This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 002168 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER IO LY SY AG
SUBJECT: SUBJECT:  ALGERIA PREPARED TO COOPERATE ON CHAPTER 
VII RESOLUTION THAT SUPPORTS MEHLIS COMMISSION, DOES NOT 
PREDJUGE SYRIAN CULPABILITY 
 
REF: STATE 197619 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman: Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In an October 26 meeting with the U.S., French, and 
British ambassadors, FM Bedjaoui confirmed he would 
participate in the October 31 UNSC ministerial, said he would 
immediately instruct their New York delegation to engage in 
resolution consultations later today, and indicated Algeria 
was prepared to go along with a Chapter VII resolution and, 
if warranted by a final Mehlis report, eventual sanctions. 
He said Algeria's approach would be influenced by its UNSC 
role representing the interest of the Arab world, its current 
responsibilities as rotating presidency of the Arab League, 
its principled rejection of political assassinations, and its 
condemnation of terrorism by anyone, anywhere, and for any 
purposes.  Emphasizing that any action on sanctions needed to 
await a final Mehlis Report, he said Algeria was willing to 
help with any initiative that would strengthen Mehlis' 
ability to carry out his mission and could agree to 
"everything" in the resolution that called for full 
cooperation with the Mehlis Commission.  On the draft text, 
he positively noted the absence of a call for sanctions on 
Syria prior to a definitive report; stressed the importance 
of keeping the focus of a new resolution on the Mehlis 
Commission; and expressed some misgivings about language 
referring to Syria's having lied to the Mehlis Commission. 
He also suggested (but then backed off in response to a 
strong French and U.S. rebuttal) the idea that calling on 
Syria to cease interference in Lebanon might be prejudging 
the situation, and quibbled that calling on Syria to renounce 
terrorism might also be prejudicial, absent a final Mehlis 
Report. (End summary.) 
 
ALGERIA'S VIEWS WILL BE SHAPED BY ITS STRONG 
CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (C) Algerian FM Bedjaoui convoked British, French, and 
U.S. Ambassadors October 26 to discuss draft UNSC resolution 
concerning the Mehlis Commission report.  He prefaced his 
remarks (in French) by noting that he had earlier in the 
morning met with ambassadors of other UNSC member countries 
present in Algiers but had wanted to meet separately with the 
ambassadors from the countries that had co-drafted the 
proposed resolution.  The current situation between Syria and 
Lebanon was very difficult, he said, "with implications we 
all know."  Algeria's approach to the issue was influenced by 
several factors.  First, on the Security Council it had the 
responsibility of reflecting Arab world concerns and 
interests.  Second, since March Algeria has held the rotating 
presidency of the Arab League.  Third, as a matter of 
principle, Algeria vigorously condemned any and all political 
assassinations.  Finally, Algeria opposed terrorism 
"anywhere, by anyone, and for whatever purpose."  In this 
regard, the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri was 
clearly an act of terrorism which Algeria condemned in the 
strongest terms. 
 
¶3. (C) Noting that Algeria firmly held to these principles, 
Bedjaoui said it was within this framework that President 
Bouteflika had discussed the issue over the last couple days 
with various leaders and would consider the proposed 
resolution.  Algeria, he emphasized again, firmly condemned 
terrorism and political assassinations, especially those 
aimed at holding on to power or territory.  As for the 
proposed resolution, Bedjaoui said the UNSC should take note 
of the Mehlis report while keeping in mind that this was an 
interim report only.  Mehlis himself had asked for more time 
in order to complete a thorough investigation and prepare a 
definitive report. 
 
ALGERIA CAN SUPPORT A CHAPTER VII RESOLUTION 
CALLING FOR COOPERATION WITH MEHLIS INVESTIGATION 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) Bedjaoui emphasized that in Algeria's view Mehlis 
should have full authority to carry out his mission.  At the 
same time, it would be important for him "not to lose the 
character of his mandate," whose terms of reference were 
agreed between the Lebanese government and the UN.  Algeria 
was willing to help with any initiative aimed at 
strengthening Mehlis' ability to carry out his mission and 
obtaining the cooperation of the Lebanese government, the 
Syrian government, and individuals with the investigation. It 
was also willing to call for this in a resolution within the 
framework of Chapter VII.  Noting appeals to Bouteflika to 
help the international community support the Mehlis 
Commission's ability to successfully carry out its mandate, 
Bedjaoui said Algeria was in favor of "everything in the 
resolution that called for cooperation with the Commission." 
 
"WE COULD ENVISION EVENTUAL SANCTIONS" 
IF WARRANTED BY FINAL MEHLIS REPORT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Bedjaoui then turned to the draft text, noting that 
they had only received it that morning and were still 
studying it.   He also noted plans for a ministerial-level 
Security Council meeting October 31, confirming his 
participation and adding that he would depart for New York 
October 28 in order to allow time to work on the text with 
his delegation.  He positively noted the draft resolution did 
not call for sanctions, adding that a definitive report from 
Mehlis was first needed before such a step could be taken. 
"At that point, we could envision eventual sanctions."   He 
expressed some misgivings about the language referring to 
Syria's having deceived the Mehlis Commission, noting he did 
not know how this would come out in the end but that this was 
an issue he planned to work on with his colleagues. 
 
FRENCH AMBASSADOR:  NON-COOPERATION WITH MEHLIS 
WILL BE UNDERSTOOD AS GROUNDS FOR SANCTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Bedjaoui then asked the three ambassadors if they had 
any comments.  Ambassador said he had not yet received the 
text with instructions, which had been promised, due to an 
apparent transmission problem and thus deferred to French 
ambassador de Verdiere, who had received the draft text. De 
Verdiere explained that the draft resolution had been driven 
by a desire of the three co-drafters to help the Mehlis 
Commission carry out its mandate by ensuring full cooperation 
with the investigation.  He agreed with Bedjaoui's point that 
the Mehlis Report was an interim report only, adding that was 
why the proposed resolution had avoided presenting the 
current report as definitive or imposing sanctions on Syria. 
"While we cannot prejudge," he assured Bedjaoui, "we are in 
the logic of sanctions," given the fact that the resolution 
was prepared under Chapter VII and that non-cooperation with 
the Mehlis Commission will be understood as grounds for 
sanctions.  De Verdiere also emphasized the independence of 
the Mehlis Commission.  It had a UN mandate which must be 
implemented.  The Security Council must not substitute itself 
for the Commission, but the latter must at the same time be 
able to carry out its mandate fully. 
 
BEDJAOUI EXPRESSES MISGIVINGS ON PARTS OF TEXT, 
POSSIBLY PREVIEWING LINE OF ARGUMENT IN NEW YORK 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. (C) Bedjaoui, an experienced jurist and former president 
of the International Court of Justice in The Hague with a 
keen eye for legalisms, questioned whether the resolution's 
call on Syria to cease interference in Lebanese affairs was 
consistent with a presumption of innocence, pending the final 
Mehlis report.  De Verdiere responded that this language was 
drawn from UNSC Resolution 1559.  We could not act as if 1559 
has been totally implemented, he said.  With the caveat that 
he had not yet seen the proposed text, with contextual 
language, Ambassador strongly supported this explanation, 
adding that Syria's extensive intelligence presence in 
Lebanon was a well-known fact and pushing back firmly when 
Bedjaoui, downplaying the issue, commented that many 
countries have intelligences services operating in other 
countries. 
 
¶8. (C) Bedjaoui in the end backed off this point, noting that 
"we can find suitable language."  Similarly, Bedjaoui 
questioned the demand that Syria renounce terrorism as 
prejudging Mehlis.  Ambassador pushed back strongly on this 
point as well, adding that Syria was supporting Palestinian 
groups that were committing terrorist attacks and undermining 
peace efforts of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.  They 
were also allowing suicide bombers and other elements linked 
to Zarqawi to enter Syria via Damascus Airport, something 
they could surely control if they wanted to.  Bedjaoui said 
we should keep the focus on the Commission.  The fact that 
the resolution was under a Chapter VII framework was in and 
of itself a threat of sanctions. 
ERDMAN