This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL KPKO ET ER UN EE BORDER
SUBJECT: UNMEE OFFICIALS GIVE ADVICE FOR NEXT 
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA ENVOY 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3599 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 3401 
     ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 3316 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UNMEE Deputy Head Azouz Ennifar and his 
political aide told the Charge that any new UN envoy on the 
Ethiopia/Eritrea border issue should come to the parties with 
concrete proposals for resolving the conflict and avoid media 
attention during initial phases of his work. New economic and 
commercial arrangements could make a deal more attractive. 
The UNMEE officials also urged that any new envoy take 
advantage of their Mission's expertise on the border area and 
the political climate, and noted that former UN envoy Lloyd 
Axworthy had not done so. Ennifar indicated that active 
African Union (AU) involvement was not welcomed by either 
party. Ennifar wondered whether both sides were hurting badly 
enough to take difficult measures to break the stalemate; he 
recalled that, prior to the recent extension of the UNMEE 
mandate, UN officials in New York had considered cutting 
UNMEE back severely in an effort to create incentives for the 
two countries to move forward. The UNMEE deputy believed that 
if there were political instability in Ethiopia, the risk of 
a military attack from Eritrea would increase.  He speculated 
that Eritrea's strategy would be to quickly seize key areas, 
including Badme, then count on rapid international 
intervention to freeze the new status quo. PM Meles, for his 
part, seems not to be worried saying "Isaias doesn't want to 
die."  He also does not see any drawn out political violence. 
 Chief of Staff General Samora told Charge and DAO separately 
that the "tripwire" for an Eritrean military attack would be 
the removal of UNMEE. Samora considered such an attack 
unlikely, however, given that Eritrea (like Ethiopia) had a 
good harvest; Eritrean sorties are in the field not on the 
front lines, he said. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Charge and PE Counselor met Sept. 27 with Deputy 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Azouz 
Ennifar, who serves as the Deputy Head of the UN Mission in 
Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), and his senior political 
advisor, Abdel-Kader Haireche, to seek their views concerning 
the possible naming of a new UN envoy on the border conflict. 
Ennifar took up his post in Addis in August, while Haireche 
has worked with UNMEE for over four years. 
 
Axworthy's Missteps:  Too Much Talk, Too Little Listening 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶3. (C) When asked what a potential new border envoy could 
learn from the experience of former UN Special Representative 
Lloyd Axworthy, both officials pointed to the ill-conceived 
interview that Axworthy gave during his first visit to Addis 
Ababa. According to Haireche, Axworthy talked excessively in 
the interview about "his ability to open doors and make 
things happen." The former minister's bravado seemed to 
alienate the Eritrean side in particular, as did Axworthy's 
very public initial visit to Addis, rather than Asmara. 
Perhaps as a result of this initial misstep, President Isaias 
never agreed to receive Axworthy. The lessons for a future 
envoy, both officials agreed, were to take a low public 
profile initially and to go to Asmara first, where insecurity 
and mistrust were greater.  Ennifar recommended that any 
envoy on the border issue move quietly, "like the Oslo 
Mideast peace process," in order to avoid public pressure, 
posturing and unrealistic expectations. 
 
¶4. (C) Haireche also noted with some irony that Axworthy 
began his mission on the border conflict without ever 
consulting experts at the UNMEE mission. In so doing, he 
ignored a wealth of military and political expertise that the 
staff had accumulated over several years of detailed work on 
the issue. UNMEE head Joseph Legwaila had been forced to 
"chase Axworthy around" just in order to stay in the loop 
about what he was doing. The two senior officials disagreed 
on a number of issues and did not get along well. Haireche 
added that the UN officials in New York had also failed to 
consult internally before naming Axworthy, who in turn never 
touched base with the diplomatic community, at least not in 
Addis. The lesson Haireche underscored was that an extensive 
body of knowledge and experience concerning the border issue 
exists at the UN and among diplomats in the region, and a 
future envoy would be well advised to tap into it. 
 
Needed: Fresh Ideas 
------------------- 
¶5. (C) Amb. Ennifar told the Charge that any new border envoy 
must come with new ideas. An increased focus on economic 
issues was one of the most promising fresh approaches, he 
said. For example, the port of Djibouti was not working well 
for Ethiopia and gaining new maritime commercial options 
would be appealing to the landlocked country. Haireche 
remarked that Ethiopia seemed to be building up the 
importance of Badme as a bargaining chip, perhaps in order to 
cede it eventually in return for internationally guaranteed 
access to the Eritrean port of Asaab. Ennifar recalled that 
in response to a bellicose Eritrean speech the week before, 
Ethiopian FM Seyoum had offered a fairly measured response 
that focused on economic issues. 
 
¶6. (C) He also reported that PM Meles had told a group of 
Eritrean opposition leaders recently that he would be willing 
to give up heavily-disputed Badme if it would ensure border 
demarcation and sustainable peace. Haireche added that 
although some Ethiopian veterans opposed turning Badme over 
to Eritrea after so much blood was spilled to recapture it, 
veterans groups were not very well organized and did not 
appear to represent a real constraint on the PM's 
flexibility. On the other hand, Ennifar noted that Ethiopia's 
opposition parties still officially opposed Eritrean 
independence and were little inclined to compromise on the 
border. For this reason, Meles would need international help 
to sell whatever deal emerged to his domestic audience. Amb. 
Ennifar suggested that contact with the Secretary of State at 
the right time, for example, might be necessary. (Note: 
Berhanu Nega, a prominent moderate in Ethiopia's principal 
opposition party, told the Charge subsequently that 
opposition would not try to roll back Eritrean independence 
as such, but did need better sea access for maritime trade.) 
 
Is Timing Right for a Solution? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Unlike his boss Joseph Legwaila (see ref C), Ennifar 
wondered whether both sides were hurting badly enough to take 
difficult measures to break the stalemate. He recalled that, 
prior to the recent extension of the UNMEE mandate, UN 
officials in New York had considered cutting UNMEE back 
severely in an effort to create incentives for the two 
countries to move forward, but in the end the UNSC was 
reluctant to take such a step now. 
 
¶8. (C) Both Ennifar and Haireche agreed that the Ethiopian 
government would not be prepared to move ahead on the border 
issue until it felt that it had its internal political 
situation under control. Ennifar, however, expressed 
confidence that the election dispute that has bedeviled PM 
Meles for several months would soon be over. 
 
Will Eritrea Strike While Meles is Weak? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Both Ennifar and Haireche agreed that if Ethiopia's 
internal political situation worsened substantially, the 
chances of an Eritrean attack would grow. UNMEE's political 
advisor said that Eritrea had the military capacity to strike 
quickly and seize key points, such as Badme, but could not 
hold them against an Ethiopian counterattack. Isaias' 
strategy, therefore, would likely be to take what he wanted, 
then work for immediate international community intervention 
to freeze the new status quo, possibly backed up by the 
findings of the UN's Ethiopia/Eritrea Boundary Commission. 
 
¶10. (C) PM Meles for his part seems not to be worried.  He 
told the Charge and AF DAS Yamamoto (Ref A) that "Isaias 
doesn't want to die."  He also does not see any drawn out 
political violence.  Chief of Staff General Samora told 
Charge and DAO (septel) that the "tripwire" for an Eritrean 
military attack would be the removal of UNMEE. Samora 
considered such an attack unlikely, however, given that 
Eritrea (like Ethiopia) had a good harvest; Eritrean sorties 
are in the field not on the front lines, he said. 
 
Probing for U.S. Intentions 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Haireche indicated that some of his contacts, 
including those in both governments, were trying to determine 
where the U.S. stood on the border issue now. He asked 
whether the State and Defense Departments had the same view 
on how to handle the problem. He speculated that DoD had a 
different agenda than State and other agencies in Eritrea, 
where it had strategic interests the took precedence over 
other concerns. Haireche also remarked the Ethiopian 
Government blamed State officials for short-circuiting the 
GOE's five point peace plan in late 2004 and continued to be 
wary of their involvement on the border issue. 
HUDDLESTON