This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KCRM CO AUC FARC
SUBJECT: NO CHANGE IN EXTRADITION POLICY FOLLOWING AUC 
STATEMENT, GOC HAS 10 DAYS TO RESTORE PEACE PROCESS MOMENTUM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) In a 90-minute meeting with Ambassador Wood on 
October 7, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo described 
paramilitary leaders as distrustful of President Uribe and 
scared of extradition, but confirmed GOC extradition policy 
would remain unchanged following the October 6 AUC statement 
suspending demobilizations.  Restrepo said the GOC calculates 
it has about 10 days to ensure that the peace process regains 
its momentum before pending demobilizations, and the December 
31 deadline, are threatened.  He noted that more than 1,000 
members of the Bloque Central Bolivar had left the 
concentration zone for demobilization and returned to the 
field.  Restrepo expressed great concern that the GOC would 
struggle to secure the security corridors left exposed by the 
pending demobilizations of the Bloque Central Bolivar, and 
said Colombians are insufficiently attentive to the FARC 
retaking control of the areas.  End summary. 
 
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Restrepo: Paras Distrustful, Scared 
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¶2.  (C) Restrepo said the paramilitary leaders with whom he 
met in Santa Fe de Ralito October 6 distrust President Uribe 
and are scared that they could be extradited to the U.S. 
Their behavior and statements were not "radical"; rather, 
they appeared to lack confidence in the president and the 
peace process.  The leaders told him they are the stronger 
"third generation" of paramilitary leaders and they fear 
being accused by their followers of selling out if they do 
not ensure that Don Berna is safe from extradition, for they 
could be next (Colima prison is the "antechamber to 
extradition," they believe).  The leaders say Uribe takes 
decisions over their heads and makes it difficult for them to 
defend the peace process to their subordinates.  Restrepo 
described the behavior of demobilized leader Salvatore 
Mancuso as especially revealing: he had his head in his hands 
frequently, and appeared scared at times and dumbfounded 
("tonto") at others.  He asked for forgiveness for his deeds 
and told Restrepo he did not even want to be at Ralito for 
the meeting.  Similarly, Vicente Castano sent a letter to 
Restrepo saying he would not participate in the meeting. 
Restrepo said demobilized commanders (like Mancuso and 
Castano) are in the worst of all positions, in that they have 
no troops to command and rely on the GOC for their security. 
 
¶3.  (C) The leaders told Restrepo they feared "judicial 
uncertainty" and requested legal guarantees that they would 
not be extradited.  As stated in an October 7 presidential 
press release (see para 10), Restrepo said "judicial 
certainty" does not depend on legal norms but rather on the 
political credibility of the peace process.  In turn, such 
credibility is intimately linked to the seriousness with 
which the paramilitaries approach their obligations under the 
Justice and Peace law.  Restrepo told the paramilitaries 
Uribe had to take the decision to transfer Don Berna to 
Colima to maintain the integrity of the peace process. 
Restrepo emphasized that Uribe made the decision some time 
before Ambassador Wood characterized as "disappointing" 
Uribe's decision to suspend Don Berna's extradition.  In the 
GOC's view, sending Don Berna to Combita does not violate any 
GOC undertaking; the Justice and Peace law requires 
paramilitary leaders such as Don Berna to be incarcerated in 
"serious prisons." 
 
¶4.  (C) According to Restrepo, the leaders at Ralito 
requested that the GOC issue a joint declaration saying that 
demobilizations were suspended; dialogue would restart; and 
Don Berna would have the same "probation" (i.e., freedom to 
move around and meet with people) as ELN leader Francisco 
Galan.  The GOC declined the suggestions.  Restrepo said the 
GOC offered the paramilitaries two options: first, that the 
GOC would seek their suggestions on how the "Casas de 
Justicia y Paz" (justice centers) would operate (Restrepo did 
not elaborate); and second, that the GOC would reaffirm its 
recognition of Don Berna as a paramilitary leader.  According 
to Restrepo, it is "practically impossible" to go beyond 
these offers. 
 
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Ambassador: GOC Has Made Great Progess, Should Stay Course 
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¶5.  (C) Noting he was reading from instructions, the 
Ambassador told Restrepo the GOC should remember it was 
negotiating from a position of strength.  Don Berna is in a 
serious prison, thousands have demobilized, and remaining 
leaders feel vulnerable.  The behavior of paramilitary 
leaders is a test for the peace process.  The Ambassador said 
the U.S. was not looking for a public confirmation of the 
GOC's continued commitment to extradition; rather, the U.S. 
wants to know privately that doors have not closed, and that 
the GOC's firm policy on extradition remains intact.  He 
expressed concern at the AUC's statement about "redefining" 
the "rules of the game," a position the Ambassador suggested 
was a codeword for reexamining extradition.  In the 
Ambassador's view, this is not the time for punishments or 
vengeance.  The GOC should, however, insist on the December 
31 date by which paramilitaries must demobilize to receive 
benefits under the Justice and Peace law. 
 
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GOC Extradition Policy Will Not Change 
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¶6.  (C) Restrepo was clear that the GOC would not change its 
extradition policy in response to paramilitary demands 
("definitely no extradition on the table").  He agreed with 
the Ambassador that the policy is somewhat ambiguous with 
regard to paramilitary leaders: a subjective GOC assessment 
of leaders' compliance with Justice and Peace obligations 
would be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to 
decide an extradition case.  Paramilitary leaders know the 
GOC will assess their behavior carefully before making a 
judgment to extradite.  Even if the leaders comply in full 
(which the Ambassador said he doubted in cases such as Don 
Berna), the GOC still had the option of extraditing. 
Restrepo agreed that this was the nub of the paramilitaries' 
concern: they want to shut the legal door on the possibility 
of extradition and the GOC cannot agree.  The Ambassador and 
Restrepo agreed that extradition would not be the subject of 
a GOC-paramilitary negotiation. 
 
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GOC Considers it has 10 Days to Restore Momentum 
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¶7.  (C) About 10 days remain for the GOC to restore the peace 
process and demobilization momentum, in Restrepo's view.  Any 
delay beyond that date risks the process unraveling.  The GOC 
must retake control of the peace process but should avoid 
issuing an "ultimatum," he said.  (Text of the GOC's 
preliminary response to the October 6 AUC statement is at 
para 10.) 
 
¶8.  (C) Restrepo expressed concern at the recent dispersal of 
1,000 of the Bloque Central Bolivar (BCB) paramilitaries from 
their initial demobilization concentration zones.  (The 
3,500-strong BCB is the backbone of the paramilitary 
movement.)  He said the availability of cheap weapons and the 
ease with which paramilitaries could return to their previous 
zones of influence worried the GOC.  Restrepo will not meet 
with Don Berna October 7 to avoid the impression he is 
negotiating with him in the wake of the October 6 AUC 
statement.  Rather, Restrepo plans to call Don Berna next 
week and offer to reaffirm his role as a paramilitary leader 
and peace process negotiator, and suggest communication 
options from Colima so Don Berna can continue to persuade his 
followers to disarm.  (Restrepo has heard from two sources 
that Don Berna is not in agreement with paramilitary leader 
Ernesto Baez's October 6 AUC statement.  Don Berna apparently 
fears being "too radical," a position that could push Uribe 
to authorize his extradition.)  The GOC will hold out the 
possibility of additional jail visits for Don Berna. 
Restrepo said the GOC will also try to convince Don Berna and 
his supporters that the GOC has not locked the cell door and 
thrown away the key.  It is in his interest, and that of his 
followers, to fulfill his Justice and Peace commitments to 
the letter, Restrepo said. 
 
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Restrepo Fears FARC Incursions 
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¶9.  (C) In Restrepo's view, Colombians do not sufficiently 
appreciate the dangers of the FARC (and to some extent the 
ELN) retaking control of stategic territory when the BCB 
demobilizes.  BCB demobilizations would open up key corridors 
to FARC incursions, such as a corridor to Uraba (the site of 
the San Jose de Apartado massacre).  The GOC cannot get more 
out of its police and military forces, who are stretched to 
the limit.  Restrepo said he was pleased when Uribe told him 
he had recently removed General Cabellos from command; 
Restrepo said Ceballos always offered excuses and analyses 
rather than action when asked to deliver security. 
 
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Text of October 7 Presidential Press Release 
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¶10.  (U) Begin unofficial Embassy translation of October 7 
presidential press release: 
 
Judicial security for those that will benefit from Justice 
and Peace Law will depend on their seriousness in complying 
with the Law, in order to generate national and international 
credibility. 
 
No norms will guarantee security of the process; lack of 
seriousness does not generate credibility.  Despite the 
perceived inflexibility of a norm that has been adopted to 
guarantee judicial security, if there is no credibility, it 
becomes absolete. 
In public opinion and in the contemporary world, 
characterized by interrelations between people, judicial 
norms and the decisions that have to do with justice and 
peace processes can only be stable if the compliance is 
serious and it meets expectations, dispel doubts, and 
finally, generates the necessary legitimacy that corresponds 
to credibility from all beneficiaries. 
 
Only if there is seriousness is there credibility.  Only if 
there is credibility is there seriousness. 
 
End text of October 7 presidential press release. 
WOOD