This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001752 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARPI: STHORNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2010 
TAGS: IZ PREL PTER QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: S/I JEFFREY'S OCTOBER 6, 2005 MEETING WITH 
FOREIGN MINISTER HAMAD BIN JASSIM AL-THANI 
 
Classified By: Amb. Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Senior Advisor on Iraq James Jeffrey and an 
interagency team that included representatives from the NSC, 
DOD, and Treasury met with Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh 
Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani (HBJ) on October 6.  HBJ assured 
the U.S. delegation that Qatar was committed to winning the 
war in Iraq and stressed the importance of preventing Iraq 
from becoming a breeding ground for terror.  HBJ pressed the 
delegation to give more time to allow for greater Sunni 
participation in the political process and insisted that 
de-Ba,athification focus only on top Ba'ath party 
leadership.  He also said that per the USG's requests Qatar 
had raised with the Syrians the latter's failure to address 
the issue of insurgents crossing from Syria into Iraq and had 
urged the Iranians to not interfere in Iraq.  HBJ also 
indicated that Qatar remains committed to forgiving Iraq,s 
external debt, but he showed sensitivity to pressure when 
asked about Qatar's policies on Al Jazeera.  End Summary 
 
Iraq/GWOT 
--------------- 
¶2. (C) HBJ emphasized that despite the all of the criticism 
Qatar had shouldered for its support of the war in Iraq, it 
was committed to victory there.  "When you succeed in this 
war, we all succeed," HBJ told Jeffrey, stressing the 
importance of Iraq in preserving stability in the region and 
of the need to prevent Iraq from becoming a terrorist 
breeding ground from which terrorists could strike Qatar and 
the Gulf, as well as Europe and the U.S.  HBJ felt that 
states in the region were not adequately sharing information, 
which he suggested that if done on a weekly basis could 
provide a clearer picture of the situation in Iraq.  He also 
expressed his firm opposition to Bremer's plan for 
categorical de-Ba,athification within Iraq, insisting that 
"you could not get a job in Saddam,s Iraq without being 
Ba,athist." 
 
Iraqi Constitution 
--------------------- 
¶3. (C) HBJ advised Jeffrey and delegation that "even if it 
takes two to three months," it was absolutely necessarily to 
secure Sunni Arab support for the constitution, predicting 
that without Sunni buy-in the constitution would be rejected 
and another year of political wrangling would ensue.  Jeffrey 
pointed out that that the parties had dithered for months, at 
the expense of American and Iraqi lives, and it was 
ultimately the deadline that pressed them to produce the 
constitution.  Jeffrey praised the constitution, but noted 
that Ambassador Khalilzad believed that additions should be 
made, including regarding de-Ba'athification and to clarify 
what action would be taken against the former senior 
leadership.  When asked by HBJ whether Chalabi had the ear of 
the USG, Jeffrey made clear that the USG does not support any 
one person or party, but added that he would not listen to 
Chalabi on de-Ba,athification. 
 
Arab Police Force 
---------------------- 
¶4. (C) Referring to a proposal that HBJ had previously 
transmitted to General Abazaid, HBJ touched on his idea that 
an Islamic police force should be deployed in Iraqi cities to 
reduce the American presence there and to leave fewer 
American targets for insurgents to attack.  "Then the 
insurgents) will be killing Arabs, not Americans," HBJ 
explained.  The proposed police force would be composed of 
Muslims from countries in the region (with the exception of 
Syria).  BG Mike Jones, representing the Joint Staff, 
requested more detail on the composition and capability of 
the force, pointing out that though some countries are good 
at peacekeeping Iraq is not currently peaceful.  Some 
countries may resist the kind of rules of engagement that 
success in a environment like Iraq requires.  Further, any 
such force would have to have the express support of the 
Iraqi government to operate.  Jeffrey added that any such 
force would require fighting elements as this would be a 
combat mission, but acknowledged that the Qataris need an 
official response to their proposal from the USG. 
 
Sunni Leaders 
----------------- 
¶5. (C) On the subject of Sunni leadership, HBJ cautioned that 
Americans should be careful not to "insult" Sunni tribal 
chiefs, who will not easily forget perceived insults and 
could prove difficult to work with for years to come.  HBJ 
said that the USG should "press its) policy on them slowly." 
"Let them play the game," and in this way build mutual 
respect.  Jeffrey agreed and asked for Qatar's help in 
identifying specific leaders with whom the USG should work. 
HBJ replied that his Executive Assistant had already passed 
names to former Ambassador Maureen Quinn.  After some 
discussion about the head of the Iraqi Muslim Ulema Council, 
Jeffrey warned HBJ about talking to people with blood on 
their hands. 
 
Diplomatic Help: Iran, Syria, and Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶6. (C) HBJ told Jeffrey and delegation, "The Iranians are 
interfering in Iraq.  They want to keep you busy with this 
job."  Jeffrey responded that he hoped that HBJ had told the 
Iranian foreign minister not to interfere, which he affirmed 
he had.  Responding to a misconception heard elsewhere, 
Jeffrey told HBJ that, "we are not opening the door to the 
Iranians.  No one is more opposed to the Iranians than the 
U.S.  We fought a two-year naval war in 1986-88) against 
them."  Jeffrey also instructed HBJ that the Qataris, as 
friends of the U.S., needed to talk frankly with the Syrians 
to discourage them from deliberately closing their eyes to 
the passage of foreign fighters into Iraq.  HBJ said he had 
done so within the past few days, as requested. 
 
¶7. (C) Jeffrey told HBJ that the U.S. needs help"from Arab 
countries that are on the fence," and that an exchange of 
ambassadors by Qatar and Iraq would be helpful.  HBJ said he 
would consider the Jeffrey,s offer that the U.S. provide 
safe housing for a Qatari ambassador. 
 
Iraqi Debt 
------------- 
¶8. (C) When encouraged by Treasury representative MacDonald 
to reengage with the Iraqis on Iraq,s external debt, HBJ 
responded that the USG had his word that "at the right time 
Qatar) will be helpful."  HBJ noted that Qatar was the only 
country that pledged to help during Jim Baker,s January 2004 
visit, but even so the Iraqi government had not "mentioned" 
Qatar,s willingness to forgive its external debt.  HBJ 
pledged to work with Ambassador Untermeyer and assured the 
delegation that it could rely on Qatar.  MacDonald said an 
announcement along those lines would be helpful, as would 
Qatar,s receiving the Iraqi finance minister and encouraging 
countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to do the same. 
 
Al Jazeera 
------------- 
¶9. (C) HBJ ensured Jeffrey and delegation that Qatar was 
"working hard to improve it," but that they did not want 
their relationship with the U.S. to be affected by this 
issue.  He said that Qatar can deliver on a wide range of 
issues, recalling that Qatar "supported your policy on 
Israel, on energy "We were the first country to allow joint 
ventures," and stated that Qatar deserves to be considered a 
serious small partner by the U.S.  HBJ indicated that they 
were very sensitive to pressure on Al Jazeera.  He told the 
delegation, "I wish I could close Al Jazeera.  Some 
journalists think I own 40% of it.  If that were true, I 
would sell it." 
 
¶10. (C) HBJ expressed his willingness to continue dialogue 
with the USG and stated he would report the meeting to the 
Amir.  HBJ also stated that he would meet with Ambassador 
Untermeyer within a week to continue the discussion. 
UNTERMEYER