This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 002675 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BR OVIP ZOELLICK ROBERT US
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR MARCOS AURELIO GARCIA, 6 
OCTOBER 2005 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4(B)(D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick, 
accompanied by Ambassador Danilovich and delegation, met on 6 
October with Marco Aurelio Garcia, International Affairs 
Advisor to President Lula da Silva.  Garcia has often served 
as Lula's special envoy for crisis situations in the region, 
and much of the discussion focused on Bolivia, where the GOB 
has tried to use both economic and political influence to 
enhance stability and press for constitutional solutions. The 
GOB sees Bolivia (as well as Ecuador and Peru) as 
"fragilized" and views the coming Bolivian elections, the 
debate on regionalization and a future constitutional 
assembly as the key passages that will determine Bolivia's 
future. D/S Zoellick urged that the OAS and IDB be involved 
in supporting Bolivia in weathering those moments and in 
institution building generally.  On Venezuela, Garcia 
indicated that the GOB has used its influence with Chavez to 
successfully insert the "Group of Friends" into a useful role 
in last year's referendum, to try to "soften" his 
anti-American stances, and to mediate between Colombia and 
Venezuela during a recent crisis.  But Garcia would not be 
drawn into a substantive discussion of Chavez's repressive 
internal political actions.  D/S Zoellick asked that the USG 
and GOB look for ways to place the theme of democratic 
solidarity in the region at the center stage of the upcoming 
Summit of the Americas (with emphasis on the roles the OAS 
and IDB can play). On bilateral relations, D/S Zoellick 
suggested that the GOB and USG look for areas where 
cooperation could be intensified, as it seems ironic that 
U.S. relations with China and India now seem more dynamic 
than those with Brazil, the hemisphere's other giant 
democracy.  Garcia expressed receptivity and said that the 
GOB's guiding principle in its foreign policy is "expanding 
the space for democracy" in the region and world.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (U) In a 6 October morning meeting lasting more than an 
hour at the Presidency's Planalto Palace, Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick and Lula's senior international advisor, Marco 
Aurelio Garcia, reviewed a range of regional issues. 
Highlights follow below.  A delegation list is at paragraph 
¶15. 
 
 
BOLIVIA 
------- 
 
¶3. (C) Garcia said the GOB fears the entire Andean region is 
"fragilized," with Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru all facing grave 
challenges (Garcia placed Colombia in a separate category, 
owing to its internal armed conflict). Especially in Ecuador 
and Bolivia, weak institutions undermine political comity and 
stability.  In Bolivia, Garcia said enormous social and 
income inequalities exacerbate a belief in much of the 
population that the nation has been systematically "looted" 
of its natural riches (silver, energy resources), and 
wrongfully denied access to the sea.  "A certain type of 
nationalism" stems from these views, affecting the behavior 
of all political forces in the country, to the detriment of 
rational discourse on politics, economics and foreign 
investment, Garcia said. 
 
¶4. (C) Brazil's approach to trying to assist Bolivia, Garcia 
explained, includes deepening its economic presence in the 
country, seeking to invest heavily in gas, chemical and 
metallurgical projects that can create employment and attract 
other foreign investment. But these efforts are "paralyzed" 
in Bolivia's insecure environment, a point that Garcia said 
he and other GOB envoys regularly stress with Bolivian 
interlocutors ranging from Evo Morales to Santa Cruz 
businessmen. With all of these interlocutors the GOB insists 
that Bolivians must seek constitutional resolutions to their 
country's political crises, which are both electoral and 
institutional, Garcia said.  (He added that President Lula 
intends to meet the major candidates and personally reinforce 
this message.)  But the GOB doubts that any candidate in the 
coming presidential candidate will garner close to fifty 
percent of the vote. Hence the congress would again have to 
select a president, inevitably undermining his legitimacy, 
especially if the congress' choice is not the largest vote 
getter. For that reason, Garcia expressed some sympathy for 
the idea of a two-stage referendum. 
 
¶5. (C) Despite the challenges, Garcia expressed the GOB's 
belief that the situation in Bolivia is "unstable but 
controllable."  Noting his emergency visits to Bolivia as 
Lula's envoy during crisis points in 2003 and again this 
year, Garcia opined that Bolivians "may approach the edge of 
the abyss" but always seem to find a way back.  Whoever 
emerges as president will quickly perceive the need to build 
a national consensus for governance, and this will moderate 
his views, including on the petrochemical questions. Garcia 
said the GOB reinforces this reality in its conversations 
with Evo Morales in particular, and the GOB "has information" 
that Morales is actually becoming more pragmatic in his 
outlook as he contemplates the possibility of winning (which 
Garcia quickly said the GOB still sees as uncertain).  Garcia 
downplayed the importance of foreign actors in Bolivia, 
saying that Hugo Chavez and foreign NGOs may try to exert 
influence, but the dominant factors in Bolivia are internal 
ones.  Garcia even claimed that Chavez, at Brazil's behest, 
had played a moderating role in convincing Morales and his 
supporters to soften their positions on legislation on 
petrochemical industries. 
 
¶6. (C) Deputy Secretary Zoellick agreed with the importance 
of addressing the fragility of institutions in Bolivia. He 
pointed out the danger of a refusal by parts of the 
population to accept election results, and in that regard, 
emphasized the importance of international election observers 
and an international presence in the election's aftermath. 
He asked what the U.S., Brazil, the OAS, and the IDB could do 
to build institutions in Bolivia. 
 
¶7. (C) Garcia saw three key passages ahead where 
international efforts to support Bolivia could be focused. 
First, the election will set the political context and 
anticipate the conflicts for the foreseeable future.  Second, 
the current debate about regionalization (including focus on 
potential models such as Spain) will influence events.  And 
third, the constitutional assembly will be a bellwether of 
Bolivia's direction, one that is linked closely to the first 
two.  If the election and regionalization debate can produce 
results that contribute to legitimacy, stability and 
dialogue, then a salutary environment will be set for a 
constitutional assembly.  But if the elections and 
regionalization debate produce greater polarization, the 
constitutional assembly will be "surreal," with extremist 
forces hijacking debate with divisive, exotic and unworkable 
proposals, Garcia said. 
 
¶8. (C) D/S Zoellick replied that the USG believes the OAS 
could play helpful roles.  Indeed, the USG believes now is 
the time for thinking creatively of how the OAS and IDB can 
be used more effectively in institution-building throughout 
the region, since democracy is not only about elections, but 
about institutions that work.  Observing that he had just 
come from Managua, D/S Zoellick pointed to Nicaragua as a 
vivid example of the need for political parties that can 
represent broad constituencies (Nicaragua has no center-left 
party that can counter balance the Sandinistas, he noted), 
for objective courts, and for tackling corruption. 
 
¶9. (C) Garcia said he shared these views on the OAS, though 
he said the organization may at times have to operate in a 
"complex" manner. In example, he noted that the OAS's ability 
to engage in Bolivia during the crisis there earlier this 
year had been hampered by the fact that the new Secretary 
General is Chilean -- a sore point for Bolivians.  Instead, 
Argentina and Brazil had sent in envoys (Garcia was 
dispatched by Lula). (Note: Garcia failed to mention that the 
envoys never reached Sucre, where the Bolivian congress was 
meeting, due to riots in that city. End Note.) In future in 
Bolivia, the OAS may be able to become involved.  He also 
noted Brazil's efforts to assist Ecuador in developing a 
non-politicized judicial system, and said this is an area in 
which the OAS might be especially helpful throughout the 
region. 
 
NICARAGUA 
--------- 
 
¶10. (C) Picking up on D/S Zoellick's comments on Nicaragua, 
Garcia said he would visit that country in the near future, 
and intended to meet with representatives from across the 
political spectrum.  He said he would insist in all of his 
conversations on respect for elections and institutions.  D/S 
Zoellick in reply urged Garcia to speak to the PLC. 
 
SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) D/S Zoellick expressed his concern that the 
declaration for the upcoming Summit of the Americas (SOA) 
could become a formulaic document.  He emphasized that the 
SOA should be an important forum for showcasing the potential 
of the OAS and IDB to provide political and economic support 
for fragile nations in the hemisphere, and for strong 
democracies to express their solidarity.  It is important now 
to create a sense of hope, he added.  Garcia agreed, and 
observed that some problems in the SOA may result in part 
from "summit fatigue" and a flawed approach that has heads of 
state signing off on poor declarations at the end of 
torturous negotiations. 
 
VENEZUELA 
--------- 
 
¶12. (C) Turning to Venezuela, Garcia explained that the GOB 
has sought to maintain good relations with Venezuela and play 
a positive role there. Brazilian vital interests dictate that 
there must be no "upheaval" in its populous neighbor, because 
a meltdown in Venezuela would set a dangerous precedent for 
regional stability and endanger Brazil's economic investments 
there.  The GOB has maintained a dialogue with the opposition 
in Venezuela, which has come to see Brazil as a stabilizing 
force.  The GOB has used its influence with Chavez to bring 
the "Group of Friends" into the referedum process (though 
Chavez initially balked at the group's composition), to 
mediate between Chavez and Colombian President Uribe in the 
recent crisis over FARC presence in Venezuela, and to caution 
Chavez to take a "softer" rhetorical line with regard to the 
U.S.  Brazil continues to actively pursue joint ventures with 
Venezuela in petrol refineries, construction of oil platforms 
and tanker vessels, and provision of concessions for 
Brazilian firms operating in Venezuela. D/S Zoellick asked 
whether the GOB is concerned about repressive internal 
actions by Chavez against opposition elements, NGOs and the 
press.  Garcia demurred on a clear response, saying only that 
the GOB is taking a "wait and see" approach to the internal 
political scene and that the Venezuelan press appears to 
continue to be outspoken in its attacks on Chavez. 
 
 
BILATERAL RELATIONS 
------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) In considering U.S.-Brazil relations, D/S Zoellick 
said he wanted to "plant some seeds" with the GOB.  Noting 
that he had recently returned from a bilateral strategic 
dialogue in China and that the U.S. relationship with India 
is also evolving, D/S Zoellick said he had found himself 
thinking of Brazil and finding it ironic that there is not a 
similar movement toward broader horizons in the U.S. 
relationship with Brazil, the other giant democracy in the 
western hemisphere.  D/S Zoellick suggested that the USG and 
GOB should consider new ways for working together in 
initiatives on democracy building, development and assistance 
projects and cooperation in science and technology, health 
and the environment.  He also suggested more frequent contact 
at the ministerial level in finance and other areas beyond 
the traditional realm of foreign ministries. 
 
¶14. (C) Ambassador Abednur endorsed this approach and noted 
his own contacts with a range of ministries in Brasilia to 
energize cooperation in several areas.  Garcia also agreed, 
saying the GOB would welcome concrete initiatives to deepen 
relations between the U.S. and Brazil.  He criticized 
Brazilian pundits who have frequently charged that the Lula 
administration's foreign policy ignores or antagonizes the 
U.S. for ideological reasons.  Garcia opined that, while 
Brazil's is a government of the left, it does not allow 
ideology to influence its "realistic" approach to the world. 
The GOB's guiding interest is "expanding the space for 
democracy" throughout the world, starting in this hemisphere. 
Garcia further observed that personal ties are important to 
Lula, and that the friendship he enjoys with Presidents Bush 
positively colors the bilateral relationship, as does the 
good relations between FM Amorim and D/S Zoellick, and 
Finance Minister Palocci and Treasury Secretary Snow.  Such 
relationships "are not accidental" and are reflective of the 
many things that the two countries have in common, Garcia 
added. 
 
 
¶15. (U) PARTICIPANTS: 
 
GOB: 
 
Marcos Aurelio Garcia, International Affairs Advisor to 
President Lula 
Ambassador Roberto Abdenur, Brazilian Ambassador to the 
United States 
Paulo Chuc, Foreign Ministry Americas Desk Officer 
Cristian Viana, Foreign Ministry Advisor 
 
 
USG: 
 
Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick 
Ambassador John Danilovich 
NSC Senior Director Tom Shannon 
DCM Phillip Chicola 
D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla 
Political Counselor Dennis Hearne (notetaker) 
Interpreter 
 
 
¶16. (U) D/S Zoellick's delegation cleared this message.