This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2014 
TAGS: GR PGOV PREL EU AMB
SUBJECT: BALKANS UPDATE FROM THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Charles P. Ries. Reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In an October 27 meeting, Foreign Minister 
Molyviatis confirmed to Ambassador that Greece will support 
the opening of EU accession talks with "FYROM," absent 
resolution of the name issue between Greece and Macedonia. 
Prospects for resolution of the name issue, however, are dim, 
in his view.  Serbian PM Kostunica, visiting Athens October 
31, will hear from the Greeks about the need to comply with 
ICTY in the case of General Mladic and to support (and 
participate in) negotiations on Kosovo's status.  Molyviatis 
told Ambassador that he is considering a SEECP ministerial 
visit to Kosovo in December to close out Greece's 2005 SEECP 
presidency.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MACEDONIA NAME ISSUE 
 
¶2.  (C) Molyviatis asked Ambassador about a Washington Times 
article dated October 26 (citing "U.S. sources in Athens") 
that forecast a third proposal on the name issue from UN 
Special Negotiator Nimetz and Nimetz's impending resignation 
thereafter.  Ambassador pointed out that the article had 
numerous errors of fact and no one in Embassy Athens had ever 
heard of the journalist.  Molyviatis warned Ambassador that 
Greece's proposal in April (Republika Makedonija Skopje) was 
"it" as far as Greece was concerned.  If UN Special 
Negotiator Nimetz proposed a "third way" to resolve the 
Macedonia name issue that was in between his April and 
October proposals, Greece would not be able to accept it. 
When pressed, Molyviatis confirmed that Greece would study 
any new proposal from Nimetz, "but I don't know how fast we 
will reject it." 
 
¶3.  (C) Ambassador asked whether Greece's offer to upgrade 
representation in the talks still stood.  Molyviatis 
responded that this idea had been made on the basis of using 
the Nimetz proposal as the basis for talks.  He admitted, at 
Ambassador's urging, that Greece would be willing to upgrade 
the level of discussions "on no basis at all" if it would 
help promote a solution.  He stated, however, that Skopje 
"was in no mood" for compromise.  He pointed to Macedonian PM 
Buckovski's Washington visit, where no one had mentioned the 
name issue "because the facts speak for themselves" (meaning, 
presumably, that the U.S.'s recognition of Macedonia by its 
constitutional name last November put Washington squarely in 
Skopje's camp).  Somewhat gloomily, Molyviatis said he saw no 
chance for a solution for the future. 
 
¶4.  (C) Therefore, Molyviatis continued, his priority was 
keeping Macedonia's EU accession on track.   Greece had no 
problem, he stated, seeing the EU begin accession 
negotiations with "FYROM," absent resolution of the name 
issue.  He had made this position clear to in London, 
Brussels, Paris and Berlin, and Foreign Ministers Straw, 
Solana, Douste-Blazy and Fischer had assured him of their 
support.  Molyviatis said bluntly that Greece would not 
consent to a change in EU practice (of using FYROM) by the 
Council, and he emphasized that changing the EU's policy of 
using FYROM would require EU consensus, and absent an agreed 
resolution of the name, Greece would never agree to change EU 
practice in this regard. 
 
KOSTUNICA VISITS ATHENS OCTOBER 31 
 
¶5.  (C) Molyviatis told Ambassador that as he would be in New 
York on October 31 for the UNSC meeting on Syria, Deputy FM 
Valynakis would represent the MFA during PM Kostunica's 
working visit to Athens (Kostunica will meet Greek President 
Papoulias, Prime Minister Karamanlis and opposition leader 
George Papandreou).  Molyviatis and Ambassador compared notes 
on messages to Kostunica to underscore the importance of 
meeting the conditions for Euro-atlantic integration, and 
Molyviatis agreed to: 
 
-- Stress the need to bring Mladic to justice, not only 
because it demonstrates Belgrade's compliance with 
international statutes, but because it opens the door to 
Euro-atlantic integration, i.e., PfP. 
 
-- Focus on practicalities: encourage constructive Belgrade 
engagement with regard to returns and property rights -- 
issues that mattered to real people and which have to be 
addressed regardless of Kosovo's status.  Molyviatis 
mentioned that Greece was considering whether it could use 
some of the much-touted (though little in evidence) Balkans 
Reconstruction Fund to fund the return of Serbs to Kosovo. 
 
-- Press Kostunica to be in touch with UN Special Envoy 
Ahtisaari as soon as possible after his appointment to 
demonstrate Belgrade's constructive approach and to assemble 
a top-notch negotiating team. 
 
SEECP 
 
¶6.  (C) Molyviatis said that he had been discussing with his 
SEECP ministerial colleagues the idea of a SEECP meeting in 
Pristina in December in support of international status 
efforts on Kosovo.  The idea of a visit would be to 
demonstrate regional support for a settlement of status 
issues.  He started, he said, with Serbian FM Draskovic, "who 
was not negative."  Molyviatis is targeting early December 
for a visit, and is mulling over whether it would involve all 
10 SEECP ministers, or just the SEECP Troika (Greece, Romania 
and Croatia). 
RIES