This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM NI XY XW
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 
MOHAMMED 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On 24 October, Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs Jendayi Frazer met with Nigerian National 
Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed. They discussed the Sudan 
Peace Process, recent Liberian elections, Cote D'Ivoire, the 
Bakassi dispute with Cameroon, upcoming Nigerian elections, 
the stability of the Niger Delta, Mauritania, Guinea, the 
Gambia, Senegal and Guinea Bissau. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  Those in attendance: 
 
Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer 
Ambassador John Campbell 
Special Assistant Kendra Gaither 
AF/W Desk Officer for Nigeria Daniel Epstein 
Notetaker:  Gino Pagotto 
 
On the Nigerian side: 
 
National Security Advisor (NSA) Aliyu Mohammed 
Permanent Secretary for the Office of the NSA 
Policy Advisor Ambassador Kayode Garrick 
Policy Advisor Moustapha Aliyu 
Personal Assistant to the NSA Col. M.I. Idriss 
 
Sudan Peace Process 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Assistant Secretary Frazer began the discussion by 
expressing sympathy for the recent death of four Nigerian 
peacekeepers attached to the African union (AU) peacekeeping 
mission to the Darfur Region of Sudan.  She noted the need to 
put pressure on the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) to commit 
to the peace process and to ensure that all stakeholders were 
committed to working with each other to forge a lasting peace 
deal.  She believed that there should be only one team 
negotiating on behalf of the government of Sudan, and that 
team should consist of both the government delegation and 
members of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement.  A/S 
Frazer queried the NSA as to how the USG and other donor 
countries could increase the capabilities and impact of the 
AU mission in Darfur. 
 
¶4. (C) The NSA indicated he was in regular discussion with 
the AU mediator of the Abuja talks Salim and Abdul-Wahid. 
Abdul-Wahid recently met with Nigerian president Obasanjo and 
made a request for US$600,000 in Nigerian support, because 
his group is struggling for funds, food, and clothing. 
Abdul-Wahid told Obasanjo that he did not have even enough 
funds to support the delegation to the Abuja peace talks.  In 
order to provide support, which could not be misconstrued as 
supporting the rebels, the NSA indicated Obasanjo provided 
US$ 100,000 in support to Abdul-Wahid so they could sponsor 
their peace-talk delegation. 
 
¶5. (C) The NSA said he believed the AU mission to Darfur 
should consist of 10,000 troops to ensure it could 
effectively address security and peace building issues. 
Nigeria believed it could contribute another battalion 
(approx. 1,000 troops), but would need donor financing and 
assistance in making the deployment happen.  In discussions 
with Salim, Salim believed that following this adjournment of 
the peace talks, the parties to the Darfur crisis would be 
able to reach a conclusion, making the next round of Abuja 
talks the last. 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Frazer said the USG believed that 6-7,000 
peacekeepers were more realistic than 10,000.  She thought 
South Africa would not be able to fulfill its promise to 
deploy a battalion to Darfur.  The European Union also did 
not want the force to get bigger than 6,000 troops.  The best 
course was to reinforce and enhance what the AU already had 
in place.  Sudanese President Bashir and Vice President Taha 
were very wary of the proposal to have Canadian armored 
personnel carriers (APC) deployed to Sudan.  However, Bashir 
would let 35 APCS into Sudan to see how it went.  Bashir and 
Taha were fearful that the rebels could seize control of the 
APCS and use them against the government.  The USG was 
hopeful that the we could be successful in implementing a 
peacekeeping model whereby regional organizations would be 
the first to intervene in a crisis, followed by AU forces, 
with eventual United Nations "blue-hatting" of forces, if 
necessary.  A/S Frazer was optimistic that by the middle of 
2006 the AU forces in Darfur would be blue-hatted and come 
under the control of a U.N. mission. 
 
¶7. (C) The NSA hoped the U.N. would become engaged much more 
quickly and that the forces would be blue-hatted closer to 
the beginning of 2006.  He concurred with the observation 
that Bashir did not want any non-African troops in Darfur, 
and said he would talk to Obasanjo with the goal of having 
Obasanjo talk Bashir away from this position.  In addition, 
the NSA supported having Obasanjo, the U.S. ambassador to 
Nigeria, and the Nigerian military leadership sit down to 
discuss the path forward in Darfur and Nigerian involvement. 
 
¶8. (C) A/S Frazer said that Nigeria and the USG must put 
pressure on the rebels to adhere to the cease-fire agreement 
and cease all attacks.  The rebels must stop their infighting 
and stop factionalization, otherwise, the Sudanese government 
would take advantage of differences in the peace talks.  The 
NSA agreed.  In closing on Sudan, A/S Frazer said she was 
shocked at what she saw in Juba in Southern Sudan.  In 
comparing Juba with Monrovia, Juba was much worse off in 
development and infrastructure. 
 
Liberia 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) The NSA said the run-up to and the actual elections in 
Liberia seemed to have gone fine.  Although it might seem 
that the political parties were gravitating to Ellen 
Sirleaf-Johnson for the runoff election, he firmly believed 
the Liberian people would choose George Weah.  The NSA was 
skeptical about Weah's leadership and executive potential, 
but with help from ECOWAS, and the USG, Weah should be able 
to succeed.  He had had a discussion with Obasanjo over 
Liberia and the way forward if Weah is elected and Obasanjo 
responded with the quip that "even a donkey can be a good 
president", if he had a strong team of personnel supporting 
him. 
 
¶10. (C) The A/S Frazer had a very positive experience in 
Monrovia and believed that from what she saw, the elections 
went relatively smoothly and were credible.  She thanked the 
Nigerians for their continuing contribution to the UNMIL 
mission.  The USG would be ready to work with whomever 
emerged as the victor from the upcoming runoff elections and 
Embassy Monrovia and its ambassador were in touch with both 
parties.  The USG was standing ready to help the next 
Liberian president build a strong leadership team. Turning to 
former Liberian president Charles Taylor, she noted the USG's 
continuing concern over the potential for Taylor to 
manipulate the electoral process either by planting people 
around various candidates, getting his people elected, or 
outright stealing elections.  Weah, being a younger Liberian 
and having never been involved in Liberian politics, might be 
susceptible to Taylor's influence should he become president. 
 
¶11. (C) The NSA responded with what has become the Nigerian 
party line on this issue by noting president Obasanjo's 
previous declared position that he is ready and willing to 
turn Taylor over to an elected Liberian government should 
they ask for him. A/S Frazer did not want Taylor to go back 
to Liberia but rather, asked that the Nigerians deliver him 
to the special court for Sierra Leone.  The USG was concerned 
that Taylor's physical presence in Liberia could be a impetus 
for instability. The NSA said Nigeria supported U.S. efforts 
in the UN to pass the resolution that would give UNMIL the 
authority to arrest Taylor if he were ever to set foot in 
Liberia again.  A/S Frazer attempted to clarify if that meant 
that if the Nigerians would land at Roberts International 
Airport in Monrovia with Taylor, that Taylor would walk down 
the steps of a Nigerian aircraft, be arrested by UNMIL, and 
then escorted up the steps of a U.N. aircraft and taken to 
Sierra Leone.  The NSA laughed and indicated that he was sure 
that Taylor would one day get to the Sierra Leone special 
court. 
 
Cote D'Ivoire 
------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The NSA expressed concern that in Cote D'Ivoire, 
because of the current constitution, president Laurent Gbagbo 
would be in power for another year because a new president 
could not assume office until the predecessor left.  The NSA 
was concern that the northerners, especially the supporters 
of the late rebel leader Robert Guei, would never agree to 
allow another southerner to become president.  ECOWAS 
chairman Mohammed Ibn Chambas had floated the names of 
several candidates, unfortunately, none of who were majority 
Ivoirian in their ancestry.  Nigerien president Mamadou 
Tandja was presently in Nigeria to discuss the Ivorian issue 
with Obasanjo.  In discussions with Bruno Joubert from the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France would support any 
presidential candidate endorsed by ECOWAS and the AU.  A/S 
Frazer said the USG would support whichever candidate could 
effectively deal with and disarm both Gbagbo's militias and 
the new forces, and ensure that elections were held within 
twelve months. 
 
Senegal, the Gambia, and Guinea - Bissau 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) The NSA said Obasanjo had recently traveled to Dakar 
to participate in a discussion designed to mend fences 
between Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade and Gambian 
president Yahya Jammeh.  As part of that trip Obasanjo 
stopped in Bissau and met with the current president Joao 
Bernardo Vieira and former head of state Kumba Yala.  The 
trip went well and Obasanjo was satisfied that things would 
continue to be calm in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
Guinea 
------ 
 
¶14. (C) The NSA expressed concern about Guinea, stemming from 
his belief that President Lansana Conte's health was 
diminishing quickly and there were no real successors.  The 
NSA said he and Obasanjo were not sanguine about the concept 
of the current prime minister succeeding Conte for what could 
be a period of up to a year before new elections were held. 
Obasanjo had a few ideas for interim arrangements should 
Conte pass away, and at a future meeting in Washington would 
like to discuss them with A/S Frazer and the administration. 
 
Nigeria: Bakassi 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (C) On the Bakassi, the NSA saidt Nigeria and Cameroon 
were working together in a healthy dialogue with both the 
U.N. and the mixed commission.  Nigeria was pursuing a tact 
by which they would lease the Bakassi.  Obasanjo and Cameroon 
president Paul Biya continued to have a dialogue on the issue. 
 
Nigeria: Elections 
------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) The NSA quickly moved to the looking 2007 
presidential elections and alluded to the fact that the 
political intrigue and machinations were already beginning. 
A/S Frazer noted the importance of the 2007 election season 
as a milestone in Nigeria's democratic development. 
Obasanjo's successful transition from his civilian 
administration to a successor civilian administration was 
extremely important for Nigeria's nascent democracy.  The USG 
already was working with the national electoral commission, 
civil society, and various civic education programs to ensure 
that the 2007 elections were better than the 2003 elections. 
 Comment: The Assistant Secretary sought subtly to make the 
key point that the USG would not support Obasanjo attempting 
to stay for a third term. End Comment. 
 
Nigeria:  Delta Stability 
------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) A/S Frazer asked about peace and stability in the 
Niger delta. The NSA responded that for now, things seemed to 
be calm and peaceful.  He attributed this to the recent 
arrest of Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) leader 
Dokubu Asari.  As a result, the Chambas and other militias 
were crumbling.  The most important thing for peace in the 
Delta, however, was continued investment and development. 
The Delta relied solely on money allocated to the governors, 
creating problems when the governors stole all the money. 
The NSA asked for USG assistance in tracking and locating 
stolen and diverted funds, noting his impression that U.S. 
law enforcement is particularly successful in this field.  He 
believed this would help fight corruption. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Ambassador said he would attend an upcoming 
conference in London being hosted by the Nigerian High 
Commissioner to London and Rivers State Governor Peter Odili. 
 The conference would brainstorm solutions for the way 
forward in the Delta.  The British High Commissioner to 
Nigeria also would attend.  The NSA was aware of this 
conference, sponsored by the Coventry Foundation and Stephen 
Davis.  Nigerian State Security Service Director General 
Lateef Kayode Are would attend. 
 
Mauritania 
---------- 
 
¶19. (C) Touching briefly on Mauritania, the NSA said it 
looked as if the current military regime would be in place 
for circa two years before having free and fair elections. 
In the interim, they would reform the government.  When the 
regime did have new elections, all those in currently 
involved in the interim government would not be allowed to 
participate.  The NSA was concerned with Salafism in 
particular to Mauritania and the Sahel.  Nigeria still did 
not have strong ties with Mauritania, ever since the latter 
removed itself from ECOWAS. 
 
¶20. (C) A/S Frazer said USG's position was that the current 
regime needed to call and hold new elections within a year; 
two years was too long.  The current regime needed to infuse 
itself with some civilians, be they newly retired military 
officers or otherwise.  If they did not move in that 
direction, the USG would be forced to move in the direction 
of levying sanctions on Mauritania.  The NSA said he would 
travel to Mauritania to deliver the message to the current 
regime and tell them that having sanctions levied on them 
would not help them to enact meaningful reforms in Mauritania. 
 
¶21. (U) This cable was been cleared by the Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs. 
 
SIPDIS 
CAMPBELL