P R 031312Z OCT 05
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5800
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE
NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 
AMCONSUL DUBAI

S E C R E T DUBAI 004824 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/3/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KNNP IR
SUBJECT: ONE IRAN EXPERT'S VIEW OF PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX, an Iranian XXXXXXXXXXXX
well known in Iran watcher circles, offered to PolEconChief his 
views on his "childhood friend," President Ahmadinejad. He 
asserted that Ahmadinejad had no role in the 1979 hostage 
crisis. He had opposed Ahmadinejad's candidacy due to his lack 
of foreign policy experience, but does not think the new 
president intends to "export the revolution"; instead, his 
preference is to focus on domestic issues. XXXXXXXXXXXX does not think 
Iran is actively supporting the insurgency in Iraq but believes 
it is laying down future "capacity". He believes there is room 
for compromise on the nuclear issue. XXXXXXXXXXXX has been waiting for 
almost a year for issuance of a U.S. visa that would allow him 
resume work at XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (please protect) discussed his 
views of the new Iranian government with PolEconChief September 
¶29. He was in the UAE for a conference on Iran-GCC relations 
organized by a think tank, XXXXXXXXXXXX. (Note: 
the XXXXXXXXXXXX conference was by invitation only and when we asked to 
attend, we were told it was "closed to diplomats." Asked about 
his reaction to the conference, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had been 
surprised by the perception among the Arab participants of 
Iranian hostile intent.) 
 
Ahmadinejad - a school chum 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) On the new president, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he went to XXXXXXXXXXXX with Ahmadinejad and has kept up the acquaintance in the years since. This did not stop him, however, from openly 
advocating the election of Rafsanjani, primarily because he 
thought of all the candidates, Rafsanjani was the most skilled 
in the arena of international relations. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he 
privately advised Ahmadinejad against running. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he is now considering writing a biography of Ahmadinejad, particularly 
as there is little information about his past in the public 
domain. 
 
Embassy Takeover 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that two leaders of the 1979 U.S. embassy takeover, Mohsen Mirdamadi and Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, had told him that Ahmadinejad had not been involved. Without citing sources, XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that Ahmadinejad's background in the IRGC involved only logistical planning and engineering, not intelligence work or the Qods force. He further claimed that Ahmadinejad had played no role in the 1989 assassination of 
Kurdish rebel leader, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, in Vienna. 
 
New Generation of War Veterans 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX breaks down Iranian conservatives
into four groups:  "pragmatic", "ideological", "traditional", and 
"transitional."  He says Ahmadinejad falls into the last 
category. He defined "transitional" essentially as referring to 
a generational shift of power in Iran. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that 
the growing presence of the military in the government is more a 
by-product of this generation rising in the ranks than a 
concerted effort by the military to seize power. A large 
percentage of the younger revolutionaries fought in the 
Iran-Iraq War, mainly joining the newly formed Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basiji forces, rather than 
the regular army. He also said the recent Majlis rejections of 
several cabinet nominees demonstrate that there is not one IRGC 
viewpoint. 
 
¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that many in the military supported 
Ahmadinejad more for what he would do for them -- everything 
from veterans benefits to military contracts -- than from any 
ideological stance. He said Ahmadinejad had already demonstrated 
in his prior positions that he would help solve problems facing 
the military, such as road access to garrisons, as well as send 
contracts their way. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the military doubted that 
Rafsanjani, had he been elected president, would have done 
anything to help them. 
 
President wants to focus internally 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX defined Ahmadinejad as a populist whose primary goals are domestic: social justice, anti-corruption (mostly in 
the form of opposing nepotism -- according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, 
Ahmadinejad did not see favoring the military with contracts as 
corruption), and decentralization.  Unfortunately, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, the new president's solutions tend to be "simplistic." XXXXXXXXXXXX said he does not anticipate a domestic crackdown on social issues, such as women's dress, or men and women socializing together in public. 
 
Foreign Policy 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX is particularly concerned about the new 
president's lack of skill in foreign relations, and does not 
think he is well served by the people advising him on foreign 
policy. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the president's closest foreign policy 
advisors were Mojtabeh Hashemi Samareh, his senior presidential 
advisor, and Sa'id Jalili, Deputy Foreign Minister for Europe 
and American Affairs. 
 
¶9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that rumors of a power struggle between Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi and Supreme Leader Khamenei were 
exaggerated. He said Ahmadinejad was "smarter" than Mesbah-Yazdi 
and listened only to the Supreme Leader. He also noted that 
Khamenei's longstanding preference was for Iran to look "east" 
for allies. When Khatami was president, Khamenei agreed to 
building closer relations to Europe, but with the new president, 
he is reverting to his preferences. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted, however, that those in power would "eventually" realize that Iran still 
needed ties with the West. 
 
¶10. (S) On the nuclear issue, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he saw room for 
compromise between the EU-3 and the Iranian proposals, but 
thought neither side could exercise flexibility in 
official-level negotiations. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a long-time veteran of 
Track 2 conferences, thinks that only by moving the negotiations 
to a Track 2 setting can more "creative" solutions be expected 
to emerge. He believed that in such an unofficial setting, 
Iranians -- including former officials -- would be willing to 
meet with the U.S. and even Israel to discuss a wide range of 
issues. 
 
¶11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he did not think this new government will 
try to "export the revolution" and agitate among Gulf Shia 
populations. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said he has tried to convince his 
government of the impact of its rhetoric and to take steps such 
as banning the chant of "Death to America" to reduce tensions. 
While this has not happened, he claimed to have been told that 
the government had recently banned burning of the U.S. flag. 
 
View of Iraq 
------------ 
 
¶12. (S) Asked about the reaction in Iran to al-Qaida associate 
Zarqawi's recent call for war against Shiites, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he 
had noted a shift in Iranian rhetoric about attacks in Iraq. At 
the beginning of the conflict, he said, Iranian officials called 
the attackers martyrs, but with more and more Shiites targeted, 
the label had shifted to terrorists. He is convinced that Iran 
is not working with al-Qaida, and that Iran's overall goals in 
Iraq run "mostly parallel" to U.S. goals. He says Iran does not 
want chaos next door, wants majority rule and territorial 
integrity, and is nervous about the consequences to Iran of 
divisions in Iraq along ethnic lines. He does not believe Iran 
is actively assisting attacks against U.S. and other foreign 
forces in Iraq, but says he is certain Iran is laying down a 
capacity for future internal involvement, should it feel 
threatened. 
 
Visa in Limbo 
------------- 
 
¶13. (S) While serving as a XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX was interviewed frequently by international press on Iran, spoke publicly on Iran XXXXXXXXXXXX and was often quite critical of Iranian policy. He also testified XXXXXXXXXXXX on Iranian views of their nuclear program. He told us he had been concerned that he would be arrested upon his return to Iran due to perceptions that he was too close to the U.S. Last year, XXXXXXXXXXXX applied for a U.S. visa to return to work on a project he said had been accepted by XXXXXXXXXXXX. The project would be to design mechanisms for preventing border conflict escalation, particularly between Iran and U.S. troops in Iraq. (Note: clearance of his visa application has been "pending" since 
February 2005.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (S) Comment: While we cannot confirm what access, if any, 
XXXXXXXXXXXX has to Ahmadinejad, XXXXXXXXXXXX is considered a respected commentator on the Iranian government. His views are often quoted in both the Iranian and the international press. Many of the opinions he expressed about Iranian activities in this 
conversation seem naive, but it is hard to know whether they 
reflect a lack of access to some of more hardline components of 
the Iranian government, or perhaps represent an attempt to put 
the best face on the new regime to a U.S. government official. 
 
Nonetheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX clearly did not think highly of the 
abilities of the new government and seemed genuinely concerned 
that it could lead Iran down the wrong path. Our impression from 
this conversation was that XXXXXXXXXXXX believes Iran's new government poses dangers, but more as a result of new officials' lack of knowledge and skills and their simplistic views than by intent, 
and that they could thus be managed with the right strategy. End 
Comment. 
 
 
DAVIS