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Viewing cable 05ABUDHABI4227, SUBJECT: UAE PROMISES CONTINUED COOPERATION ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ABUDHABI4227 2005-10-05 13:11 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abu Dhabi
null
Diana T Fritz  08/28/2006 11:33:06 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 04227

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: FCS
    INFO:   POL ICE CDA ECON AMB DCM P/M

DISSEMINATION: FCS
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:MQUINN
DRAFTED: FCS:MEOBRIEN
CLEARED: AMB CG FCS POLM

VZCZCADI619
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHDE RHEHNSC RUCPDOC
DE RUEHAD #4227/01 2781311
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051311Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1900
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 5469
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NP U/S JOSEPH, PMCNERNEY, NP/RA CRUSSELL, NP/CBM, 
NP/ECC, NEA/ARPI 
NSC FOR DSTEPHENS 
USDOC FOR BIS ACTING U/S PLICHTENBAUM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015 
TAGS: ETTC KNNP PARM IR PK TC SY NK
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: UAE PROMISES CONTINUED COOPERATION ON 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison for reasons 1 
.5(b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  On October 1-2, 2005, Under Secretary for 
Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, 
National Security Director for Counterproliferation Strategy 
David Stephens, and T Senior Advisor Patricia McNerney met 
with UAE officials to discuss the issue of Iran,s nuclear 
program.  The delegation also encouraged the UAE to 
participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative and 
proposed a bilateral US/UAE Counterproliferation Task Force 
that would enhance cooperation at both the policy level and 
the experts level to address proliferation issues.  Both 
Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan (Deputy Prime Minister and 
MinState for Foreign Affairs), and his brother, Abdullah bin 
Zayed al Nahyan (Information Minister) expressed grave 
concern about the Iranian threat to the UAE and regional 
stability.  They supported international diplomatic efforts 
to bring Iran to account for its nuclear program.  Both 
leaders welcomed the proposed Counterproliferation Task 
Force, agreeing that the UAE needed to do more to address the 
problem of proliferation.  The delegation also met with the 
Central Bank Governor to discuss ways to take action against 
the income and assets of proliferators (septel).  The final 
meeting was with the head of Dubai,s State Security Office 
where the delegation heard a description of the UAE,s own 
nascent interagency nonproliferation task force and discussed 
specific cases.  End summary. 
 
HbZ Promises Full Support to Diplomatic Efforts on Iran 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (S) On October 1, the delegation and Ambassador met with 
HbZ bin Zayed Al Nahyan (HbZ ) Deputy Prime Minister and 
MinState Foreign Affairs).  HbZ began the meeting by assuring 
Under Secretary Joseph of the UAE,s continued cooperation 
with the U.S.  He expressed serious concerns about the 
nuclear program in Iran.  Joseph shared his appreciation for 
the strong strategic relationship with the UAE and agreed 
that it is important to the entire international community to 
fight terrorism and to combat proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.  HbZ reiterated the UAE,s full support in 
this effort, including the federal government and local 
(emirate-level) governments.  He said further that the UAE is 
very keen to preserve regional stability, thereby preserving 
the relative stability that currently exists in the UAE. 
 
3. (S) Joseph emphasized that the implications of a nuclear 
Iran are huge for both the Middle East region and the world. 
He added that the recent IAEA resolution finding that Iran 
was in non-compliance with its NPT obligations and safeguards 
requirement was unprecedented and showed that the Iranian 
activities are a threat to the entire international 
community.  The IAEA's finding of Iranian non-compliance will 
require that the matter be referred to the U.N. Security 
Council. Joseph stated the need for the world to keep the 
pressure on Iran to bring them into line.  HbZ asked if the 
US had any information about the secret location of Iran,s 
nuclear program; Joseph replied that Iran had engaged in 
20-year programs of deception and concealment, adding that he 
believed that continued international pressure would reveal 
the full extent of the program, just as happened in Libya. 
 
4. (S) HbZ then asked Joseph what is needed from the UAE and 
what cooperation the US could offer.  Joseph responded that 
the UAE must continue to support the diplomatic effort to 
bring Iran to account for its program.  HbZ told Joseph he 
had been assured by Vice President Cheney that the US would 
respond to Iran through diplomatic means.  HbZ opined that 
military action against Iran would have catastrophic 
consequences and that the UAE would therefore support any and 
all diplomatic efforts to keep pressure on Iran to give up 
its nuclear programs. 
 
5. (S) Joseph reiterated that the US government prefers the 
use of diplomacy to address the issue and asked HbZ his 
thoughts on how to handle the Iranians.  HbZ responded that 
the only way to get Iran to comply is to have a unanimous 
resolution at the United Nations.  He said that if Russia and 
China hold out, the result would provide Iran the opportunity 
to avoid complying with the resolution.  He said further that 
Iran is very deceptive and manipulative and will never be 
transparent on their own initiative.  HbZ felt that the IAEA 
vote strengthened the position of the EU3. 
 
6. (S) Joseph then outlined the US proposal for a bilateral 
counterproliferation task force to address the transshipment 
of goods and money through the UAE in support of 
proliferation of WMD.  He explained E.O. 13382, blocking 
property of designated WMD proliferators and their supporters 
and encouraged the UAE to continue freezing assets under the 
order and to consider their own legislation in this regard. 
HbZ said he looked forward to future discussions with the 
Ambassador regarding the task force and said it would be 
important to examine airports and seaports to address the 
issue.  He said the media has shown the UAE in a very 
negative way and he hopes there will be more successes for 
the UAE in the future with the new task force. 
 
7. (S) Joseph praised the UAE,s cooperation in the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security,s Container Security 
Initiative and the U.S. Department of Energy,s Megaports 
initiative.  He then asked for the UAE,s participation in 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  HbZ 
acknowledged the vast amount of trade through Dubai,s ports 
and said more work needs to be done to monitor trade better. 
He said he would take up the issue of the PSI personally and 
said he looks forward to joining. 
 
8. (S) Regarding North Korea, Joseph asked Sheikh Hamdan that 
the UAE refrain from purchasing conventional weapons from 
North Korea because the revenue from such sales supports 
their WMD program.  He also asked the UAE,s assistance in 
stopping the transit of these weapons through the UAE.  HbZ 
said he was unaware of the official policy of the UAE on this 
issue but said he would speak to the appropriate departments. 
 
9. (C) HbZ said the UAE is very lucky to have such an open 
country and open market that attract people from all over the 
world and they want to maintain that.  Therefore any time a 
flaw is found they want to fix it. 
 
ABZ EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR UNANIMOUS ACTION AGAINST IRAN 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
10. (S) That evening, the delegation met in Dubai with 
Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ), the Minister of 
Information, who expressed to U/S Joseph that the UAE feels 
Iran is a much greater threat to the UAE than to the United 
States.  Even without weapons of mass destruction, Iran is 
difficult to deal with and is a very tough neighbor.  He 
emphasized that the UAE wants to be a partner in the efforts 
with Iran.  Joseph shared AbZ,s concerns about one of the 
most serious challenges for the international community and 
agreed that Iran is dangerous even without WMD, pointing out 
that Iran,s combined missile and nuclear programs could 
embolden Iran and make it a threat to the entire 
international community.  Joseph stressed that the world had 
to stand up to Iran and that although Iran has invested 
heavily in centrifuge technology under the guise of a 
civilian program, there is no economic rational for Iran,s 
enrichment capability.  It must to be made clear to Iran that 
there will negative consequences if they don,t go back to 
the negotiating table with the EU3. 
 
11. (S) AbZ told Joseph that Iran was much more dangerous 
than North Korea, and that Iran,s nuclear ambitions would 
remain no matter what regime might be in favor.  AbZ said he 
has heard that Iran,s nuclear program won,t stop &until 
they can hit Washington DC with weapons of mass 
destruction.8  AbZ faulted Russia and China for &muddying8 
the message to Iran.  He believes that the Iranians are 
seeking a confrontation with the US, but he also believes 
that the international community &can make Iran blink.8 
Iran must be given a way out and, in this regard, praised 
President Bush's recent proposal to provide Iran assured 
access to nuclear fuel in exchange for giving up its 
enrichment and reprocessing ambitions.  Joseph responded that 
Iran aspires to being a great country and they wrongly 
believe one of the signs of a great country is a nuclear 
program.  He said the EU3 was offering a good package of 
incentives to Iran.  Joseph emphasized that the time to act 
is now because it will be even harder to deal with Iran in 
the future.  AbZ said he thought Iran will threaten to stop 
exporting oil to put pressure on the international community. 
 
12. (S) AbZ also reported he had heard recently that Italy 
and Iran had reached agreement to build a tracking satellite 
for Iran.  He said that Iran claims it is only a 
telecommunications satellite but the UAE has serious concerns 
that the satellite is meant for more. 
 
13. (S) AbZ said that Iran had gained Afghanistan and Iraq as 
part of their sphere of influence in recent years and 
currently has a good relationship with Iraq.  He also pointed 
out that Syria has become much closer to Iran recently.  AbZ 
opined that if we could get any positive result out of our 
dealings with Syria, it would have an impact on Iran.  AbZ 
said he doesn,t trust Syrian President Bashar, who believes 
there are &two arms8 to Washington and that he can deal 
successfully with one of the arms.  (Note: AbZ last met 
Bashar in Damascus on July 31.)  When Joseph asked how we can 
accelerate the pace of change with Syria, AbZ said the 
Syrians are easier to deal with than Iran, but it will take 
time.  He suggested that since Turkey is a close ally of 
Syria, it would be good to get Turkey,s help to apply 
pressure to Syria. 
 
14. (S) U/S Joseph described the proposed US/UAE 
Counterproliferation Task Force for AbZ and also expressed 
the desire for the UAE to participate in PSI, pointing out 
that Singapore had hosted a PSI exercise this year and Turkey 
will host a PSI exercise next year.  Joseph told AbZ that the 
US Congress is viewing participation in PSI as a new 
good-housekeeping seal of approval for a state's commitment 
to non-proliferation. .  AbZ promised to review the PSI 
documents, saying that more and more the concern in the UAE 
is with the smaller ports.  He said that Dubai,s Jebel Ali 
and Rashid ports and Mina Zayed in Abu Dhabi are not as much 
of a problem as in the past but that ports in the emirates of 
Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah had become problematic. 
 
15. (S) In closing, AbZ said that Al Qaeda made a strategic 
mistake when it attacked on 9/11 because the attack has 
brought the international community together in the fight. 
 
DUBAI STATE SECURITY GIVES UPDATE ON CP ACTIVITIES IN DUBAI 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
16. (S/NF) On October 2, U/S Joseph met with Brigadier 
Mohammed Al-Qemzi, Director of Dubai State Security Office, 
who started the meeting by saying he was very interested in 
building a national expertise in nonproliferation.  He 
reported that the UAEG had recently formed an interagency 
nonproliferation task force, consisting of high level 
representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, and Energy, as well as representatives from the 
Dubai Ports, Customs, and Free Zone Corporation and Civil 
Defense.  The Ambassador asked Al Qemzi if the emirates of 
Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah were represented on the task 
force, but al Qemzi,s reply was a little vague, saying that 
the other emirates were represented at the federal level.  Al 
Qemzi showed Joseph a printed power point presentation 
describing the mission of the Task Force, which is to prevent 
proliferators from exploiting the free and open trading 
environment in the UAE to traffic in weapons of mass 
destruction.  Al Qemzi said this would improve the image of 
Dubai, which has suffered adverse attention from high-profile 
cases such as the AQ Khan proliferation network.  Al Qemzi 
said the task force would review national legislation and 
procedures to see if tougher measures are required in order 
to deter and detect proliferators operating in Dubai. 
Additional training needs for officers would be reviewed and 
the task force would look to increase its cooperation with 
international organizations, including adopting the export 
control lists of these organizations. 
 
17. (S/NF) Al Qemzi reported that SSO had compiled a list of 
28 companies that are proposed for closing because of 
proliferation activities.  Fifteen of the companies are 
reported to have been closed.  Ambassador noted that this 
information had already been provided during Oct 2004 and Feb 
2005 UAEG-USG meetings.  Al Qemzi then advised that there was 
nothing in the pipeline for future action.  Al Qemzi said 
some of the companies are officially owned by the Iranian 
government and therefore SSO has to move carefully with these 
companies, in some cases taking only administrative action, 
such as refusing to renew visas for employees, to deter the 
companies, proliferation activities.  He conceded that some 
of these companies had attempted to open up again at other 
locations and under different names.  Al Qemzi said that the 
Iranians are well aware of these activities and are wondering 
why the sudden change in Dubai,s policy towards Iran.  He 
said that he has heard the Iranians may have stopped their 
activities in Dubai because of these recent actions taken by 
Dubai. 
 
18. (S) Joseph summarized for Al Qemzi the proposed bilateral 
US-UAE nonproliferation task force and Al Qemzi welcomed such 
a step.  He reiterated that it was important to improve the 
UAE,s image in the world. 
 
19. (S/NF) Another problem for the Dubai authorities, said 
Qemzi, is the Mahmoud Seif case, who is under indictment in 
the US for the attempted diversion of night vision goggles to 
Iran.  Seif was released on bail by the Dubai courts. 
Although his passport has been retained by the Dubai 
authorities, Al Qemzi speculated that the Iranian government 
might issue him a new one so that he can travel back to Iran. 
 He also pointed out that the Austrian authorities who 
arrested Seif on the charges relating to the night vision 
goggles were not concerned about Seif. 
 
20. (S/NF) Joseph expressed concern about the Syrian WMD 
programs and told Al Qemzi that the USG looks forward to 
cooperation on illicit acquisition efforts by Syria. 
Curiously, Al Qemzi told Joseph he had &no information8 on 
such activities by the Syrians but would certainly welcome 
cooperation on the issue. 
 
21. (S/NF) Regarding North Korea, Joseph said the US is 
asking countries to forgo purchasing conventional weapons 
because the hard currency earned through these sales goes to 
support North Korea,s WMD programs.  He asked for Dubai,s 
cooperation in preventing the transshipment of these 
conventional weapons through the UAE.  Al Qemzi and his staff 
said there is &little activity by North Korea8 in the UAE, 
saying one North Korean company in Dubai was closed and 
another North Korean company located in the Jebel Ali Free 
Zone traded in toys and plastics.  Joseph pointed out that 
North Korea does not trade in toys. 
 
22. (S/NF) Al Qemzi told Joseph that he believed there was 
considerable internal support in Iran for Iran,s nuclear 
program and it would be hard to stop the program.  He 
commented on Iran,s recent movement of investment and 
companies but was not sure such activity was similar to such 
moves by Libya prior to the imposition of sanctions. 
 
23. (U) This message was cleared by U/S Joseph. 
QUINN