This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003636 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ET ELEC UNREST
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: CHARGE PRESSES MFA FOR GOE RESPONSE TO 
POLITICAL CRISIS 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3129 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 3128 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Charge took the opportunity of a summons to 
the MFA on Sept. 5 to press Deputy Minister Tekeda Alemu on 
the GOE's response to the current political crisis. Charge 
argued that while the international community and others 
urged the opposition to take up its newly-won seats in 
parliament, it was also incumbent upon the GOE to take steps 
to restore credibility to Ethiopian institutions and reduce 
tensions in Addis Ababa. Tekeda took the point on board, but 
wondered whether PM Meles retained sufficient political 
capital and flexibility to undertake such initiatives.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Tekeda summoned the Charge on 
very short notice September 5 to deliver a note protesting 
the EU Election Observer Mission's conduct in Ethiopia. 
Pol/Econ Counselor accompanied the Charge, while Tekeda was 
joined by Director for American Affairs Ayalew. Septel 
includes a report on that conversation as well as the text of 
the note. The Charge took the opportunity of the high-level 
MFA call to ask Tekeda for his thoughts on next steps to 
resolve the country's current political crisis. Bio note: 
Tekeda is a career diplomat who has served as (political 
appointee) Foreign Minister Seyoum's deputy for well over a 
decade. 
 
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We Know You're Upset -- But What Are You Gonna Do? 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3. (C) Charge told Tekeda that while she could understand in 
some measure the GOE's concerns about the EU-EOM report, what 
was really important was to focus on what happens next. It 
was clear to everyone that tensions in Addis were rising over 
the disputed election results. Would opposition leaders be 
willing and able to control popular anger and frustration, 
she asked? Tekeda replied that the expected the bulk of the 
opposition's newly elected parliamentarians to take their 
seats. He admitted, however, that there was a large mass of 
"lumpen" in the capital that leaders in the CUD could easily 
mobilize for mischief if they wished. Tekeda estimated that 
40 percent of the young adults in Addis were unemployed, 
plenty of "combustible material" to cause a problem if 
politicians were irresponsible. EU-EOM head Ana Gomes had 
already poured fuel on the fire, he added. 
 
¶4. (C) The Charge returned to the point that the future was 
still largely in the GOE's hands. People both within Ethiopia 
and in the international community were looking to the GOE to 
do something to calm the situation. She noted that the 
international donor community hoped that both sides of the 
current dispute would work together to move forward, or 
everyone risked falling backward. Ethiopia stood at an 
important crossroads in its democratic evolution. The Charge 
underscored that Ethiopia's opposition leaders had far less 
experience in government, and so the world was looking 
primarily to the GOE for leadership. A public message 
emphasizing the GOE's readiness to work with all parties to 
develop a truly open, multiparty system would be a good 
start, she said. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
No Way Back -- But is There a Way Out? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Tekeda recognized that the GOE did have a greater 
responsibility to manage the situation. Tekeda said that 
while he was not an EPRDF member, he believed that the 
coalition's leadership understood the political sea change 
that had taken place as a result of the May elections. The 
ruling party's acceptance of this reality was evident when 
the EPRDF ceded control of Addis Ababa -- the historical 
center of power in Ethiopia. The difficulty, however, was 
that the top leadership in the ruling coalition was not sure 
that opposition leaders from the Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD) would "play ball." While Ana Gomes was 
fueling anger with the EU-EOM report, he said, some key 
opposition leaders in Washington (note: from the UEDF) issued 
a statement calling for public protests in early October. 
Members of the governing Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) were wondering whether such people 
were really ready to engage with the GOE within the 
Constitutional order. Tekeda confided that GOE officials like 
him could argue that the GOE had to lead the way out of the 
current crisis, but the response from EPRDF leaders was, "how 
can I trust our opponents to cooperate?" 
 
¶6. (C) Tekeda lamented that moderate leaders in the 
opposition, such as the CUD's Berhanu Nega and the UEDF's 
Beyene Petros, did not seem to have the upper hand in 
internal party debates. The UEDF was extremely dependent on 
financial support from the United States, while the CUD was 
somewhat less so. Tekeda argued that most Ethiopian Diaspora 
leaders had ties to the former Mengistu regime, known as the 
DERG. If they were in Ethiopia, he said, they would be in 
jail for crimes committed under that government. It was 
ironic, Tekeda remarked, that the United States was the 
source of extremism in Ethiopia's current situation. There 
was still time, however, for opposition moderates to reassert 
control, but they would have to "come out" and make their 
good intentions known. Tekeda believed that the GOE was still 
open to dialogue with them. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Help the Moderate Opposition Help You 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Pol/Econ Counselor noted that the GOE could take 
certain measures on its own initiative -- with or without 
direct negotiations with the opposition -- that might lower 
the level of tension and stem popular anger against the 
government. The GOE might express willingness to revisit the 
package of changes to parliamentary procedures that the 
ruling coalition hurried through in the dying days of the 
previous parliament, for example. Re-establishing the 
opposition's access to the state-run broadcast media would be 
another potential confidence-building measure. Such steps 
could improve the GOE's tarnished image on the street in 
Addis and make it easier for moderate opposition leaders to 
justify taking their seats in parliament. Positive steps 
would also make it easier for the international community to 
press the opposition on participating in parliament. 
 
¶8. (C) Tekeda took the suggestions on board, and indicated 
that changes in media's conduct should not be so difficult if 
a climate of greater trust existed. At the same time, he 
noted that "PM Meles has only so much political capital. Is 
he really in a position to take more steps toward the 
opposition? The PM cannot stray too far from his followers in 
the EPRDF. He lost a lot of capital with them by allowing 
Eritrea to secede. He also brought the EPRDF to this point 
(in the election/democratization process). What did they get? 
The lost Addis." Tekeda commented while Meles was strong, he 
was not all powerful, and internal EPRDF debates were now 
common. 
 
¶9. (C) The Charge concluded by saying that the international 
community wanted to work with the GOD to promote a peaceful 
solution to the current impasse, but that the GOE had to be 
willing to address the problems that existed with the 
electoral process and Ethiopian institutions. Everyone would 
be looking for GOE leadership. "I'm worried that the ruling 
coalition has decided that it can't give anymore, when now is 
precisely the time when more initiative is most needed," she 
concluded. Tekeda replied that the most difficult period 
seemed to have passed now. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: It is unclear how open members of PM Meles' 
inner circle are to new initiatives that could ease tensions 
and pave the way for a successful new parliament in Ethiopia, 
but our suggestions will no doubt reach EPRDF ears. 
HUDDLESTON