This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ KRG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT TALABANI'S CHIEF OF STAFF  COMMENTS ON 
MERGER BETWEEN PUK AND KDP 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford 
for   Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Kurds appear fairly confident 
about their chances in the December election, and have 
begun working on their joint list of candidates, 
according to Kamiran Karadaghi, President Talabani's 
chief of staff, on October 23.  The two Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) administrations must be 
combined, but Karadogi warned that forcing the issue 
would be destabilizing. In response to PolOffs' query 
on the issue of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 
reported infiltration of the Makhmour refugee camp, 
Karadogi replied that both the PUK and the KDP knew 
the PKK was operating out of the camp.  He said that 
neither the Kurds nor the Americans could afford to 
take on this issue, and warned that Kurdish support 
for the U.S. in Iraq would evaporate if the Americans 
went after the PKK.  He offered his own solution to 
the PKK issue: offer a general amnesty to the PKK in 
Turkey and offer a quiet conference between Turkish 
military and political leaders, Iraqi Kurds, and the 
U.S.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
A National Accord? 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Karadogi confirmed that the PUK and KDP had 
formed a joint committee, along with some other 
smaller groups in Kurdistan, to present a unified 
candidate list for the December 15 election.  He 
confided that many in both the PUK and the KDP were 
unhappy with the quality of their representation in 
the TNA this year, and were seeking to field more 
qualified and proactive members.  Even a 40 percent 
improvement in the caliber of the candidates would be 
a major achievement, complained Karadogi. 
 
¶3. (C) Talabani gave too much consideration to 
candidates from his own PUK party, Karadogi continued. 
He emphasized that he himself was not a member of any 
Kurdish party but was merely reporting as a neutral 
observer.  He indicated that Talabani would remain the 
Kurds' candidate for President in the coming election, 
and that Barzani would continue to operate out of 
Irbil. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Irbil and Sulymaniyah to Combine? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Karadogi stated that Talabani and KDP leader 
Masud Barzani had met in Irbil recently to discuss the 
details of merging the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) administrations in Irbil and Sulymaniyah.  The 
talks had even named a single KRG Prime Minister 
designate that both sides supported.  However, there 
was more difficulty in deciding what to do with the 
rest of the civil servants in the two administrative 
organizations.  He was quick to reassure us that the 
service ministries were not going to be an issue, as 
both governments had excellent records; however, 
finding suitable positions for the technocrats in 
Irbil and Sulymaniyah was slowing the process down. 
 
¶5. (C) When pressed on how to speed up the process, 
Karadogi admitted that he was not concerned about the 
delay.  "A merger idea was floated in 1997 and 1998 
and it didn't work," he stated flatly.  He countered 
that separate governments actually worked to 
Kurdistan's advantage - the two sides were so busy 
competing with each other to provide security and 
services for their people that they did not have time 
to fight.  There was no hurry to merge, he concluded. 
Indeed, he said, forcing the issue would result in 
destabilizing the region and creating a less effective 
government. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Who's Afraid of the PKK? 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) In response to PolOffs' query on the issue of 
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) reported 
infiltration of the Makhmour refugee camp, Karadogi 
replied that both the PUK and the KDP knew the PKK was 
operating out of the camp, but that neither the Kurds 
nor the Americans could afford to take on this issue. 
The Kurdish public in the north would not support any 
attack against other Kurds, regardless of their 
affiliation, he stated.  Both parties have advised the 
U.S. not to get involved in fighting the PKK, 
Karadaghi said.  He warned that Kurdish support for 
the U.S. in Iraq would evaporate if the Americans went 
after the PKK. 
 
¶7. (C) Karadogi offered his own solution to the PKK 
issue: offer a general amnesty to the PKK in Turkey 
and offer a quiet conference between Turkish military 
and political leaders, Iraqi Kurds, and the U.S.  The 
PKK would immediately disband if offered an amnesty 
and a chance to go back to their homes in the north of 
Turkey, according to Karadogi.  Unlike Kurds in Iraq, 
Turkish Kurds had more of a sense of Turkish identity, 
are fully integrated economically, and if offered the 
chance would be willing to peacefully coexist with the 
Turks.  The key is not to make amnesty a political 
issue, he stressed, just a practical move to stop the 
violence.  When pressed by Poloffs on how such an 
amnesty could avoid politicization, especially when 
the Turkish Kurds begin to press for regional autonomy 
like their Iraqi brethren, Karadogi just shrugged his 
shoulders and laughed. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Karadogi's comments on eventual merger of the 
KRGs in Irbil and Sulymaniyah echo reports Embassy 
Baghdad have been hearing from other sources in 
Kurdistan.  Although the two parties will eventually 
be merging the two regional government structures and 
presenting a joint list for the election, the KDP and 
PUK continue to operate as two wholly separate 
entities.  The overall impression is that any 
decisions on combining the two main Kurdish parties 
will be delayed as long as the delicate balance of 
power between Talabani and Barzani is maintained. 
 
Satterfield