This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171314Z Sep 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV ECON PHUM YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: DFM EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER KIDNAPPING OF 
JOURNALIST AND HIS OWN SAFETY 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On September 13, DFM Mustafa Noman briefed 
DCM on the recent kidnapping and assault of his close friend, 
journalist Jamal Amer.  Noman also shared his concerns that 
his perceived support for Amer angered President Saleh, who 
reportedly encouraged Zindani to publicly attack Noman. 
 
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Kidnapped Journalist: Part of a Disturbing Trend? 
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¶2.  (C) Noman retold the story of Amer's abduction, which was 
widely published in the local and international media.  On 
August 23, Amer was abducted from his home by armed men in a 
car bearing a license plate number normally reserved for the 
Republican Guard, the President's own elite military unit. 
Amer was taken to a remote location and beaten for alleged 
fax communications with the US and Kuwaiti Ambassadors, 
supposedly in an attempt to undermine the Yemeni government. 
After an interrogation of his involvement with foreign 
embassies, Amer was returned home four hours later.  He 
reported the abduction to MOI authorities and helped a sketch 
artist create a detailed sketch of the lead abductor. 
 
¶3.  (C) Noman believed the allegations of contact with the 
American and Kuwaiti embassies were an attempt to mask Amer's 
real offense, which was the publishing of several articles 
accusing high-level government officials of corruption. 
While Amer's abductors demonstrated a lack of 
professionalism, continued Noman, by showing their faces and 
employing rudimentary interrogation tactics, he believes it 
was unlikely they acted without high-level government 
support.  (Note: Amer is not an isolated case of harassment. 
In the last several weeks several journalists critical of the 
government have been arrested or had materials confiscated). 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Two hours after the abduction, Noman alerted Saleh's 
office to the incident, after receiving a call from Amer's 
wife, believing the President would want to know immediately. 
 Instead, Saleh was angry he received a direct call on the 
issue.  According to Noman, the President was already upset 
with him, believing Noman supported journalists against the 
government and passed information to Amer.  (Note: Saleh 
recently named Noman Ambassador to India, which the DFM 
considers a slight as he expected to receive London, Paris or 
Rome). 
 
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Zindani Lashes Out 
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¶5.  (C)  One week after the abduction, Akhbar al Youm (a 
sensational paper reportedly used by Saleh's supporters to 
trash his foes) published a statement by Zindani saying that 
it was against national and Sharia law to act against another 
Muslim without just cause.  "This is interesting" said Noman, 
considering the accusation stems from a February television 
interview, where he said Yemen was committed to enforcing the 
UN Security Resolution targeting Zindani's assets.  Noman 
questioned why Zindani would launch an attack on a seven 
month old interview, especially after the Foreign Minister 
and Prime Minister immediately made public statements 
contradicting him, saying the ROYG would not support freezing 
Zindani's assets without concrete evidence.  The only logical 
reason, Noman asserted, is that the President wanted to 
intimidate him over his support for other journalists. 
 
¶6.  (C) On September 8, Noman met Zindani to discuss the 
issue privately.  During the meeting, Zindani admitted that 
Saleh encouraged him to publish a statement against Noman, 
based on the February interview.  Noman assured Zindani that 
his comments had been misconstrued and that he would not 
support freezing Zindani's assets without clear proof. 
Zindani considered the issue settled and promised to publish 
a clarification to ensure that his supporters did not 
consider the original statement to be a fatwa against Noman. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7.  (C)  Noman, a well-known advocate for political and 
economic reform, was still visibly shaken from the run-in 
with Zindani.  Noman fears that any young supporter of 
Zindani could take it upon himself to avenge his master for 
the perceived slight from Noman.  He plans to travel to Cairo 
soon, presumably to await the publishing of Zindani's 
clarification that Noman did not violate Sharia law.  Already 
frustrated with the government in general, Noman admitted he 
was actively pursuing a private UN position. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The abduction of Amer and Saleh's possible collusion 
with Zindani to attack a member of his own government 
highlights several disturbing trends.  While the mastermind 
of the kidnapping is unknown, it appears to be part of an 
organized campaign to intimidate the press with at least the 
tacit approval of government officials. The kidnapping 
follows an increasing number of articles criticizing Saleh 
and numerous other high-level officials for corruption. 
Yemeni authorities possess the license plate number and a 
detailed sketch of one of the abductors.  If the ROYG is 
serious about finding those responsible, it could do so 
easily.  To date, however, no suspects have been detained or 
questioned. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Further, Saleh's use of Zindani as a tool to 
intimidate reformers is also of great concern.  While Noman 
himself is no real threat to the regime, his brother 
currently living in Germany plans to run for president. 
Neither Saleh's thin skinned reactions to any criticism nor 
his lashing out at friend and foe alike bode well for 
transparency and tolerance in the run-up to the 2006 
Presidential Election. 
 
 
 
Krajeski