O 061620Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0123
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 003291 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: IS LE KPAL PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  JUMBLATT'S STRAIGHT TALK 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per section 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  In a meeting with the Ambassador on the 
afternoon of October 6, Druse leader Walid Jumblatt flatly 
stated his belief that the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and 
the series of bombings committed since then, were the work of 
the Syrian regime, specifically Bashar Assad.  His colleague, 
Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, who was also 
at the luncheon, stated the Syrians "are on the 
counter-attack, similar to what they did last November and 
December."  Hamadeh maintained the Syrian campaign began with 
the July 12 assassination attempt on Minister of Defense 
Elias Murr, and has been increasing in tempo.  Jumblatt said 
the international community should send Bashar another 
message, warning the Syrian president not to destabilize 
Lebanon.  Regarding the recent public dispute over the 
intentions of Palestinian militias in Lebanon, Jumblatt 
suggested now was not the time to raise an internal conflict 
over militias and arms that have been there a long time 
because it would shift the focus from Mehlis -- and away from 
Syria.  Jumblatt also criticized the extended absence of Saad 
Hariri, who he believes is now heavily influenced by the 
advice of President Chirac.  Concerning a possible visit to 
Washington, Jumblatt adopted a relatively disinterested pose, 
despite his earlier requests for Embassy assistance.  His 
plans are now open-ended and, having missed his original 
Georgetown lecture date, he may not travel until after 
Ramadan.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Ambassador hosted a lunch for Druse leader Walid 
Jumblatt on Thursday afternoon, October 6.  (Jumblatt was on 
the Embassy compound to also obtain a visitor's visa, whose 
issuance required a waiver from the Department due to 
intemperate comments made by the Druse leader in 2003.)  Also 
attending the luncheon were Ministry of Telecommunications 
Marwan Hamadeh (an assassination target in October 2004) and 
former member of parliament (and aspiring presidential 
candidate) Dr. Ghattas Khoury, as well as Poloff and Pol 
Specialist.  Jumblatt appeared tired and was quiet at the 
outset of the meeting, but became more animated as the 
discussions progressed, particularly when he recalled 
anecdotes from the civil war.  He fondly remembered the time 
his forces inadvertently shelled the residences of both the 
U.S. and Spanish ambassadors, even though what they were 
really trying to hit was the Baabda palace -- which according 
to the old warlord, "is really quite difficult to do." 
 
SYRIA'S CENTRAL ROLE 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The primary topic of conversation was the role of 
the Syrian regime in Lebanon's instability.  Jumblatt clearly 
stated that Bashar Assad and his regime were responsible for 
the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, as well as the recent 
series of events which were increasing tensions -- the recent 
more aggressive posture taken by Palestinian militias in the 
Biqa and their enclave located south of Beirut, strong 
attacks against the government in Parliament by Hizballah 
representatives, as well as the long string of unsolved 
bombings in and around Beirut.  Marwan Hamadeh categorized 
these developments as a "counter-attack" orchestrated by the 
Syrian regime under the direct supervision of Bashar Assad to 
ensure its survival and escape from the intense international 
pressure.  Hamadeh maintained this most recent Syrian effort 
dates back to the July 12 attempted assassination of Minister 
of Defense Elias Murr, and it has increased in tempo and 
aggressiveness. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Jumblatt suggested to the Ambassador the time was 
right to send a message to Syria -- to warn it to cease its 
campaign of violence and destabilization in Lebanon.  When 
asked what form this warning should take, Jumblatt smiled and 
suggested "perhaps a message from Iraq."  Hamadeh took a more 
serious tone, but he concurred with the Druse leader and 
insisted Syria was now calling in all its resources and would 
escalate the situation as we come closer to the release of 
the Mehlis report.  All three guests inquired about the 
report, and while the Ambassador said he did not know its 
contents, he urged his guests to continue to support the work 
of the Mehlis investigation and to ask their political 
colleagues to do likewise.  He stressed that the difficult 
part would come with the release of the report, when its 
findings had to be effectively implemented by Lebanon's 
judicial system.  Jumblatt and Hamadeh both felt that UN 
investigative and judicial assistance was critical in the 
post-report phase and hoped the UN effort would continue. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Addressing the political climate, Jumblatt 
acknowledged that tensions had increased, especially 
concerning the recent attention given to arms held by 
Palestinian militias.  Jumblatt argued that pressure at this 
time was counter-productive because it took the focus off the 
real culprit and source of instability -- the Syrian regime. 
He reasoned that those Palestinian groups, and their arms, 
had always been a part of the Lebanese political landscape. 
He agreed that the issue needed to be addressed, but he 
argued not at this time.  It simply took pressure off Syria 
and increased Sunni-Shia tensions.  The Ambassador noted that 
it was not the Lebanese Armed Forces that had raised the 
tensions recently, but rather Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC had 
changed the status quo. 
 
¶6.  The conversation turned to political personalities and 
how they were performing in office.  Khoury, Hamadeh, and 
even a grudging Jumblatt, agreed that PM Siniora was punching 
well above his weight class.  His unyielding defense of the 
government and his non-sectarian tenor in yesterday's debate 
in parliament impressed even previous detractors.  Hamadeh 
and Jumblatt both believe he is not being well served by a 
hit-and-miss collection of cabinet members, but overall his 
performance both in New York and, more importantly, at home 
has been unexpectedly sound and reassuring.  (Comment: 
Jumblatt has been known to grumble about Siniora.  We 
attribute his positive attitude today to the fact that 
Siniora called Jumblatt and met with him yesterday, the first 
face-to-face meeting since mid-July.  Jumblatt's notorious 
paranoia, we have discovered, worsens when he feels he is 
being ignored.  End comment.) 
 
¶7.  (C)  The same could not be said for Sa'ad Hariri, whose 
frequent and lengthy absences are clearly getting on the 
nerves of other political leaders.  Jumblatt sarcastically 
asked, "where is our majority leader?"  Hamadeh suggested 
that Hariri receives far too much of his advice from 
President Chirac, who himself is far too conservative because 
he feels partly responsible for assuring Rafiq Hariri shortly 
before his assassination "not to be concerned because he 
(Chirac) had delivered a message."  Even Dr. Khoury, who owes 
much to the Hariri bloc, suggested that the least Sa'ad 
should do during the holy month of Ramadan is to show up in 
Lebanon for a few days and host Iftar dinners for his anxious 
followers.  Regarding the almost invisible Samir Ja'ja, 
leader of the Lebanese Forces, Jumblatt curtly and 
dismissively stated, "he is the least of my concerns." 
 
WASHINGTON VISITS 
 
¶8.  (C)  Jumblatt was noncommittal on rescheduling his 
Washington trip, saying that his Georgetown University 
sponsors had suggested waiting until after Ramadan.  (Note: 
Jumblatt's Georgetown lecture was originally scheduled for 
October 4, but Jumblatt himself asked that it be postponed to 
ensure sufficient time for U.S. visa adjudication.  End 
note.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Walid Jumblatt displayed his usual sang froid and, 
when interested, had a comment on nearly every issue.  His 
unequivocal belief that Bashar Assad and his regime are 
directly responsible for the full range of activities that 
have destabilized Lebanon was of note, as was Marwan Hamadeh 
belief that the Syrian regime will likely attempt 
increasingly risky behavior to escape the corner it now finds 
itself.  End comment. 
 
 
FELTMAN