This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 001717 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN, AND EUR FRONT OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS AJ AM OSCE
SUBJECT: DETAILS OF SHOOTING INCIDENT ON LINE OF CONTACT 
 
REF: BAKU 1415 
 
Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4(b,d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) The September 20 shooting incident on the line of 
contact seemed clearly directed to disrupt N-K negotiations 
and will certainly be raised at the OSCE Permanent Council. 
While there is no way to determine which side fired, the 
round -- which impacted about 20 meters from an international 
monitor -- came from the direction of Azeri lines.  This was 
the message delivered by OSCE Monitor Peter Keay in a meeting 
with CDA on September 23.  A confidential report signed by 
OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk of the shooting (text 
below) will be delivered in the coming days to the OSCE 
Permanent Council.  Monitoring is suspended until Kasprzyk 
has an opportunity to raise the incident with both sides 
together with Minsk Group co-chairs.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
OSCE MONITOR CONFIRMS SEPTEMBER 20 SMALL ARMS FIRE 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2.  (C) Peter Keay, a UK national member of the OSCE group 
led by Special Rep Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, met with the 
CDA at the Embassy on September 23 and described events in 
detail.  Keay took part in the monitoring of the Line of 
Contact (LOC) between N-K Armenian and Azerbaijani forces on 
September 20 and was the first monitor out of the trench on 
the N-K side.  Amb. Kasprzyk was leading the party from the 
Azerbaijan side of the LOC.  The trench lines were about 1300 
meters apart at the point of monitoring. 
 
¶3.  (C) The monitoring event had been proceeding according to 
standard procedure.  Positive contact had been made with 
commanders of both sides and both sides provided assurances 
that there would be no incidents.  Monitoring groups were in 
contact with hand-held radios.  Keay emerged from the trench 
on the N-K side of the LOC with the local N-K forces 
commander.  He could see Amb. Kasprzyk's monitoring party on 
the Azerbaijan side of the LOC and made positive contact as 
usual, by waving an OSCE flag.  He was in discussion with the 
local N-K commander, who was directing his attention to new 
trenches extending toward the N-K lines from the Azerbaijan 
side when he saw a round impact the dust about 20 - 30 meters 
away from his position.  He then heard the sound of a weapon 
discharge which he described as the distinctive sound of a 
7.62 mm Kalashnikov rifle. 
 
¶4.  (C) Keay said that although the round came from the 
direction of the Azerbaijan side, the trenches at that point 
of the LOC are so serpentine that it would be impossible to 
determine with certainty which side fired.  He immediately 
returned to the trench on the N-K side and contacted Amb. 
Kasprzyk, who discontinued the monitoring event and issued a 
statement.  (See para 6 below.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Keay said Amb Kasprzyk intends to raise the issue 
with both sides at an upcoming meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers together with the Minsk Group co-chairs.  Keay 
passed us a copy of a confidential report prepared by the 
group which would be distributed in Vienna next week (see 
para 7 below).  Keay speculated that while it is remotely 
possible that the round was fired by accident, it was most 
likely an attempt to "throw a spanner in the works of 
negotiations" just at a point where they appear most 
promising.  He asserted that tension along the LoC seemed to 
be growing as the negotiators became more optimistic.  "It's 
very, very tense right now," he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
OSCE PRESS STATEMENT FOLLOWING SHOOTING INCIDENT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (U) Begin text of Kasprzyk statement issued immediately 
after shooting incident: 
 
At approximately 1157 hrs during the course of the 
Monitoring, following security guarantees issued by both 
sides, after both monitoring teams were out of their trenches 
on the open ground and visual contact between them had been 
established, a single shot was heard by both teams.  A field 
assistant participating on the territory controlled by 
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) armed forces confirmed what appeared to 
be a bullet strike the ground 20-30 meters in front and 
slightly to the left of his position approximately one second 
prior to the report.  The Monitoring party immediately took 
cover in the trenches. 
 
End Text 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
OSCE REPORT NO. 147 ON MONITORING THE LINE OF CONTACT 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Begin text of Text of "official incident report." 
(Note internal paragraph markings and OSCE classification.) 
 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
The Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on 
the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Report No. 147 on Monitoring on the Line of Contact 20 
September 2005 
 
1 Basic Data on the Monitoring 
 
1.1 Introductory remarks 
 
The Monitoring on the Line of Contact (LoC) was initiated by 
the Personal Representative (PR) of the Cia. The PR requested 
the Monitoring to be held in the southern part of the LoC on 
20 September 2005, in the vicinity of the village of 
Karakhanbeyli in Fizuli Region. The last Monitoring in this 
area took place on 01 June 2005 (MR 141) and on this exact 
spot on 23 November 2004 (MR 130). The aim of the Monitoring 
was to verify the current situation along this part of the 
LoC. 
 
1.2 Monitoring Requests and Security Guarantees 
 
On 12 September 2005, a Field Assistant, on behalf of the PR, 
presented a Monitoring Request to the Azerbaijani MFA. The 
Azerbaijani side responded positively on 19 September and 
offered security guarantees in their response. A 
corresponding request was presented to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
(NK) authorities on 13 September 2005. The NK side responded 
positively on 19 September and also offered security 
guarantees in their response. 
 
1.3 Place of the Monitoring 
 
The site of the Monitoring on the LOC was approximately 5 km 
north-east of the village of Karakhanbeyli. 
 
The positions of the Teams at the Monitoring site in the LOC 
were: 
 
Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side) 
Lat. N 39 degrees 38 minutes, Long. E 47 degrees 18 minutes 
(from map) 
 
Team No.2 (NK side) 
Lat. N 39 degrees 38 minutes, Long. E 47 degrees 17 minutes 
 
The Teams were approximately 1300m apart. 
 
1.4 Personnel 
 
Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side) 
 
OSCE Monitoring Team 
Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland), Personal Representative 
of the CiO 
Miroslav Vymetal, Field Assistant (Czech Republic) 
Maj Konstantinos Theodoropoulos HLPG, (Greece) 
 
Escort Personnel 
¶O. Ismayil-Zade, MFA 
Capt R. Kerimov, MoD 
Lt Col A. Seyidov, regional commander Lt Col A. Aslamov, 
local commander 
 
Team No.2 (NK side) 
OSCE Monitoring Team 
Lt Col Imre Palatinus, Office Coordinator (Hungary) 
Peter Keay, Field Assistant (UK) 
 
¶2. Detailed account of the Monitoring 
 
2.1 Course of the Monitoring 
 
The two Teams traveled in a total of five clearly marked OSCE 
vehicles, three on the NK and two on the Azerbaijani side. 
General visibility was good, up to 15 kilometres and weather 
conditions were good. After security guarantees for crossing 
open ground were given, the Teams moved to their covered 
positions. After further security guarantees for the 
Monitoring were exchanged, the Teams moved forward on foot to 
the Observation sites. Once both were in position they 
climbed out of the trenches with raised OSCE flags and 
established visual contact. The distance between Teams was 
1300m. Approximately four minutes after visual contact was 
established a single shot was heard on both sides (at a 
distance of 600-800 meters slightly to the left of the 
Observation site on the NK front lines).  The Monitoring 
party immediately took cover in the trenches.  A Field 
Assistant from Team 2 confirmed what appeared to be a bullet 
strike the ground 20-30 metres in front and slightly to the 
left of his position approximately one second prior to the 
report.     Following VHF radio communication between the 
Teams, the decision to halt the Monitoring was taken. All 
personnel returned to their vehicles and left the area. 
 
Team 1 
 
Team 1 was given a briefing in Goradiz by the Head of the 
Local Executive and the regional and local military 
commanders. After the briefing, the two vehicles of Team 1, 
escorted by two vehicles from the Azerbaijani side, moved to 
a point approximately 3 km east of the Monitoring Site where 
they stopped to exchange security guarantees before crossing 
open ground and to confirm the exact locations for the 
Observation sites. Team 1 then traveled to a covered position 
at the Monitoring Site where further security guarantees for 
the Monitoring were exchanged. After this, Team 1 moved 
approximately 250 metres on foot to its Observation site, and 
with an OSCE flag raised climbed above ground out of the 
trenches, from where visual contact was established with Team 
¶2. After a single shot was heard the Team moved back into the 
trenches. 
 
Team 2 
 
Team 2 met with the local military commanders on the road 
north of Fizuli and was given a briefing on the situation on 
the LOC. After the briefing, the three vehicles of Team 2, 
escorted by two vehicles from the NK side moved to a point 
approximately 2 km north of Karakhanbey Ii where they stopped 
to exchange security guarantees before crossing open ground 
and to confirm the exact locations for the Observation sites. 
Team 2 then traveled to a covered position at the Monitoring 
Site where further security guarantees for the Monitoring 
were exchanged. After this, Team 2 moved approximately 50 
metres on foot to its Observation site, and with an OSCE flag 
raised climbed above ground out of the trenches, from where 
visual contact was immediately established with Team 1. After 
a single shot was heard the Team moved back into the 
trenches.  All members of the Team 2 were able to agree on 
the direction and approximate distance of the shot. 
 
2.2 Information obtained during Monitoring as stated by the 
respective Parties 
 
Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side) 
 
Cease-fire violations 
 
The regional commander confirmed information given by Head of 
the Local Executive that cease-fire violations are common and 
the local population close to the LOC lives under the 
permanent threat of shooting. He reported that 26 cease-fire 
violations, took place on this part of the LOC since the 
Monitoring on 1 June 2005. In some cases the Azerbaijani side 
opened returned fire. As a result of sniper fire one 
Azerbaijani soldier was reported to have been killed on 28 
July 2005. Another incident was reported to have taken place 
on 13 August when one soldier was killed while fetching water 
and another injured when trying to remove the body. 
 
Other Military Information 
 
The regional commander stated that the NK side is constantly 
improving its positions by building fortified positions at 
intervals of 300-350 metres. He stated that this is in order 
to improve control over the adjacent territory. Such 
positions were pointed out to the Team while moving to the 
Observation site. He also added that tracer rounds are used 
to set fire to dry grass in no-man's land and as a result the 
harvest close to the LOC is under threat. 
 
Mines 
 
No mine related incidents were reported in this sector. The 
regional commander stated that 12 mine explosions were heard 
during the fire in no-man's land on 1-2 September. 
 
Team No.2 (NK side): 
 
Cease-fire violations 
 
Team 2 was given a list of three cease-fire violations on the 
whole of the LOC since the last Monitoring on 08 September 
¶2005. Two of the violations were said to have taken place in 
the Hadrut Sector and one in the Mardakert Agdere Sector. No 
injuries were reported. 
 
The local commander informed the Team that the situation on 
the LOC is relatively calm and stable, with a reduced number 
of reported cease-fire violations. 
 
Mines 
 
No mine incidents were reported on the NK side, but Maj M. 
Arushunyan mentioned that on five occasions since the last 
Monitoring, mine explosions had been heard on the Azerbaijani 
side. 
 
¶3. Conclusions 
 
- The fact that the Monitoring was halted due to a shot being 
fired towards OSCE monitoring Team brings into question the 
security of the Teams. The exchange of guarantees prior to 
Monitorings is meant to ensure the safety of OSCE personnel. 
It is of paramount importance that escort personnel, 
including local and regional commanders, should ensure that 
every measure possible is taken to guarantee the safety and 
security of OSCE personnel also by strengthening the 
discipline among troops. 
 
- It was not possible for the Teams to determine the side 
from which the shot came due to the terrain and the nature of 
the front lines. 
 
- Parties should promptly investigate the incident and submit 
relevant reports. 
 
- The tension on the LOC observed at the last Monitoring 
remains high. The increased number of casualties is a cause 
for concern and should be addressed. 
 
ANDRZEJ KASPRZYK 
Personal Representative of the CiO 
 
End text. 
GODFREY