O 261653Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0403
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 003498 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015 
TAGS: IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: FM SALLOUKH DISCUSSES MEHLIS AND 
LEBANON-SYRIA 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador.  Reason:  Sections 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh was 
enthusiastic in his support of the Mehlis report findings, 
but was reluctant to send a Lebanese representative to next 
Monday's planned UNSC meeting of foreign ministers.  He 
considers this meeting strictly an affair between Syria and 
the Security Council.  With respect to next week's 
anticipated UNSC resolution calling on Syria to cooperate 
fully with the on-going investigation, Salloukh cautioned 
against imposition of sanctions and urged patience.  He 
soft-pedaled the October 25 border incident in which a 
Lebanese army civilian employee was killed by hostile fire 
from Syria, and again urged patience.  He insists that 
Lebanon and Syria are making progress on normalizing 
relations, despite the absence to date of specific actions. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Lebanese FM Fawzi Salloukh, joined by aide Rami 
Mourtada, received the Ambassador and poloff on October 26. 
Salloukh, as a member of the Shia community, owes his 
position to support from Hizballah and Amal's political 
monolith.  But in recent weeks, and particularly following 
the September New York Core Group meetings on Lebanon, he has 
displayed an independent streak in defending the programs of 
Prime Minister Siniora, and doing little to affiliate himself 
with the Shia leaders of Hizballah and Amal. 
 
UN DEBATE ON THE MEHLIS FINDINGS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  FM Salloukh declared that Boutros Assaker, the MFA's 
#2 official now in New York, had delivered an effective 
explanation of the situation in the country to the UNSC the 
previous day.  The foreign minister indicated he had sent 
Assaker a detailed letter of instruction that corresponded to 
decisions reached in last Saturday's meeting of the Council 
of Ministers and was pleased that his government's position, 
as well as its request for an extension of the Mehlis 
Commission, had been well received by the Council.  Salloukh 
said the GOL was now awaiting the response of the Security 
Council. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Salloukh informed the Ambassador the Cabinet was 
unified in its approach.  He said the government believes 
that although Detlev Mehlis had diligently uncovered a 
significant amount of critical information, the investigation 
was not complete, and -- in a surprising comment -- that an 
extension even beyond December 15 may be necessary. 
Commenting on the unanimity of the Cabinet, he stated, "All 
of us are looking for the truth." 
 
¶5.  (C)  When asked how he thought the international 
community could best compel Syria to cooperate, FM Salloukh 
(who is not unsympathetic to Syria) recommended a strongly 
worded resolution that spells out what was required of the 
Syrian regime.  But he also advised that sanctions would not 
work.  Salloukh insisted the Syrian regime in the last few 
days had signaled it was now willing to cooperate fully with 
the investigation, but he also admitted that there has been 
"conflict" among the Syrian ruling elite, particularly 
between Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shara and his deputy, 
Walid al-Mu'allim.  But even with this internal Syrian 
debate, Salloukh maintained things could be resolved to the 
satisfaction of the Security Council. 
 
AWAITING THE LARSEN REPORT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Concerning the imminent release of the Roed-Larsen 
report on implementation of UNSCR 1559, FM Salloukh rather 
anxiously asked the Ambassador what it might contain. 
Salloukh suggested that the situation in Lebanon had improved 
significantly over the past year, perhaps in an effort to 
blunt the expected criticism from the UNSYG's report. 
 
¶7.  (C)  When asked whether the GOL would be sending a 
official to present Lebanon's case in next week's meeting of 
foreign ministers, Salloukh said he would simply follow the 
instructions of the Council of Ministers, which as of this 
time had not made a decision on the matter.  While stating, 
"If the Cabinet says to go, I will go...," he also said he 
believes Monday's meeting was really between Syria and the 
Security Council members.  "We have said our piece and made 
our request." 
 
NORMALIZING LEBANESE - SYRIAN RELATIONS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  In response to the Ambassador's concern that Syria 
did not appear to be taking any positive action to improve 
Lebanese-Syrian relations, Salloukh maintained that Syria 
wanted normal relations, but because of international 
pressure found it "difficult" to take concrete steps, such as 
showing an interest in demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian 
border or discussions to establish normal diplomatic 
relations. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Salloukh rebuffed the Ambassador's observation that 
Syria usually represented a one-way street for Lebanon.  He 
pointed out that commercial border traffic had recently 
improved and that "infiltration" across the borders appeared 
to have fallen off during the last two weeks.  But he 
acknowledged these steps were not enough, and conceded that 
Lebanon had to insist that Syria discuss normal relations, 
and do it soon. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Salloukh suggested that "perhaps after New York," 
Syrian and Lebanese officials could meet to begin a dialogue 
on the mutual interests of the two countries.  Displaying an 
interesting empathy with the Syrian predicament, Salloukh 
argued that issues such as border demarcation could not be 
discussed while Syria was the focus of both the Mehlis and 
Larsen reports. 
 
¶11.  (C)  As he had preented earlier, the foreign minister 
argued for patience, saying, "we inherited a large hill, we 
have to start removing these heaps until we reach the paved 
road."  He believed the fact that Syria is also suffering 
from poor relations with its close neighbor Lebanon would 
compel the Syrian government to seek normalized relations. 
 
INCIDENTS ON THE BORDER 
AND IN AIN EL-HELWEH 
----------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  The foreign minister briefly addressed two 
incidents:  last week's firefight just outside the large Ain 
el-Helweh refugee camp in Sidon and the October 25 shooting 
which killed an Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) civilian surveyor 
near the Lebanon-Syria border in the southern Biq'a Valley. 
Salloukh said he had just met with Sidon-based MP Bahiya 
Hariri (sister of former PM Rafik Hariri) who assured him 
that tensions had eased and that the civil authorities, as 
well as representatives from Amal and Hizballah, were 
effectively dealing with the matter.  There were still two 
suspects wanted by the authorities, but Salloukh said he 
believed the issue was being resolved.  With regard to the 
fatal border shooting on October 25, Salloukh unconvincingly 
said he only knew what he read in the newspapers that 
morning.  He admitted it was "not a good indication," but 
indicated the facts were murky.  "It is a pity and we are 
investigating."  He did say it illustrated the need to settle 
the border, and not just in the Biq'a, because "there are 
many places where the border is in question." 
 
¶13. (C)  Salloukh finished the meeting with an observation it 
was too early to decide whether an international tribunal 
would be required to adjudicate cases resulting from the 
Mehlis investigation.  As with other matters, he counseled 
patience. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Foreign Minister Salloukh supports Mehlis' 
findings, he has requested continued UN support to Lebanon's 
judiciary and security services, and he indicated a desire 
for Syrian cooperation with the investigation as well as 
normal relations between the two countries.  But he also 
displayed passivity toward compelling immediate Syrian 
movement on a number of issues, and specifically, early 
discussions on normalizing relations.  He would not be a 
strong ally in 10/31 discussions in New York.  End comment. 
 
 
FELTMAN