This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTIAGO 001885 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR VC (YEHL, WILLIAMS); DEPT FOR WHA/BSC (SHERIDAN) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 
TAGS: PARM PINR PINS PREL KNNP CI
SUBJECT: IN COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY VISIT, A/S OF VERIFICATION 
AND COMPLIANCE DESUTTER EMPHASIZES PARTNERSHIP, PRAISES 
CHILEAN COMMITMENT 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM SEAN MURPHY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary: As part of the ongoing Compliance 
Diplomacy initiative, A/S of Verification and Compliance (VC) 
Paula A. DeSutter emphasized the importance of Chile as a 
strategic partner with the capacity to influence key 
organizations and countries on current topics in arms control 
and nonproliferation during her August 18-19 meetings with 
Chilean officials.  The GOC appreciated A/S DeSutter,s visit 
to Chile and warmly received her calls for collaboration and 
cooperation, and perceived her visit as clearly demonstrating 
the importance of Chilean participation in responding to 
noncompliance and on countering proliferation.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  During August 18-19 meetings with Chilean 
representatives, A/S of Verification and Compliance Paula 
DeSutter emphasized the importance of Chile as a strategic 
Partner on matters of international security.  She emphasized 
that Chile is a country that has both credibility and 
international influence on controversial topics in arms 
control and nonproliferation.  All participants agreed that 
flexible and active partnerships are key in combating the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  A/S 
DeSutter's Compliance Diplomacy discussions were well 
received, and her visit clearly demonstrated to the Chileans 
the importance of their participation on this issue.  During 
her visit A/S DeSutter was accompanied by DCM Emi Yamauchi, 
EPOL Officer Stephanie Acosta-Mikulasek, Thomas Yehl and 
Shara Williams of VC, and additional Embassy staff. 
 
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Meetings with Ambassador Luis Winter 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  On August 18, A/S DeSutter held discussions in two 
meetings with Ambassador Luis Winter, Director of Special 
Policy, at the Ministry of Foreign Relations.  A/S DeSutter 
was accompanied by Thomas Yehl, Director of the Office of 
Technology and Assessments, and Shara Williams, Diplomacy 
Fellow at the Office of Technology and Assessments. 
Ambassador Winter was accompanied by Francisco Bernales, 
Director of International Security and Dismarmament, Maria 
Luisa Rodriguez, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Pedro 
Suckel, Assistant Director of International Security and 
Disarmament.  The second meeting with Amb. Winter included a 
larger set of officials from the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations, the Chilean Commission of Nuclear Energy, the 
National Customs Service, the National Authority for the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 
the National Intelligence Agency, and the National Customs 
Service. 
 
------------------------ 
Compliance Diplomacy 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU)  In both meetings, after a brief explanation of her 
Bureau,s organization, A/S DeSutter explained her Bureau,s 
three main missions: assessing the compliance of other 
nations with arms control treaties, agreements, and 
commitments; assuring verification of agreements under 
negotiation; and acting as the principal policy liaison to 
the U.S. intelligence community on matters of verification 
and compliance. 
------------------- 
The Libyan Model 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  A/S DeSutter also noted that the Bureau of 
Verification and Compliance has been responsible for 
coordinating U.S. assistance to Libya with the destruction of 
their WMD programs and Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR)-class missiles.  Citing her experiences with Libya as 
a model, A/S DeSutter emphasized the necessity for both the 
assessor having "good" intelligence information and the 
assessed having a desire to comply as critical components of 
effective and successful elimination of WMD. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  A/S DeSutter continued by discussing the necessity 
to adapt old tools of assessing compliance and responding to 
noncompliance, and then complement them with new ones to 
further policy.  She saw two main factors as central to 
streamlining the process of working in arms control and 
noncompliance issues: agility and flexibility in choosing 
different types of multilateral, bilateral, and cooperative 
mechanisms.  This combination, she explained, would balance 
the reliance on large international organizations with a more 
tailored and flexible approach.  During her discussions, the 
A/S emphasized the dangers of the unintentional consequences 
of inaction. 
¶7. (SBU)  A/S DeSutter's comments were well received by 
Ambassador Winter and his colleagues.  Recognizing Chile,s 
limitations in terms of population size (15 million) and 
distance, Amb. Winter acknowledged their dependence on 
international security and peace given their open economy. 
Amb. Winter believes the general public understands the 
importance of Chile,s recent role on the U.N. Security 
Council, the Committee on Disarmament, the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and within the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).  In reference 
to the problem of intentional noncompliance, as in the case 
of Iran, Amb. Winter conveyed uncertainty in how to respond 
and whether verification was effective.  A/S DeSutter noted 
the importance of long-term thinking about enforcement which 
may require short-term costs from enforcers.  She also noted 
the difference between North Korea and Iran, and the 
latter,s emphasis on cultivating a positive international 
image.  She concluded by underlining the value of Chile as an 
important partner to the U.S. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Ambassador Winter requested to remain informed of 
U.S. advancements in compliance and verification of WMD.  He 
agreed that the international community must continue to act, 
and that Chile was prepared to participate. 
 
------- 
MTCR 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Ambassador Winter said Chile is now prepared to 
join the MTCR, but that Chile needs to be invited again and 
to be assisted with joining and doing customs regulations and 
legislation. 
 
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PSI 
---- 
 
¶10. (SBU)  He added that GOC officials would be meeting this 
week (August 22-26) regarding the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI). 
 
------------------------------- 
Control of Chemical Weapons 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Amb. Winter said that Chile, while it is not now a 
member of the Executive Council of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), expects to 
participate next September.  He added that Chile is prepared 
now to join the Australia Group. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Chile's Membership in the Non-Aligned Movement 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶12. (SBU)  Regarding Chile,s membership in the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), Amb. Winter stated that Chile only shares 
some of NAM,s positions.  He commented that it is both 
difficult to moderate the NAM and difficult to leave the NAM. 
 He stated that Chilean Deputy Perm Rep to the UN Labb was 
furious at the behavior of Egypt and the NAM during the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 
¶2005.  However, he believes Chile can play a more helpful and 
moderating role on these issues from within NAM rather than 
from outside. 
 
---------------------------------- 
The Inter-Agency Working Group 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU)  In the second meeting following the one-on-one 
meeting with Ambassador Winter, A/S DeSutter met with a 
larger group of Chilean officials, hosted by Amb. Winter, 
from the various Chilean agencies that deal with 
nonproliferation and disarmament issues, as listed above. 
After briefing the group  on the VC Bureau's function, A/S 
DeSutter expanded on the process of implementing the various 
arms control treaties, stating that it should be a 
cooperative process and that many put too much faith on 
on-site inspections.  The process must build on existing 
approaches, she said, but at the same time relying on 
available national means and methods.  She suggested that, 
for countries with limited means, the widely available and 
informative open sources like the Internet should be 
considered. 
 
------------------------------ 
The Non-Compliance Report 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU)  During the meeting, A/S DeSutter described the 
Bureau,s Congressionally-mandated role in preparing the 
Noncompliance Report.  She noted that the Bureau requires 
access to quality and highly-classified intelligence, and 
that it exhaustively and systematically reviews, 
nation-by-nation, compliance with an array of arms control 
treaties including the BWC, CWC, START, MTCR, NPT, the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. 
She also described the extensive review process for the 
report before its release, assuring her audience that the 
process was rigorous. 
 
------------------------ 
Cooperation with Chile 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (SBU)  A/S DeSutter emphasized Chile's role as an 
important partner with international credibility and a 
regionally persuasive voice.  A/S DeSutter explained, in 
addition, that just because a country does not have the 
weapons, it does not mean it could not be a transit country. 
She concluded that a good exchange of opinions to create a 
timely detection of threats is the way to control these world 
threats. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU)  GOC officials asked about U.S. policy on the BWC 
and its proposed verification protocol.  The A/S explained 
that the task of verifying biological weapons was much more 
difficult because of dual-use equipment and anywhere 
production.  In the case of noncompliance and an inspection, 
she asked, rhetorically, &What would you discover?  How 
would you determine if the work is offensive?8  She said the 
existence of the Protocol would have led to international 
complacency resulting from the fact the international 
community believed something had been done to verify the 
treaty.  But she said that sense of security would be false, 
and because the U.S. believes the biological weapons threat 
is credible and worrisome, the U.S. cannot support the 
Protocol that would lead to a false sense of security.  She 
said to attempt to verify compliance with controls on these 
types of WMD requires flexible multilateral collaboration 
even more than with other technologies. 
 
¶17. (SBU)  The meeting concluded with Ambassador Winter 
emphasizing that Chile is committed to ending proliferation 
and eliminating WMD.  The Chileans want to work with and 
within international treaties and their commitment on this 
issue is "very clear." 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Emphasis on Collaboration and Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C)  After the interagency meeting, Amb. Winter pointedly 
remarked in a one-on-one discussion that some Chileans 
perceive the U.S. administration as unilateralist, and that 
it was positive to hear A/S DeSutter,s emphasis on 
cooperation and collaboration. He thought it was very good 
that she described PSI as a cooperative approach.  He made a 
point to say it was &big deal8 and &means a lot8 for 
Chileans to hear that A/S DeSutter had come to Chile to ask 
for their assistance and support. 
 
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Public Diplomacy 
------------------ 
 
¶19. (SBU)  In meetings after the interagency discussion, A/S 
DeSutter explained the purpose of her trip and the role of 
the Bureau of Verification and Compliance to members of the 
media in a roundtable discussion and on an embassy radio 
program.  She also met informally with members of the 
military, think tanks, and academics at a working lunch 
hosted by the Ambassador. 
 
¶20. (SBU)  Finally, she met with the Director Latora 
Villanueva and staff of the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission 
to learn about Chile,s uses and plans for nuclear energy and 
control of radioactive material. 
 
¶21. (SBU) A/S DeSutter has reviewed and cleared this report. 
KELLY