This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 005800 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL PINS PGOV KDEM IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT GOI EXTERNAL GOI INTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: NSA EILAND ON POST-DISENGAGEMENT STEPS FOR MOVING 
FORWARD 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz.  Reason 1.4 (B/D) 
. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Israeli National Security Advisor Giora 
Eiland briefed NEA DAS Elizabeth Dibble September 21 on steps 
Israel and the Palestinians can take over the coming year to 
build on the success of Israeli disengagement.  DAS Dibble 
raised the situation at Rafah, and Eiland cited major points 
of agreement with the Palestinians on next steps.  He also 
expressed a willingness to be flexible on the time it would 
take to reach an understanding with all the parties involved 
in discussions about Rafah.  Note: this conversation took 
place prior to this weekend's events in Gaza and does not, 
therefore, reflect the current situation on the ground, or 
the Israeli reaction to it.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
DISENGAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) DAS Dibble asked NSA Eiland to share his observations 
on disengagement.  Eiland cited several positive elements: 
 
-- The days of disengagement proved to be the most peaceful 
period of the past five years. 
 
-- People on both sides -- Palestinian and Israeli -- are 
tired of violence.  This creates a better basis for the 
future.  Eiland said that over the past six to eight months 
Israel had several excuses for retaliation to Palestinian 
attacks, but the GOI refrained for (external) political 
reasons and because the message from the Israeli people has 
been: "Don't escalate or enter a cycle of violence -- even if 
we can justify it." 
 
-- Hamas is not like Al-Qaida.  It is an organization that is 
very popular and very sensitive to the level of support it 
enjoys with the Palestinian people. 
 
------------------------------- 
HAMAS AND PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Addressing why Hamas kept quiet when it would appear 
against their interest and image, Eiland surmised that had 
Hamas instigated violence during disengagement, Palestinians 
would have questioned its motives and asked why sacrifice 
(i.e. casualties that would likely have resulted from Israeli 
retaliation) were necessary to achieve an objective that had 
already been realized. 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to the DCM's question about Hamas and 
Palestinian elections, Eiland said the coming January 
elections are the main factor that determines Hamas policy, 
including Hamas respect for the PA's call for calm.  Calm is 
in the clear mutual interest of all Palestinian parties, 
especially in Gaza, according to Eiland's analysis.  He 
cautioned that after the election things will change. "Once 
Hamas has achieved its objective of strengthening its 
political power, it will be able to undermine any political 
process its leaders do not support."  Eiland also predicted 
that Hamas will end the current truce ("tahdiya") and 
concentrate on violence in the West Bank. 
 
¶5.  (C) DAS Dibble asked Eiland whether Hamas might decide 
that the political route is the way to go.  Eiland replied 
that there is no precedent for such a move.  He situated 
Hamas within the international network and ideology of the 
Muslim Brothers.  "Pragmatic moves may be made for a certain 
time, but that will not necessarily result in the 
transformation (of Hamas) into a political party willing to 
give up its ideology (rejecting Israel's existence) or its 
measures (terrorism)."  In response to PolCouns' follow-up 
question, Eiland clarified that Hamas does not see itself as 
being "in the opposition."  Its leaders see Hamas as a 
coequal of the PA.  Hamas will cooperate with the PA, but if 
Hamas leaders disagree with the PA, "they will do it their 
way.  They do not accept PA rule (over them)."  In fact, 
Eiland said, Hamas has established areas where PA police are 
not allowed, and Hamas maintains its own checkpoints. 
 
------------ 
FATAH/TANZIM 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Turning from Hamas, Eiland noted that the PA controls 
the biggest independent militia: the Tanzim organization. 
"So when we talk about disarming militias, Fatah (must be 
accountable too)." 
 
------------------------ 
NO WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Eiland said the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is more 
severe than is currently perceived by many observers after 
disengagement.  This dispute is not about the content of a 
final settlement so much as it is about the process leading 
to it.  According to Eiland, the official Israeli position is 
that the disengagement from Gaza was unique: "(There will be) 
no more steps in the future (in the West Bank)."  Final 
status talks are premature until the PA dismantles militias. 
Before this is done, "it would be wrong for us to touch 
political substance," Eiland maintained.  Eiland analyzed the 
PA's position as exactly the opposite: The PA will not 
dismantle militias until there is a comprehensive political 
solution, with detailed benchmarks, a timetable, and 
international guarantees.  The PA narrative, through Eiland's 
eye, continues: "Only then will we (the Palestinians) have 
the will and strength to get to the 'one authority, one 
weapon, one law' endgame." 
 
¶8.  (C) Before respective Palestinian and Israeli elections, 
there will be no real will to more forward to narrow 
differences, according to Eiland.  Neither side -- Israeli or 
Palestinian -- can make a significant change in its position 
due to domestic political reasons.  In addition, the two 
leading proponents of disengagement within the Government of 
Israel -- PM Sharon and Vice Premier Peres -- have 
fundamentally different philosophies and approaches to the 
steps that should be taken post-disengagement. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
DIFFERENT POST-DISENGAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES OF PERES AND SHARON 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Eiland said Peres believes that improving the 
economic situation in the Gaza Strip is the fundamental 
condition for any future process.  Thus, from the Peres 
perspective, it is in Israel's interest to improve 
Palestinian lives, and to allocate Israeli resources to that 
end.  This will also strengthen President Abbas.  In 
contrast, Eiland said, Sharon's position is that Israel will 
no longer be responsible for life in Gaza.  Sharon may be 
willing to help, but not because it is in Israel's interest 
to do so.  Sharon is willing to take some security risks -- 
e.g., opening the Philadelphi corridor and possibly the 
seaport too -- in order to demonstrate that Gaza is now a 
Palestinian responsibility.  Eiland sketched out how these 
differing views could affect Israeli policy options.  For 
example, on passages between Gaza and the West Bank, Eiland 
said Peres would be willing to pay a high price (to 
facilitate this objective) whereas Sharon does not see an 
Israeli interest in doing so.  "Gazans can get what they need 
from Egypt," is how Eiland summarized Sharon's hypothetical 
response to Peres, adding that Sharon will not be willing to 
take the security risk that he perceives would result from 
providing a Gaza-West Bank connection. 
 
------------- 
THE WAY AHEAD 
------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Eiland suggested three ways to improve the 
situation, adding that they will require the goodwill and 
flexibility of the parties, Egypt and others in the 
international community. 
 
-- (1) Resume real, productive dialogue with the Palestinians 
on the economic side.  "We were preoccupied (with 
disengagement).  Now we can work with Wolfensohn" and the 
Palestinians.  For example, Israel built a new, modern 
passage facility at Erez.  The Palestinians will not 
cooperate on using the facility because they do not agree 
where the (demarcation) line is located. 
 
-- (2) Strengthen security cooperation between the two sides, 
which started on a good basis during disengagement, and could 
expand to other areas post-disengagement.  The objective 
would be to transfer more responsibility for other areas and 
cities.  The PA has changed some "old figures" in the past 
few months, and this has strengthened the capacity of the PA. 
 
-- (3) "Rebuild the (Palestinian) nation."  Assistance could 
be provided to the PA to support legislative and municipal 
systems.  In return, the PA will be required to become more 
accountable.  Benchmarks, in Eiland's view, would include the 
gradual "fading out" of independent militias.  Weapons cannot 
be collected overnight, but the PA can determine -- in a day 
-- that it is illegal for Palestinians to carry weapons.  He 
acknowledged that prospects for the PA achieving such 
benchmarks would be improved if they do not appear to be 
dictated by the GOI. 
 
¶11.  (C) Eiland's deputy, Eran Etzion, stressed the 
importance for the international community to pressure Hamas 
to disband its militia before the January 25 elections.  DAS 
Dibble asked Etzion for specific actions that Etzion would 
suggest.  In reply, Etzion mentioned the role that UNSCR 1559 
had played in Lebanon, but could not explain how such a 
precedent would work in Gaza after Israeli disengagement. 
Etzion acknowledged that policy recommendations usually 
boiled down to increasing pressure on the PA.  Eiland 
commented, in a moment of candor, that it might not 
necessarily be bad to let Hamas participate in the political 
process, but he said President Abbas had not exacted an 
appropriate price for the participation of Hamas. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: STAGNATION WILL LEAD TO VIOLENCE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶12.  (C) Eiland said the alternative to pursuing the options 
described above is stagnation, which increases the risk of 
violence, i.e. a "third Intifada," quoting PA Minister 
Dahlan.  The DCM asked whether the GOI anticipated further 
unilateral measures to prevent such a scenario.  Eiland 
acknowledged that the GOI had not begun to dismantle 
outposts, but claimed that the GOI had done "too much" 
freezing of construction in settlements.  DAS Dibble recalled 
Israeli obligations on these issues, and the DCM suggested 
the GOI move forward on the basis of the Sasson report. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
RAFAH AND PALESTINIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR GAZA 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) DAS Dibble asked Eiland about the situation at Rafah 
and Israeli views on timing.  She questioned how long, in 
Eiland's view, it would take to come to agreement on the 
Rafah crossing, given the pressure the PA is under to find a 
solution quickly on access from Gaza in and out of Egypt. 
Eiland confided that the GOI had made a mistake in its 
dialogue with the Egyptians and Palestinians.  Certain 
arrangements could have been agreed upon before 
disengagement.  Nonetheless, Eiland said, the GOI and PA 
basically agreed on five general points: 
 
-- Someday, movement of people and baggage between Egypt and 
Gaza at Rafah will occur with no Israeli inspection or 
presence. 
 
-- Movement of cargo will be via Nitzana or Kerem Shalom. 
 
-- Possibility of a third party monitor (not as a 
requirement, but as an option); 
 
-- If Rafah becomes operational, there will be no need for 
other crossings for people to and from Egypt. 
 
-- If these arrangements work reliably, Israel will not 
change the customs envelope between Israel and Gaza. 
 
¶14.  (C) Eiland assessed that the gap between positions arose 
not so much over issues of timing (six months versus two 
weeks), but on the practical arrangements that need to be 
made between three or possibly four parties concerned.  In 
particular, the question of who might enter Gaza freely 
remains unresolved.  Eiland said Israel had decided to allow 
visitors (to enter Gaza) without prior clearance or agreement 
"unless Israeli intelligence suggests that they are coming to 
do bad things."  Eiland gave examples: If Palestinian 
refugees want to return from Lebanon, Israel does not want to 
be involved.  If the Iranian Revolutionary Guards seek entry, 
Israel would want agreement (from the Palestinians and 
Egyptians) that they cannot enter. Eiland suggested that 
Kerem Shalom would be an interim solution until 
understandings are reached on these issues.  "We want to make 
sure the PA controls Gaza.  If they do not, will Israeli 
commitments to keep the Customs Envelope open remain?" 
 
¶15.  (C) In closing, Eiland recalled that, until recently, 
Israel's highest priority had been full control of the 
Gaza/West Bank customs envelope.  Post-disengagement, 
Israel's much more important goal is to demonstrate that it 
has no responsibility for the Palestinians.  He noted that 
Israel's only true security guarantee would be to 
unilaterally transform Erez and Karni into international 
passages and to change the customs envelope, but acknowledged 
that this would separate Gaza and the West Bank and result in 
severe economic consequences for the Palestinians.  Such a 
decision would mean the collapse of the PA in Gaza, in 
Eiland's view.  DAS Dibble asked Eiland about the state of 
Israeli-Palestinian talks on Gaza.  Eiland said that PA 
Minister Dahlan's recent sickness had delayed discussions, 
but that timing of a Rafah agreement was negotiable. 
 
¶16. (U) This cable has been cleared by NEA DAS Dibble. 
 
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