ANY PROBLEMS WITH CHINESE AT THE BORDER TO CALL THE CHINESE 
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE.  LTC MIRZOEV SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER TO 
DEAL WITH SUCH PROBLEMS LOCALLY BETWEEN THE TWO BORDER GUARD 
FORCES. 
 
6.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) ON 28 SEPTEMBER RO WAS TOLD BY 
SOURCE D THAT RO COULD NOT ACCOMPANY THE TAJIKS AND CHINESE 
DEFENSE ATTACHE TO THE BORDER IN ORDER TO PICK UP THE VEHICLES. 
SOURCE SAID THAT THE CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE SAID IT WOULD BE 
INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE UNITED STATED DEFENSE ATTACHE TO BE SEEN 
AT THE BORDER WITH TAJIK MILITARY PERSONNEL. 
 
7.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTING, RO 
OBSERVED THE CONTRACTED CIVILIAN TAJIK DRIVERS PUTTING ON 
MILITARY UNIFORMS.  IN RESPONSE TO RO'S QUESTION, ONE DRIVER 
 
 
SAID CHINESE CUSTOMS WERE REQUIRING THAT ONLY TAJIK MILITARY 
PERSONNEL PICK UP THE VEHICLES.  [FIELD COMMENT: CUSTOMS TURNED 
OUT TO BE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE FOR THE TAJIKS.  RO OBSERVED 
ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS SOURCE D PAYING A NUMBER OF LOCAL 
OFFICIALS IN MURGHAB TO INCLUDE CUSTOMS, MINISTRY OF SECURITY 
AND POLICE PRIOR TO PICKING UP THE VEHICLES.  IN ADDITION, THE 
MINISTRY OF SECURITY, CUSTOMS, BORDER GUARDS AND LOCAL POLICE 
ALL ACCOMPANIED THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO THE BORDER TO PICK UP 
THE VEHICLES]. 
 
8. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) LATER ON 28 SEPTEMBER, RO 
OBSERVED THE ARRIVAL OF 32 CHINESE VEHICLES, INITIALLY PARKED AT 
THE MURGHAB BORDER GUARD OTRYAD //GEOCOORD: 
3810.119N/07357.901E//.  THE VEHICLES CONSISTED OF 20 LIGHT 
"JEEP" LIKE THAT APPEARED SIMILAR TO THE CHINESE BJ2020, 10 
TRUCKS WITH "FAW" LETTERING THAT APPEARED SIMILAR TO THE CHINESE 
EQ2102, A SMALL AMBULANCE WITH "IVECO" LETTERING THAT THE 
CHINESE AND TAJIK CALLED A SMALL X-RAY AMBULANCE AND A LARGER 
AMBULANCE WITH "DONG FENG" LETTERING THE CHINESE AND TAJIKS 
CALLED A LARGE AUTOBANDAGING MEDICAL VEHICLE. ALL VEHICLES 
APPEARED TO BE NEW.  SOURCE D EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION HALF OF THE 
VEHICLES REQUIRED DIESEL THE OTHERS GASOLINE.  SOURCE EXPRESSED 
A PREFERENCE FOR THE RUSSIAN VEHICLES THAT ALL REQUIRE GASOLINE. 
[FIELD COMMENT: PLEASE SEE ENCLOSURES FOR PICTURES OF VEHICLES. 
THE CHINESE AND THE TAJIKS COULD NOT PROVIDE RO WITH THE ENGLISH 
DESIGNATION FOR THESE VEHICLES]. 
 
9. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) AFTER THE VEHICLES ARRIVED LTC 
MIRZOEV OF THE BORDER GUARDS APPROACHED COLONEL LEE AND ASKED 
WHY ALL THESE VEHICLES WERE GOING TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. 
MIRZOEV NOTED THAT THE BORDER GUARDS HELPED BRING THE VEHICLES 
ACROSS THE BORDER AND THE CHINESE TO DATE HAVE PROVIDED NO 
ASSISTANCE TO HIS BORDER GUARD UNIT.  COLONEL LEE RESPONDED THAT 
THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WORKS THROUGH THE TAJIK MINISTRY 
OF DEFENSE AND COORDINATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE BORDER GUARDS 
WOULD NEED TO GO THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.  MIRZOEV THEN 
PULLED COLONEL LEE AWAY FROM RO FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.  MIRZOEV 
THEN RETURNED TO RO AND SAID THAT HE DEEPLY APPRECIATED THE 
STRONG ASSISTANCE THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES THE BORDER GUARDS. 
HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS THE TAJIK BORDER GUARDS 
BRIGHTEST STAR IN THE SKY. 
 
10.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) COLONEL LEE LATER TOLD RO THAT 
THE TAJIKS DO NOT KNOW HOW TO RECEIVE THIS TYPE OF ASSISTANCE 
AND HE EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE TAJIKS LACK OF ORGANIZATION. 
 HE ADDED THAT HE WISHED THE VEHICLES HAD AIR CONDITIONING FOR 
THE HOT TAJIK SUMMERS. 
 
11.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) RO ASKED A NUMBER OF DRIVERS 
WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF THE VEHICLES.  RO ASKED FIVE DRIVERS WHAT 
THEY THOUGHT OF THE CHINESE VEHICLES.  TWO HAD NO OPINION, TWO 
EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE QUALITY AND FELT RUSSIAN 
EQUIVALENT VEHICLES RAN BETTER, AND ONE FELT THE CHINESE VEHICLE 
WAS A BETTER RIDE. 
 
12.  (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) RO ACCOMPANIED THE CONVOY FROM 
MURGHAB TO KHOROG.  DURING THE DRIVE THREE VEHICLES BROKE DOWN 
OF WHICH ONE REMAINED IN PLACE APPROXIMATELY 20 KILOMETERS WEST 
OF MURGHAB.  ON THE MORNING OF 29 SEPTEMBER AS THE CONVOY 
PREPARED TO DEPART KHOROG, SOURCE D TOLD RO THAT TWO ADDITIONAL 
VEHICLES WERE MISSING.  SOURCE D EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT 
NEEDING TO HIRE CIVILIAN DRIVERS AS THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE DID 
NOT HAVE ENOUGH TRAINED, RESPONSIBLE DRIVERS TO MAKE SUCH A 
TRIP.  SOURCE D ALSO REITERATED HIS CONCERN THAT HE DID NOT HAVE 
ENOUGH MONEY TO GET THE VEHICLES BACK TO DUSHANBE.  [FIELD 
COMMENT: RO DEPARTED KHOROG BEFORE THE CONVOY DEPARTED. RO WAS 
LATER TOLD THAT ALL VEHICLES EXPECT THE ONE TRUCK, EQ2102 TYPE, 
SUCCESSFULLY ARRIVED IN DUSHANBE]. 
 
 
13. (C) DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHIC TITLING LOG.  ALL PHOTOGRAPHIC 
ENCLOSURES TO IIR 6 947 0005 06 ARE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. 
THEY WERE ACQUIRED AT THE MURGHAB BORDER GUARD OTRYAD, MURGHAB, 
//GEOCOORD:3810.119N/07357.901E//, TAJIKISTAN, ON 20050928 
BETWEEN 1600L AND 1700L USING A SONY CYBERSHOT 7.2 MEGAPIXEL, SN 
1411693, GROUND. 
 
FRAMES  DESCRIPTION 
01          TAJIK CIVILIAN DRIVERS AFTER RETURNING WITH 
VEHICLES.  (C) 
 
02          1 TRUCK, LARGE AMBULANCE AND 3 LIGHT VEHICLES. (C) 
 
03          8 LIGHT VEHICLES. (C) 
 
04          2 LIGHT VEHICLES, 2 TRUCKS, TAJIK BORDER GUARD 
SOLDIERS. (c) 
 
05          3 TRUCKS, SMALL AMBULANCE. (C) 
 
06          WIDE ANGLE ON 12 LIGHT VEHICLES, 1 TRUCK, LARGE 
AMBULANCE. (C) 
 
07          TAJIKS GOING OVER PAYMENTS TO CONTRACTED DRIVERS. (C) 
 
08          CHINESE TRUCKS BEING LOADED WITH UNKNOWN GOODS 
APPROXIMATELY 4 KM EAST OF MURGHAB. (C) 
 
COMMENTS: 1. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) FIELD COMMENT:  RO WAS 
SURPRISED THAT THE TAJIKS AND CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE INVITED RO 
ALONG ON THIS TRIP.  ONE REASON COULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE THE 
LEVEL OF CHINESE ASSISTANCE TO THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. 
THE OTHER COULD BE THE TAJIKS AND CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE 
REQUIRED RO ASSISTANCE TO GET TO THIS PART OF TAJIKISTAN.  THE 
ROADS ARE VERY DIFFICULT AND RO IS UNAWARE OF ANY VEHICLE AT THE 
CHINESE EMBASSY CAPABLE OF MAKING THIS JOURNEY.  IN ADDITION, RO 
PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION SAVED THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE MONEY. 
SOURCE D NOTED A NUMBER OF TIMES THAT IT WAS FAR EASIER TO 
TRAVEL TO THIS RESTRICTED PART OF TAJIKISTAN IN A UNITED STATES 
DIPLOMATIC VEHICLE THAN IN A MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PLATED VEHICLE. 
 THE CHALLENGES THE TAJIKS FACED IN GETTING THESE VEHICLES FROM 
THE CHINESE BORDER TO DUSHANBE IS FURTHER INDICATION THE TAJIKS 
HAVE LITTLE TO NO CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN BASIC SUPPORT 
REQUIREMENTS.  THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PAY 
OFF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN FEES, IS FURTHER INDICATION OF SYSTEMIC 
CORRUPTION AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT.  IT APPEARED TO RO THAT 
MOST IF NOT ALL TAJIK MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SAW THIS 
CHINESE ASSISTANCE AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE SOME FORM OF 
PAYOFF.  RO SELDOM HAD THE SENSE THAT TAJIK OFFICIALS FELT ANY 
SENSE OF LOYALTY OR SATISFACTION THAT THEY WERE HELPING THEIR 
OWN GOVERNMENT IMPROVE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY. 
 
2.  (U) SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONTACT. 
 
3.  (U) DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS IIR TO DIA/DHO-2 AT 
STU III (202) 231-7299, OR DSN 428-7299. 
 
COLL: (U) AB. 
INSTR:  (U) U.S.  NO. 
PREP:  (U) 6-04708. 
ENCL: (U) TO FOLLOW - 1 ENCLOSURE. 
DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHY, BORDER GUARD OTRYAD, MURGHAB (C), COLOR, 8 
IMAGES, 20050928 (C). 
ACQ:  (U)  MURGHAB, TAJIKISTAN (20050928) 
DISSEM:  (U)  FIELD:  EMBASSY AT DUSHANBE. 
WARNING:  (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN 
DRVD FM: DHS HUMINT SCG OCT 04 
DECL ON:  20150928 
 
HOAGLAND 
 
 
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