This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

050840Z Oct 05

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE - PASS TO POLAD 
LONDON PASS TO JACMOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL 10/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NI THIRDTERM
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA:  VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU CONVINCED 
PRESIDENT OBASANJO WILL TRY ANYTHING TO STAY IN OFFICE 
 
 
Classified By: Campbell, John, Ambassador, Abuja, State 
Reason(s): 1.5 (b,(d). 
 
REFS:  (A) ABUJA 1845, (B) ABUJA 1703, (C), ABUJA 1635, 
(D) LAGOS 1363, (E) LONDON 7934 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Atiku believes that President Obasanjo 
will try anything to stay in power past 2007, including 
exploiting unrest in the Delta and the Bakassi dispute to 
justify postponement of the elections.  The Vice President 
fears that he himself could be assassinated.  Atiku wants 
the U.S. and the UK to issue clear statements of 
opposition to Obasanjo staying in power through any 
unconstitutional or extra-constitutional means.  He said 
his people are in contact with members of the U.S. 
Congress and the UK House of Commons to achieve this end. 
Atiku has hired political consultants, both British and 
American, to support his candidacy, and has a working 
group that monitors the domestic print and electronic 
media.  As a result, he continued, he has a much better 
sense of the grassroots than any of his presidential 
rivals.  President Obasanjo, by contrast, is largely 
ignorant of Nigerian public opinion.  Nevertheless, Atiku 
said, the current U.S. Department of Justice investigation 
of his involvement with Congressman Jefferson must be over 
by the end of the first quarter of 2006 if he is to remain 
a viable candidate.  Atiku anticipates the breakup of the 
ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in the coming 
months, and he expects to lead a new party, leaving 
Obasanjo with control of only a "shell" of the PDP.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) At his request, Vice President Atiku met with me 
alone at the residence the evening of October 1 -- 
Nigeria's independence day.  Earlier, he had represented 
President Obasanjo at the National Lecture given by Prof. 
Joy Ogwu, and, as the senior Muslim in the government, had 
presided over religious ceremonies at the National Mosque. 
However, he said he had not been invited to the changing 
of the guard ceremony at the Villa and the subsequent 
reception hosted by President Obasanjo for the diplomatic 
corps. 
 
¶3.  (S) Atiku said that the current political struggle in 
Nigeria is between the "military elite" and the "political 
elite" (himself, certain governors, members of the 
national legislature) for power.  However, cutting across 
this paradigm is Obasanjo's effort to remain in power past 
¶2007.  So, while Obasanjo rules in the "style" of a weak 
military dictator and is the product of the "military 
elite," his ambitions have alienated his erstwhile 
military allies.  When I observed that the current 
constitution prohibited a third term and that the 
President had stated repeatedly that he had no intention 
of staying after 2007, Atiku said that Obasanjo's 
behavior, especially within the PDP, belies those 
sentiments.  Atiku said flatly that Obasanjo intends to 
manipulate the political process to stay in office.  When 
I observed that the President's current unpopularity made 
his reelection moot, Atiku observed that Nigeria's 
presidents are selected by manipulation of the political 
process, not by vote totals.  The Vice President then 
sketched out a scenario by which the President through 
carrots and sticks succeeds in winning the support of a 
majority of governors due to leave office in 2007, and 
thereby losing their immunity to the civil and criminal 
prosecution that would certainly follow.  These governors, 
in turn, would call on their National Assembly patronage 
networks to ensure the necessary amendment of the 
constitution.  If that strategy fails, and Atiku was 
confident it would, then Obasanjo might seek to create an 
atmosphere of national emergency by exploiting endemic 
unrest in the Delta and or the unresolved Bakassi dispute 
to justify postponement of the elections.  And, Atiku 
hinted, there are other, more sinister scenarios.  The way 
out of all these depressing scenarios, Atiku continued, is 
to convince Obasanjo that a third term is impossible. 
 
¶4.  (S) Within Nigeria, Atiku said, the effort to convince 
Obasanjo to step down would be initiated by a public 
statement opposing a third term signed by Gen. Babangida, 
Gen. Buhari, Gen. Aliyu Mohammed, himself, and perhaps 
others from the North.  Outside Nigeria, Atiku is looking 
for a clear statement from the U.S. and UK also opposing 
an extra-legal third term.  To that end, Atiku continued, 
"his people" (presumably his lobbyists and agents) are 
working closely with interested MP's in the House of 
Commons. He said his people have excellent access to the 
Foreign Office, less so to the Prime Minister's office. In 
the U.S., he continued, the strategy is similar.  His 
people are talking to members of Congress, who are 
starting to become involved.  He referred to a recent 
letter from Sen. McCain, and said there will soon be 
others. 
 
¶5.  (S) In this context, Atiku continued, he had been 
warned by "official" UK sources and by his private 
"American consultants" that his life is in danger.  He has 
asked the Director General (DG) of the State Security 
Service for augmentation of his security arrangements.  As 
yet, there has been no reply.  And the DG is a Yoruba from 
Obasanjo's village.  I observed that the DG reports to 
National Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed; Atiku said that 
the NSA is able to exercise only nominal authority over 
the DG.  He might, however, have alternative ways of 
strengthening the Vice President's security. 
 
¶6.  (C) Turning to the recent arrest of Dokubo Asari and 
the ongoing turmoil in the Delta, Atiku said that Asari 
should be treated as a criminal matter -- not political. 
The President, he continued, had made a mistake by 
negotiating with Asari in October, 2004.  Now, Asari would 
be charged with some form of treason.  With respect to a 
more fundamental solution to the Delta, Atiku said that 
the international community must assist in reducing the 
oil bunkering that fuels criminal enterprises.  To that 
end, he continued, Nigeria needs international assistance 
to create a coast guard that could operate in the creeks 
as well as in the near-shore waters.  He said he was 
familiar with Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) MD Kupolokun's "holistic" approach to the Delta, 
involving a partnership of the Federal and state 
governments, the Niger Delta Development Corporation 
(NDDC), the oil companies and foreign donors. 
 
¶7.  (S) Comment:  The bottom line is that Atiku wants to 
be president in 2007 and believes that Obasanjo had 
promised to support him, first in 2003 and then for 2007. 
Atiku is not beyond manipulating the system and his 
foreign interlocutors to achieve his ambition.  He feels 
personally betrayed by Obasanjo's failure to support his 
candidacy up to now.  Yet, despite Atiku's absence from 
the Independence Day Changing of the Guard, the two 
continue to work together, at least in public.  And, it is 
Atiku who is in charge, at least nominally, during 
Obasanjo's incessant travel.  (Atiku believes he was 
snubbed by not being invited to the Independence Day 
Changing of the Guard; perhaps, but invitations here often 
go astray.)  Atiku, like many others, is convinced that 
Obasanjo, at present, will stop at nothing to remain in 
power.  However, many of our contacts say that the 
military/political establishment also will stop at nothing 
to prevent him from doing so -- even if it means violence. 
Atiku believes that a clear statement from the U.S. and 
the UK opposing a third term might help change Obasanjo's 
mind.  Atiku has a sophisticated understanding of how the 
policy process works in London and Washington, and he said 
his agents are pushing for such a statement in both 
capitals.  He is also asking for a joint meeting with the 
British High Commissioner and me, to which we have agreed. 
 
¶8.  (S) Comment, continued:  Atiku, Babangida, Buhari and 
Marwa are rivals seeking the presidency.  Atiku is in some 
ways the odd man out -- the only civilian.  And Babangida 
emphasized to me that the next president of Nigeria must 
be from the military to preserve the state (Reftel A), 
sentiments with which Buhari and Marwa are likely to 
agree.  Nevertheless, all four could well unite, if only 
momentarily, to oppose a third term for Obasanjo or a 
postponement of the change of leadership to be marked by 
the 2007 elections. 
 
¶9.  (S) Comment, continued:  Obasanjo continues to say 
that he will leave office in 2007, a position reiterated 
by his close supporters (Reftel D).  Atiku argues that 
Obasanjo's behavior, especially his manipulation of the 
PDP, is a clear indication of his intention to hang on to 
power.  Like others, Atiku believes that Obasanjo is 
increasingly isolated from Nigerian realities and is 
consumed with the round of diplomatic activity associated 
with his role in the AU and ECOWAS.  Atiku and others 
believe that Obasanjo does not know or understand how 
unpopular and discredited he is throughout Nigeria, that 
he actually believes the sycophants around him and other 
African heads of state who argue that he is indispensable. 
Atiku's concerns about his own possible assassination 
recalls similar fears by the Lord Chief Justice when the 
Buhari suit challenging the 2003 elections was before the 
Supreme Court.   Political life in Nigeria is violent in 
the best of times, more so in the run up to elections; 
Atiku's concerns, like those of Chief Justice Uwais, are 
real.  Nevertheless, the British High Commissioner here 
has no knowledge of the "official British sources" that 
allegedly have warned Atiku that his life is in danger. 
 
¶10.  (S) Comment, continued: Atiku's comments about the 
likely breakup of the PDP recall those of Babangida 
(Reftel A).  However, his view that the elections of 2007 
are unlikely to reflect the will of the people is 
apparently more cynical than that of Babangida, who argues 
that the electoral process should be strengthened in 
practical and concrete ways.   For Atiku, however, who 
will be the next President of Nigeria will apparently be 
decided without much reference to the electorate.  It is 
premature to say whether it is Babangida or Atiku who is 
the most clear-eyed about the potential for the 2007 
elections.  However, the experiences of 1999 and 2003 do 
lend credibility to Atiku's misgivings.  End comment. 
CAMPBELL