This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 003360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PL
SUBJECT: WHAT'S AT STAKE IN POLISH ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. WARSAW 3298 
 
     ¶B. WARSAW 2479 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, 1.4b,d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: With just a few weeks remaining in the Polish 
parliamentary and presidential election campaigns, all signs 
indicate that the new government and head of state will be 
ones committed to advancing long-standing principles of 
Polish foreign and economic policy.  September 25 
parliamentary elections will determine which of the two 
likely coalition partners -- the centrist Civic Platform (PO) 
and the center-right Law and Justice (PiS) -- will dominate 
the government and shape its key policies.  The choice 
between the more liberal PO and the more nationalist, 
populist PiS is particularly sharp in economic policy, but 
differences in emphasis exist in their foreign and defense 
policies as well.  In October 9 presidential elections, 
meanwhile, voters will choose from among two main candidates, 
whose presidencies would be defined largely by their 
different personalities and their partisan political 
relationship with the government.  Both could be counted on, 
if elected, to sustain Poland's strategic partnership with 
the United States and its active engagement in Europe and the 
wider world.  End summary. 
 
PO vs. PiS 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) For more than a year, it has been widely assumed 
that PO and PiS would form the core of a new coalition 
government, and for some time the only issue was whether they 
would require a third coalition partner to reach a 
parliamentary majority.  With their combined support in 
recent polls topping sixty percent, the question is no longer 
whether PO and PiS will govern alone but which of the two 
parties will finish in first place and thereby dominate the 
coalition.  After months of surveys indicating a rough parity 
in support for PO and PiS, the Civic Platform has in the 
closing weeks of the campaign surged to a formidable lead 
over its rival (ref A), supporting that conventional wisdom 
about Jan Rokita (PO) as the next prime minister and PO's 
control of key ministerial portfolios. 
 
¶3. (SBU) With large numbers of likely voters still undecided, 
however, we cannot exclude the real possibility that PiS can 
manage a close showing or even outpoll PO in the end.  It is 
also possible, but less likely, that protest parties, such as 
the populist Self-Defense and the right-wing LPR, could do 
well enough to deny PO and PiS a parliamentary majority (in 
such a case, the margins would probably be small enough that 
PO and PiS could cut a deal to form a minority government, 
without a formal third partner). What, then, are the stakes 
in looking ahead to PO-led government versus one dominated by 
PiS? 
 
Foreign policy 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Rokita and PO presidential candidate Donald Tusk have 
been at pains lately to insist that PO and PiS have 
comparable and compatible visions for Poland, but certain 
differences are evident in the two parties' approach to 
foreign policy issues.  Both PO and PiS can be expected to 
seek to establish their government as a more vigorous 
defender of Polish national interests than the outgoing 
government, particularly within the EU, but also in relations 
with the United States.  Both were relieved by the apparent 
demise of the draft EU constitution, which they opposed as 
ceding too much authority to the "major powers" and as 
ignoring Europe's Christian heritage.  PiS is decidedly more 
EU-skeptic than PO, however, and PiS rhetoric frequently 
casts Germany as an adversary (whether leading the charge 
against "historical revisionism" or condemning Schroeder's 
relationship with Putin).  Tusk, meanwhile, has stated that 
he views improvement of relations with Germany among his top 
priorities (German elections this week may do a great deal to 
get that process moving).  PiS members will press for a more 
aggressive approach toward Russia and Belarus, although in 
both cases the party's rhetoric is not likely to be matched 
in practice, given the need to maintain constructive 
relations with Russia and the challenges of the political 
situation in Belarus.  Whether led by PO or PiS, however, the 
next government will almost certainly accelerate Polish 
efforts to support democracy and civil society in its eastern 
neighbors. 
 
¶5. (C) We can count on the support of both PO and PiS to 
sustain Polish engagement in Iraq, and the next government 
will likely be more open to discussing a variety of post-2005 
options than the outgoing GOP.  Both parties supported the 
2003 intervention and subsequent stabilization missions, and 
PO and PiS leaders have defended Polish involvement in Iraq 
during the campaign (although they have been careful to avoid 
raising the issue's profile).  That said, leaders of the two 
parties have also signaled their dissatisfaction with the 
levels of support the current government was able to secure 
from us, suggesting that not only would they have done it 
differently but that Poland's participation in future 
missions will be based on new arrangements with the United 
States including requests for increased military assistance. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Although Rokita has been generally reluctant to 
discuss possible cabinet configurations, he has confirmed 
publicly that Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (former Polish EU 
integration chief, currently an MEP) is his choice to be 
foreign minister.  PiS officials have not yet conceded the 
MFA to PO, and this is one key ministry whose leadership may 
well be decided by the relative strength of PO's and PiS's 
performance September 25.  Among the leading PiS candidates 
for the foreign minister position are former culture minister 
Kazimierz Ujazdowski and former deputy FM and deputy Defense 
Minister Radek Sikorski (lately of AEI in Washington). 
 
Economic policy 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The differences between PO and PiS are perhaps most 
clear in their approaches to economic issues (ref B).  Both 
parties regard reducing Poland's chronically high 
unemployment as their government's top priority, but PiS 
focuses on creating employment incentives to address the 
problem, while PO argues that the most effective way to 
reduce unemployment is to grow the economy and create new 
opportunities.  PiS officials' concerns about Poland's income 
distribution and calls for greater "solidarity" may be 
partially dismissed as campaign rhetoric, but they reflect an 
approach that is rather more populist and statist than their 
prospective coalition partners.  One of the key elements of 
the PO platform has been introduction of sweeping tax reforms 
(introduction of a flat 15-percent rate on VAT, corporate and 
personal income taxes), for example, while PiS has argued for 
maintaining progressivity.  PO leaders are visibly more 
comfortable in dealing with the private sector, whose members 
are viewed with suspicion by many PiS officials.  PO 
officials generally favor more complete privatization of 
state enterprises than that undertaken by the outgoing 
government, while PiS has called for a review of previous 
sales and favors state control of "strategic" sectors. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Control of economic policy is an absolute 
requirement for the Civic Platform, regardless of whether 
they finish ahead of PiS or not.  PiS leaders, from the 
Kaczynski brothers on down, have effectively acknowledged 
that the finance and economy ministries will go to PO.  This 
will not mean that PO will have entirely free rein, however, 
and compromises will have to be reached on most key issues. 
With PO taking two economic posts, it appears that the third, 
treasury, may go to a PiS official (the front-runner is 
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz of the Sejm's finance committee). 
Former deputy finance minister Jan Kawalec, a close Rokita 
advisor, is the leading candidate to head the finance 
ministry. 
 
Defense transformation 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Significant differences between PO and PiS are also 
apparent on defense policy, particularly regarding 
transformation of Polish armed forces.  Civic Platform's 
approach, as articulated by former defense minister Bronislaw 
Komorowski and others, is to accelerate the processes 
underway to transform the military into a professional, 
expeditionary force, complemented by national guard-like 
elements.  PO argues for immediate reforms to streamline the 
command structure and make the military less top-heavy.  PiS, 
meanwhile, remains focused on potential external threats 
(principally from Russia) and is not convinced that Poland 
should reduce its territorial defense capabilities; the party 
favors retention of forces and the existing structure of 
garrisons. 
 
¶10. (C) Komorowski has been seen as the odds-on favorite to 
return as defense minister, but it is neither clear that he 
wants the job, nor that this post would necessarily go to PO. 
 We have heard rumors recently that Komorowski, who is closer 
to Tusk than Rokita, might prefer to be Tusk's National 
Security advisor should Tusk win the election.  A possible 
PiS candidate for defense is Radek Sikorski, who served as 
deputy in that ministry as well. 
 
The presidential race 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) It is important to remember that the powers of the 
Polish president were significantly reduced by the 1997 
constitution, and that the office's political weight depends 
on the occupant's own skills and relationship to the 
government as much as its legal authority.  Donald Tusk and 
Lech Kaczynski, with close party (and, in Kaczynski's case, 
blood) ties to the new government, would certainly be in a 
position to shape policy and speak authoritatively on foreign 
policy issues.  Although some rivalries and differences would 
be certain to emerge (particularly between a President 
Kaczynski and a PM Rokita, although Tusk and Rokita do not 
always see eye-to-eye, either), we can expect that the 
president and government from the same camp would coordinate 
their statements and activities.  With Cimoszewicz out of the 
running, it seems unlikely there will be a political split 
between the government and the presidency. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Either of the two remaining candidates could be 
expected to support the broad outlines of Polish foreign 
policy, including active engagement in Europe, the strategic 
partnership with the U.S., and support for democracy and 
human rights throughout the world.  It goes without saying, 
perhaps, that neither seem to have the political or personal 
skills of Aleksander Kwasniewski. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) Barring an unlikely blow-out by the Civic Platform 
(with PO's percentage share of the vote in recent surveys 
reaching the high 30's, some here have begun to speculate 
about the possibility that PO could win a majority of 
parliamentary seats on its own), the next government will 
function much like all coalition governments, whatever the 
relative strength of the coalition partners.  Areas of 
responsibility and interest will be carved out (PiS is 
determined to have the Justice and Interior portfolios, for 
example, given its anti-corruption focus), and compromises 
will have to be struck on most high-profile issues. 
Moreover, the parties have barely begun to address some 
critical challenges, such as reform of Poland's dysfunctional 
health care system.  On many issues, clear differences in 
approach exist between PO and PiS, but that does not mean 
that the dominant coalition partner will get all it wants, 
nor even that it will prevail. 
 
¶14. (C) The good news in all of this is that we are confident 
that we will be able to work closely and effectively with the 
next Polish government and president, regardless of the 
leadership mix between PO and PiS, and regardless of which of 
the two leading contenders replaces Kwasniewski.  The next 
government may seek to drive a harder bargain on some issues, 
and working with a coalition government may require more 
intensive diplomacy -- particularly at the beginning -- but 
our partnership with Poland will remain strong. 
Ashe