This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

111648Z Oct 05

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001957 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE - PASS TO POLAD 
LONDON PASS TO JACMOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL 10/10/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL NI THIRDTERM
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA: VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU REITERATES FIERCE 
NORTHERN OPPOSITION IF OBASANJO STAYS 
 
 
Classified By: Campbell, John, Ambassador, Abuja, State 
Reason(s): 1.5 (b,(d). 
 
REF: Abuja 1902 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Vice President Atiku believes that the 
North will erupt if its leaders are convinced that 
President Obasanjo is seeking a third term.  This eruption, 
he believes, will occur whether or not Obasanjo changes 
legally the constitution to provide for a presidential 
third term.  Atiku emphasized the President's isolation 
from domestic Nigerian realities, and said that Obasanjo 
takes at face value what the sycophants and other West 
African heads of state say -- that he is indispensable. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) At Vice President Atiku's request, I hosted a 
dinner attended by him, the British High Commissioner and 
myself October 8.  The Vice President repeated most of the 
same themes that are reported in Reftel from my one-on-one 
dinner with him on October 1.   What was new was his 
emphasis that the North would react violently should its 
leadership perceive that President Obasanjo was going to 
seek a third term, whether or not the President amended 
legally the constitution to make it possible.  The issue in 
the North, Atiku said, is not constitutionality and the 
rule of law.  It is the perceived misgovernance and 
marginalization of the region at the hands of the 
President.  Therefore, Obasanjo is unacceptable after 2007 
on any terms. 
 
¶3.  (S) That said, Atiku thinks that the President will 
attempt to change the constitution, and that he will fail. 
The most salient proposal, Atiku continued, would introduce 
a single six year term for the President, a single, five 
year term for the governors.  And that, Atiku continued is 
Obasanjo's mistake.  It means that Obasanjo would remain in 
office a year after the governors.  And many of the 
governors are convinced, Atiku continued, that Obasanjo 
will turn on them once they lose the criminal and civil 
immunity office confers on them.  So, the governors, or 
some of them, would join Obasanjo only if their term of 
office and that of the President were contiguous. 
 
¶4.  (S) Atiku is deeply suspicious that when Obasanjo's 
constitution change ploy fails, the President will seek to 
exploit Bakassi to declare a state of emergency.  Unlike my 
previous one-on-one meeting, the Vice President did not 
raise disturbances in the Delta, the Middle Belt or the 
North as providing a pretext for a state of emergency. 
 
¶5.  (S) Atiku emphasized again Obasanjo's isolation. He 
said that he had chaired a recent Council of State meeting 
when the President was out of the country.  At that 
meeting, Finance Minister Ngozi, Governor of the Central 
Bank Saludo and Minister of the Federal Capitol Territory 
el-Refai, and Minister of Solid Minerals Obi Ezekwesili, 
all members of the economic reform team, were bitingly 
critical of many of the President's inconsistent trade 
policies.  Upon his return, Obasanjo read the summary of 
the meeting.  Enraged, he summoned each individually for a 
dressing-down. Only Ngozi escaped, because she was still in 
Washington. 
 
¶6.  (S) The High Commissioner and I took the opportunity to 
reiterate our general themes:  the importance of the 2007 
elections, and that they be more credible than those of 
1999 and 2003; that they must not be postponed; and that 
the international community would have many questions 
should Bakassi be used as an excuse for a state of 
emergency. 
 
¶6.  (S) In conversations with the Political Counselor in 
two meetings that preceded the dinner, two of the Vice 
President's political advisors signaled a change in Atiku's 
assessment of his strength within the party.  The two 
advisors individually suggested that Atiku's control of the 
PDP's party structure is slipping with the new registration 
of party members controlled by the President's supporters. 
In light of these developments, they said that Atiku's 
control was "uncertain."  However, both reiterated that 
Atiku's basic plan had not changed.  They both said that 
Atiku will contest against Obasanjo for control of the 
party but, ultimately, planned to decamp on losing while 
weakening the party as much as possible. 
 
¶7.  (S) Comment:  Atiku was looking for the opportunity to 
repeat Reftel's points to the British High Commissioner. 
There was, however, a greater emphasis on the volatility of 
the North in the face of Obasanjo staying in power than 
there had been the week previously.  Obviously, we cannot 
confirm the report of Obasanjo's dressing-down of the 
"Dream Team."  However, such stories circulate frequently 
in Abuja, along with the assertion that Obasanjo is more 
and more obsessed with ensuring the loyalty of those around 
him.  However, Atiku is in a position to know.  Though 
Atiku has raised before the possible breakup of the PDP, he 
did, indeed, appear more resigned to that happening, and 
that he would need to organize his own political party to 
context 2007, just as his advisors had earlier signaled to 
the Political Counselor.  End comment. 
CAMPBELL