This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM IZ XL
SUBJECT: FALLUJANS OVERWHELMINGLY REJECT CONSTITUTION IN 
LARGE TURNOUT; SIGNAL CONTINUED MOBILIZATION 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD, REASONS 1.4 
(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Fallujah and neighboring area residents 
voted in large numbers during the October 15 referendum. 
They overwhelmingly rejected the constitution, according to 
initial reports from Fallujah-based IECI staff.  The large 
turnout in Iraq's "city of mosques", alongside low turnout 
in the rest of Al-Anbar, guarantees that the province will 
be placed in the reject column.  Ra'ad Aboud, IECI director 
of operations for Anbar, estimated October 16 that 
approximately 170,000 Fallujah-area residents participated 
in the constitutional referendum, although IECI 
headquarters has yet to release final figures.  Most 
Fallujans who registered went to the polls.  The expected 
breakdown will be over 90 percent voting against.  There 
were no major security incidents at the city's 34 polling 
sites; the IECI-approved tribal security plan, with police 
support and extensive U.S. Marine oversight and 
involvement, worked.  Fallujah leaders told Poloff and 
Marine FAO referendum day that the city would remain 
mobilized for the December election.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
FALLUJANS VOTE "NO" IN DROVES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Fallujah's leaders had long predicted high turnout. 
They  mobilized the local Sunni-Arab vote over many 
months.  City council members, Imams and tribal leaders 
played particularly pro-active roles.  Residents largely 
followed the clerics' guidance to participate, while 
heeding informal advice that the draft would lead to a 
division of Iraq.  Most Fallujans said they had not seen or 
read the draft prior to the vote. 
 
¶3. (C) Fallujah-based IECI operations director, Ra'ad 
Aboud, provided Fallujah Poloff with initial turnout 
numbers on the evening of October 15 and more solid returns 
throughout October 16.  When the IECI team had finished 
their first review, they determined that the city voters 
overwhelmingly rejected the draft.  At some polling sites, 
100 percent voted "no" -- with only a few scattered "yes" 
votes in other sites.  Examples of this dramatically lop- 
sided ratio include preliminary stats at three sites (no 
vs. yes votes):  3,059 to 37; 2,119 to 20; and, 339 
unanimous negative votes at one location.  IECI's Ra'ad 
Aboud, himself a Sunni-Arab from Ramadi, remarked wryly 
that the "yes"" votes reflected the number of "educated 
voters" in Fallujah.  (Comment:  this is the kind of lop- 
sided turnout that is drawing IECI/Baghdad attention. 
Anbar results could well figure among those re-checked by 
the IECI.  End Comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) While city imams did not formally advocate a 
negative vote from pulpits, they pursued -- rather 
effectively based on the tentative results -- a quiet "vote 
no" approach in mosque corridors.  Clerics' whispers echoed 
the negative aspects of the draft, with "federalism equals 
division" as the most prominent mantra.  Tribal leaders, 
conversely, largely maintained their neutral stance. 
 
------------------------------------- 
R-DAY ATMOSPHERICS; IECI PERFORMANCE; 
TRIBAL SECURITY PLAN A SUCCESS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) ATMOSPHERICS:  High turnout in the city was spread 
over 34 sites.  Each neighborhood had its own polling 
location (schools often), so residents were able to vote at 
their leisure.  Fallujah Poloff visited two locations on 
referendum day, both schools.  Steady voting occurred at 
each location, with children gathered in large numbers at 
one.  The mood was calm and there was a degree of buzz in 
the air, as neighborhoods took to the streets to 
participate in the referendum. 
 
¶6. (C) IECI PERFORMANCE:  IECI staff had their problems, 
but also enjoyed baseline success.  U.S. Marine logistical 
assistance -- formally requested by IECI -- proved 
invaluable, particularly as last-minute issues arose 
regarding ballot transportation, etc.  The IECI's biggest 
disconnect stemmed from confusion over whether residents 
could vote at any city site, or only the one in which their 
registration record was held (based on the PDS/food ration 
system).  IECI Chairman Izadin had told Fallujah leaders 
that voting would not be restricted to certain locations; 
however, on R Day, residents were told the opposite. 
Fortunately, IECI staff directed voters to the right sites, 
helping to alleviate the problem.  IECI also failed to plan 
in advance for ISF voting -- a sizable group in Fallujah. 
The situation was resolved only late in the day when Iraqi 
Army units were finally given IECI go-ahead to vote. 
 
¶7. (C) TRIBAL SECURITY PLAN: The tribal security plan, 
supplemented by local police, worked; there were no major 
security incidents.  City police performed particularly 
well; police searched Poloff at both locations visited. 
Fallujans will seek to repeat this arrangement in the 
December election, and consideration will likely be given 
to expanding this model elsewhere in the province.  Future 
and wider success will depend on key parameters, to include 
an adequate CF presence and related coalition commanders' 
assessments, and an ISF role (led by police) with 
sufficient training and equipment. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  One Anbar city's results -- Fallujah's 
overwhelming "no" vote -- decisively moved the province 
into the reject column.  Zarqawi's and associated 
extremists' intimidation message failed, in the very city 
that only a year ago AMZ treated as a safe haven. 
Fallujah's high turnout will undoubtedly be noticed in 
other Anbar communities, including in provincial capital 
Ramadi.  Many Anbaris will understandably begin to ask 
whether they want Fallujah to be the vast area's singularly 
dominant political voice.  Most arguably will not.  That 
will be a healthy, and overdue, internal Sunni-Arab 
dialogue.  Fallujah's October 15 surge to polling sites 
might even hasten other Sunni-Arab leaders to move more 
aggressively against extremist intimidation and toward 
similar mobilization.  Fallujah, for now, has impressively 
laid claim to implicit political leadership at the grass- 
roots level.  The city's mobilized voting bloc will be a 
tempting target in the December election, whoever seeks to 
win it.  Fallujah leaders already predict even higher 
turnout then, flowing from referendum day momentum. 
Continued Sunni-Arab political engagement -- not the 
overwhelming and predictable "no" vote -- stands as the 
most important referendum day headline in one of Iraq's 
most well known and volatile cities.  END COMMENT. 
Khalilzad