This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO PTER ET ER UN EE BORDER ELEC UNREST
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DAS YAMAMOTO DISCUSSES INTERNAL 
POLITICS, ERITREA AND SOMALIA WITH PM MELES 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  PM Meles told AF DAS Don Yamamoto that 
Eritrean President Isaias was seeking to prod U.S. action on 
the border issue through his recent ban on UNMEE helicopter 
flights.  Meles said he did not expect Isaias to attack, but 
could not afford to allow Ethiopia's election dispute to drag 
on much longer, lest it "confuse" the Eritrean leader about 
Ethiopia's vulnerability.  Yamamoto said the U.S. would 
continue to urge opposition leaders to join parliament, but 
also conveyed high-level USG concerns about arrests of 
opposition members.  Meles claimed that the GOE had shown 
restraint with the opposition leaders and hoped that many 
would join Parliament.  Other elements of the opposition 
would have to be "removed," he said.  Ethiopian policy in 
Somalia was directed at supporting the establishment of a 
government in order to combat Al Qaeda in Mogadishu, the PM 
indicated.  He hoped for greater U.S. cooperation, but 
understood if U.S. priorities lay elsewhere.  DAS Yamamoto 
told the PM that the USG was taking a fresh look at Somalia 
and underscored that the U.S. sees Ethiopia as an "anchor 
state" in the region.  In spite of tremendous pressures 
arising from the ongoing electoral dispute as well as 
provocative Eritrean harassment of UNMEE, Meles appeared 
remarkably serene and in control.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) AF DAS Don Yamamoto called on Prime Minister Meles 
October 7.  He was accompanied by Charge Vicki Huddleston, 
AF/E Director Eunice Reddick, Col. Kevin Kenny of AF/RSA and 
Pol/Econ Counselor (notetaker).  MFA Director for North 
America and Europe Grum Abay and a notetaker joined PM Meles. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Eritrea Border: Isaias Pressuring for Action on Demarcation 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The only thing stopping Eritrea from attacking 
Ethiopia was not the U.N. Mission on Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(UNMEE), nor pressure from the international community, but 
rather President Isaias' belief that "he would die first," 
Meles said bluntly.  "The only chink in our armor is 
instability in Addis," he added.  If Isaias were to be 
confused by signs of Ethiopian weakness, the PM said, people 
would die.  According to Meles, President Isaias was focused 
on only one thing: regime survival.  The PM observed that 600 
Eritreans who would lose their jobs due to the closing of the 
USAID mission in Asmara were "bit players" in Isaias' drama. 
The Eritrean president had not yet come to grips with his 
military defeat in 2000, Meles commented.  Isaias was now 
merely acting like a child trying to get attention. 
 
¶4. (C) Meles commented that he had modified his own approach 
to Isaias, from initially trying to "cage" his Eritrean rival 
completely, to now trying to force him through a single exit 
from his predicament.  "All other doors must remain closed if 
the President is to come out through the right opening," he 
concluded.  Meles professed not to know for sure how 
comfortable Isaias' was with the status quo, but he seemed 
less comfortable every day.  The PM cautioned that if the 
U.S. and international community reacted the wrong way to 
Isaias' provocation, Ethiopia would pay the cost.  Amb. 
Bolton's response to Eritrea's decision to ban UNMEE 
helicopter flights, for example, was "the wrong statement at 
the wrong time."  The GOE had remained quiet and restrained, 
Meles noted.  The PM commented that if Eritrea really wanted 
to get rid of UNMEE, President Isaias would say so directly. 
 
¶5. (C) DAS Yamamoto conveyed USG anguish over the situation 
in Asmara.  He mentioned that the USG was considering the 
possibility of offering an American UN envoy to Ethiopia and 
Eritrea.  If the USG decided to put one forward, he added, it 
would proceed "full-throttle" on the search for peaceful 
resolution of the long-standing border conflict. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Somalia: GOE Focused on Stopping Al Qaeda in Mogadishu 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) DAS Yamamoto told Meles that the USG had met with 
Transitional Somali President Yusuf on the margins of the 
UNGA in September.  It had marked the Transitional Federal 
Government's (TFG's) first such meeting with Washington 
policymakers.  Yamamoto noted that EU and Ethiopian 
government had convinced the USG that the TFG might represent 
the last chance for establishing stability in Somalia.  In 
the New York meeting, USG reps had told TFG representatives 
that Washington expected them to reach out to other factions 
and warlords -- at least those who might potentially be 
supportive.  The USG was not opposed to an eventual 
peacekeeping mission, but only after essential security 
conditions had been established. 
 
¶7. (C) Meles replied that "we believe there must be a 
proactive plan to de-activate Al Qaeda's presence in 
Mogadishu.  "Plan A" for Ethiopia was to encourage the 
formation of a government so that GOE would have an ally in 
the fight against Al Qaida.  The PM said he thought Ethiopia 
was acting in concert with the U.S. when it agreed to provide 
support to the TFG at meetings in Abuja.  After the U.S. 
statement opposing direct Ethiopian military involvement, 
however, Meles had decided not to invest in "Plan A."  "Plan 
B" was to protect Ethiopia's border with Somalia and maintain 
contacts with friends in case the U.S. eventually decided to 
become more proactive.  The PM said he understood if Somalia 
was not a priority for the USG, but remarked that a more 
robust effort there would not overtax U.S. resources.  If the 
U.S. did decide to get more involved, Meles said the GOE 
would be ready to go "full throttle" to assist.  He added, 
however, that the GOE no longer had any intention to supply 
peacekeeping troops for Somalia, even if asked. 
 
¶8. (C) The U.S. understands that Somalia is a security issue 
for Ethiopia, Yamamoto replied.  He said that U.S. also 
believed that there might be Al Qaeda cells in Mogadishu and 
Somaliland, and did see the need for reviewing strategy on 
Somalia.  The U.S. wanted to work with Ethiopia and would try 
to speed up its own internal assessment and planning process. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
--------- 
Political Crisis: "Disloyal" Opposition Between Parliament 
and "Removal" 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
--------- 
 
 ¶9. (C) DAS Yamamoto told the PM that Ethiopia's opposition 
must take up its seats in Parliament.  He pledged to make 
that case to Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) 
President Hailu Shawel when the latter returned to Ethiopia 
the next day.  Yamamoto stated that Secretary Rice had sent 
him and his team to Ethiopia to bolster the efforts of the 
Charge in seeking closure to Ethiopia's post-election 
disputes and the successful formation of Parliament. 
 
¶10. (C) Charge Huddleston interjected that all players knew 
that Ethiopia had reached a critical juncture.  The GOE's 
flexibility had already proved effective in persuading key 
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) leaders, and 
possibly many segments of the CUD, to join the Parliament. 
It was also important for the GOE to take steps to repair the 
damage to its reputation from human rights abuses that had 
occurred since the election.  DAS Yamamoto noted that the 
Secretary was concerned by the large number of what appeared 
 
SIPDIS 
to be politically-motivated arrests.  He added that he had 
also cautioned opposition leaders against recourse to 
violence. 
 
¶11. (C) The PM replied that he had been pleased by 
Washington's positive response to Ethiopia's electoral 
process.  He remarked that so long as efforts to democratize 
in Africa were externally driven, they would not be 
sustainable.  "We've tried to avoid that," he added, and 
complained about some elements of the international 
"democracy industry" (note: this was probably a reference to 
the EU Observer Mission and/or NDI and IRI missions.  End 
note.)  He said that democracy and ethnic federalism were 
matters of survival for Ethiopia, which had to channel 
dissent and differences in a peaceful, constitutional 
manner.  Meles lamented that Ethiopia had not been blessed 
with a loyal opposition, and had instead been plagued by 
remnants of the previous DERG regime.  He claimed that the 
GOE had responded with considerable restraint to provocative 
and unconstitutional behavior by opposition parties, for 
which the PM said he had ample evidence.  He said he had 
taken risks in order to preserve democracy and educate the 
public.  "If this opposition proves it is not loyal, however, 
then removing its leaders will allow something better to grow 
back."  The PM said he thought the opposition was close to 
entering Parliament, but that the GOE could not let the 
process drag on beyond the following week, in part due to the 
dangerous signals that continuing instability sent to 
Eritrea. 
 
¶12. (C) DAS Yamamoto urged the PM to reach out more 
effectively to the Ethiopia Diaspora in Washington, including 
through Ethiopian Embassy participation in meetings the 
Department held with Diaspora groups.  While Meles 
acknowledged that the GOE's outreach efforts had been "weak," 
and indicated that he planned to revamp his Embassy's 
programs to engage Ethio-Americans.  He asked for patience 
while his government prepared a new strategy for doing so. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Talks With The OLF: No Intermediaries Needed 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) DAS Yamamoto called the meetings that he would be 
holding the following week in Washington with exiled leaders 
of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) discussions, not 
negotiations.  An OLF decision to disarm was 
"non-negotiable," but was ultimately a matter between the OLF 
and the GOE.  Yamamoto offered the USG's good offices if they 
would be helpful, and promised that the Department would not 
issue any statement concerning the discussions. 
 
¶14. (C) PM Meles said that the recent resumption of 
discussions with the OLF had originated in a direct exchange 
of letters between himself and a key OLF leader, and had 
continued at a meeting in Norway in late summer.  The PM 
noted that the OLF leader was in touch with other 
organization leaders in Asmara, and that the GOE also had 
direct contact with the Asmara wing of the OLF.  The 
Government of Norway had offered to facilitate the 
discussions, but Meles said he had declined the offer, 
preferring to keep the talks private.  Meles said he planned 
to ask for USG help when appropriate, and welcomed U.S. 
meetings with OLF leaders.  He indicated that the OLF had put 
forth a new approach in its dialogue with the GOE that had 
some merits, but the winding down of the armed struggle would 
also have to be addressed.  One positive development was that 
most of the organization no longer demanded independence for 
the Oromiya region. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Ethiopia: Anchor State, Partner and Good Customer 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶15. (C) DAS Yamamoto told PM Meles that the USG continued to 
view Ethiopia as an anchor state.  "What happens here affects 
the whole region," he said.  He also thanked Meles for 
Ethiopia's contribution of peacekeeping troops to Burundi. 
Finally, he expressed the USG's appreciation for the GOE's 
steadfastness in purchasing Boeing aircraft in the face of 
tremendous pressure from European Governments on behalf of 
Airbus. 
 
¶16. (C) COMMENT: The discussion between PM Meles and DAS 
Yamamoto reflected the broad strategic interests that are 
encompassed within the Ethio-American bilateral 
relationship.  In spite of tremendous pressures arising from 
the ongoing electoral dispute as well as provocative Eritrean 
harassment of UNMEE, Meles appeared remarkably serene and in 
control of the situation. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) DAS Yamamoto did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message. 
HUDDLESTON