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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 003298 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PL
SUBJECT: CENTRIST CIVIC PLATFORM SURGES IN PRE-ELECTION 
POLLS 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The centrist Civic Platform (PO) has moved 
into a strong first-place position in the latest opinion 
surveys, with just a few weeks remaining before Polish 
parliamentary and presidential elections.  PO's recent surge 
suggests that the party will dominate a coalition government 
formed with the center-right Law and Justice (PiS), whose own 
support remains steady and should ensure that the two parties 
will be able to govern without the need for a third coalition 
partner.  PO has been aided by the remarkable increase in 
support for its presidential candidate and party leader, 
Donald Tusk, who now holds a commanding lead over PiS rival 
Lech Kaczynski and SLD candidate Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. 
PO's and Tusk's advantage may yet prove short-lived as 
opponents resume intensive campaigning after the August lull 
and redirect their fire, but both the party and the 
presidential candidate enter the final phase of the campaign 
in an enviable position, with their popular support at 
all-time highs.  End summary. 
 
Polls mark surge for PO, Tusk 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Three major opinion polls conducted at the beginning 
of September indicate that PO has broken out of its virtual 
tie with PiS, as large numbers of undecided voters appear to 
be moving into its camp as the September 25 vote draws 
closer.  Among likely voters with a clear preference, PO has 
the support of between 38 and 34 percent, with PiS well 
behind, drawing between 23 and 29 percent of those surveyed. 
Significantly, PO's rise has not come at PiS's expense, and 
the combined support of both parties is now clearly well 
above the levels to ensure majority control of parliament. 
These latest polls suggest that just three and possibly four 
other parties will pass the five-percent threshold for 
parliamentary representation, with the governing SLD, 
populist Self-Defense, and right-wing LPR all hovering around 
ten percent, and the Peasants' party flirting with the 
five-percent mark. 
 
¶3. (U) The growth in popular support for PO presidential 
candidate Tusk has been even more remarkable, leading many 
analysts to conclude that Tusk's rise has driven the increase 
in PO's numbers.  In less than a month, Tusk's support has 
gone from the low teens to around forty percent of the vote 
(the three most recent surveys produced nearly identical 
levels for the three leading candidates: roughly 40 percent 
for Tusk, 22 percent for Kaczynski, and 18 percent for 
Cimoszewicz).  Self-Defense's Andrzej Lepper remains far 
behind at ten percent, with the rest of the field in the low 
single digits.  Although many are skeptical -- particularly 
given the volatility of the presidential race thus far -- 
that Tusk's support will continue to rise, the PO leader's 
rapid ascent in the polls has prompted his campaign to look 
at a possible first-round victory (i.e., more than fifty 
percent of the vote), something previously considered 
unthinkable for any of the candidates. 
 
Why Tusk, and why now? 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Tusk's opponents attribute the PO leader's standings 
to his being the only candidate on the hustings during the 
August vacation season, maintaining that the dynamics of the 
race will change as it gets into full gear leading up to the 
first round October 9.  Certainly, the PO candidate's team 
has made the most of the past few weeks, with a full campaign 
schedule and the launch of a broad and effective media 
effort.  Tusk picked up an important endorsement from rival 
Zbigniew Religa, who withdrew from the presidential race 
September 2 (this support is seen as significant given 
Religa's high personal credibility ratings).  The PO 
candidate was also helped by coverage of the Solidarity 25th 
anniversary events (at which Lech Walesa reiterated his 
backing of Tusk) and by Tusk's association with the cause of 
embattled ethnic Poles in Belarus (he made a high-profile 
visit there in early August). 
 
¶5. (SBU) Tusk has also benefited directly from the steady 
fall in public support for Cimoszewicz, whose brief reign at 
the top of opinion polls was ended by (apparently false) 
accusations of improper financial disclosure, made by a 
disgruntled former aide.  The affair forced the Cimoszewicz 
campaign on the defensive, reinforced the public's 
association of the candidate with other SLD corruption 
scandals, and weakened Cimoszewicz's appeal to those seeking 
an alternative to Kaczynski.  Moderate, reassuring and 
perhaps even a little dull, Tusk was well positioned to 
inherit the role of "anti-Kaczynski," a figure plausible as 
president and less ideologically divisive than the PiS 
candidate (or Cimoszewicz, for that matter).  In the end, 
Tusk may well prevail if only because he has (so far, at 
least) the lowest negative rankings among the three serious 
contenders remaining. 
 
Election not over yet 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) With as many as forty percent of likely voters still 
undecided, no one is prepared to suggest that PO and Tusk 
have a lock on their races, no matter how impressive their 
leads at this point.  PiS has already begun to step up its 
populist attacks on PO, charging that PO's programs favor the 
rich; the other parties are certain to join in seeking to 
reverse the Civic Platform's fortunes.  The Cimoszewicz 
team's initial counterattack on PO (accusing it of complicity 
in bringing the false charges against him) appears to have 
fizzled, but Tusk will remain the principle target of the 
other campaigns as long as he holds on to first place. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Finally, the polling numbers describe trends, but 
may not deliver an exact picture.  Actual support for protest 
parties such as Self-Defense and LPR, for example, may be 
higher than polling results indicate, given some voters' 
reluctance to admit their preference to pollsters (this 
phenomenon could be a factor in estimating SLD support as 
well).  As PO's and PiS's combined support surpasses sixty 
percent, it appears very likely that these two parties will 
have a majority in parliament, but an unexpectedly strong 
showing by one or more of the lesser parties could cause a 
PO-PiS coalition to fall short. 
Ashe