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S E C R E T STATE 176974 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN IZ RU SY
SUBJECT: TALABANI DISCUSSES RUSSIA, IRAN, SYRIA, AND IRAQI 
POLITICS WITH A/S WELCH AT UNGA 
 
Classified By: NEA A/S C. David Welch, reason 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1.  (U)  September 14, 6:00 P.M., New York, UNGA 
 
¶2.  (U) Participants: 
 
USG 
--- 
 
NEA A/S C. David Welch 
NEA PDAS Elizabeth L. Cheney 
Prem Kumar (NEA/I/POL notetaker) 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
President Jalal Talabani 
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari 
President,s Chief of Staff Kameron Karadaghi 
U.S. PUK Representative Qubad Talabani 
 
¶3.  (S) SUMMARY.  Reviewing their UNGA consultations with NEA 
A/S Welch September 14, Iraqi President Talabani and Foreign 
Minister Zebari said Russian President Putin had pledged to 
cooperate to renew the MNF-I mandate as the expiration of 
UNSC resolution 1546 approaches.  They praised the USG,s 
tough public line on Syria and pledged to deliver strong 
messages to Damascus and other Arab capitals that Syria must 
increase its support for Iraq.  Talabani predicted Iran would 
continue to make life difficult for the USG and Iraq by 
continuing its nuclear program while holding out the 
possibility of undermining stability in Iraq.  On Iraq's 
political process, Talabani suggested that the Kurds could 
work with moderate Arabs to defeat Islamist parties in the 
December election, but appealed for direct USG financial 
support to do so.  He pledged the Kurds would continue to 
work to bring Sunni Arabs into the political process, and 
predicted that despite reports to the contrary, neither Prime 
Minister Ja,afari nor former PM Allawi would oppose the 
draft constitution.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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RUSSIA 
------ 
 
¶4.  (S) Reviewing his meeting with Russian President Putin at 
the UNGA, Talabani said he appealed for Russia to fully 
support the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and ensure 
that Russian media did so as well (instead of praising 
insurgents as "revolutionaries," for example.)  Talabani 
claimed that Putin "agreed to everything" the Iraqis asked. 
He said Putin pledged that Russia would cooperate in the 
Security Council to renew the mandate of the Multinational 
Force-Iraq (MNF-I) as the end of the political process set 
out in of UNSC resolution 1546 approached.  Talabani also 
said Putin agreed to consult with and respect the wishes of 
the ITG on ideas such as an international conference to 
promote national reconciliation in Iraq.  On Syria, Talabani 
said he ignored Putin,s offer to mediate between the Syrian 
Government (SARG) and the ITG and that he reminded the 
Russian President that Syria was the main source of 
terrorists operating inside Iraq. 
 
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SYRIA 
----- 
 
¶5. (S) Talabani and Zebari both praised Amb. Khalilzad,s 
recent public remarks about Syria and noted that those points 
had been delivered at just the right time.  Talabani charged 
that the SARG was "deliberately supporting" former Ba'athists 
in Iraq and was allowing the Iraqi Ba,ath Party Central 
Command to operate training camps across Syria.  He noted 
that the SARG had so much control over its borders that it 
could prevent birds from crossing over, but yet had done 
little to prevent foreign fighters from leaving Syria for 
Iraq.  Zebari said he had reinforced Amb. Khalilzad,s points 
on Syria with Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa. 
 
¶6. (S) Talabani said that upon his return to the region, he 
would "frighten" the Syrians by telling them that they were 
now "in trouble" because the USG might opt for regime change. 
 He added half-jokingly that he would also warn the SARG of 
possible Sunni Arab moves to challenge Alawite dominance in 
Syria.  Welch appealed to the Iraqis to continue taking a 
tough public line on Syria -- especially on September 19 and 
20, when the ministerial meeting on Lebanon would highlight 
Syria,s negative role elsewhere in the region.  Zebari 
promised to oblige. 
 
¶7. (C) Foreign Minister Zebari noted that the Syrians had 
claimed that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad was not coming 
to the UNGA because the USG had refused his visa.  Welch 
clarified that al-Asad chose not to attend UNGA not because 
of a visa issue but because he thought he would be 
embarrassed by Syria,s diplomatic isolation.  Syria then 
belatedly decided to send Foreign Minister Shara,a to the 
UNGA, Welch noted. 
 
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IRAN 
---- 
 
¶8. (C) Despite his meeting Iranian President Ahmadinejad at 
UNGA, Talabani said that he felt like he still did not know 
the new Iranian leader.  Zebari recalled that when he 
accompanied Iraqi Prime Minister Ja,afari to Tehran, 
Ahmadinejad appeared to be a true "son of the revolution" who 
reported directly to Ayatollah Khameinei.  Zebari said 
Ja,afari had argued with Ahmadinejad in Tehran that the 
cause of violence in Iraq was not foreign occupation but 
rather Ba'athist and extremist ideology.  The new Iranian 
Foreign Minister, Zebari added, was an "ideological Muslim" 
who had been expelled from Turkey when he was Iran,s 
Ambassador there because he had fomented unrest among Turkish 
Islamists. 
 
¶9. (S) Talabani predicted that Iran would continue to make 
life difficult for the USG and ITG by "looking for the bomb" 
while holding out the possibility that Iran could undermine 
stability in Iraq.  Talabani averred that Iran had a secret 
agreement with Syria to work together in Iraq.  As evidence, 
the Iraqi President pointed to a conference of Iraqi 
insurgents in Beirut that had been guarded by Hizballah -- 
which he said could not have occurred without Iran,s 
knowledge and support.  Talabani added that after Iran,s 
recent elections, the situation in Iran had become 
increasingly unstable.  Iranian Kurds were "boiling," Iranian 
Arabs were very upset, the Turcomen and Baluchis were 
agitated, and the opposition was growing in strength. 
 
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CONSTITUTION AND POLITICAL PROCESS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) Talabani said the USG and the Kurds should 
"coordinate on all levels for the (December) election" and 
appealed directly for USG financial support for moderate 
parties.  He suggested that the Kurds could arrange joint 
lists with moderate Arabs to help them win seats, but that 
neither the Kurds nor moderate Arabs could afford to let the 
Islamists win the December ballot.  Welch urged Talabani and 
KRG President Masud Barzani (the head of Zebari,s political 
party) to honor their promises to the USG to ensure Sunni 
Arab participation in Iraq,s political process.  Talabani, 
who claimed to speak for Barzani as well, pledged that the 
Kurds would do their best to ensure inclusiveness. 
¶12. (S) Asked about reports that PM Ja,afari and former PM 
Allawi were against the draft constitution, Talabani 
predicted that neither would come out against the text. 
Despite what he acknowledged as deep antipathy for Ja,afari 
("I hate him"), Talabani assessed that the PM would not cross 
the USG.  He suggested Barzani could influence Allawi, but 
also advised the USG to urge Allawi as soon as possible to 
support the constitution. 
 
 
RICE