This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS EFIN IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: ITALY: AMBASSADOR'S TOUR D'HORIZON WITH PRODI AND 
CENTER-LEFT LEADERS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador hosted lunch on September 20 
for Center-Left political leaders Romano Prodi, Piero 
Fassino, Francesco Rutelli, and Massimo D'Alema.  The four 
politicians were mostly in sync, willing to contradict each 
other politely, and were only moderately deferential to their 
presumptive leader, Romano Prodi.  Should they win next 
year's general elections, their consensus view on Iraq is 
that any Italian troop withdrawal would be done in 
consultation with the U.S. and based on facts on the ground. 
Less forthcoming than the others, Prodi expressed a need to 
"respond to the people's request" for early withdrawal.  All 
four support Italian missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan; 
believe Turkey will not enter the EU in the near future; 
expressed a need to better integrate Italy's Muslim 
community; were firm on the need to fight terrorism; and 
welcomed the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador hosted lunch on September 20 for 
Center-Left (CL) leaders from the Union Coalition.  The four 
guests were presumptive CL Prime Ministerial candidate Romano 
Prodi, DS General Secretary Piero Fassino, Former Rome Mayor 
and 2001 Center-Left candidate Francesco Rutelli (Daisy), and 
DS President and former Prime Minister Massimo D,Alema.  The 
Ambassador was accompanied by PolOff.  The atmosphere was 
relaxed and the discussion substantive.  The four politicians 
were mostly in sync but willing to contradict each other 
politely.  They were only moderately deferential to their 
presumptive leader, Romano Prodi. 
 
-------------------------------- 
ITALIAN TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked the four what the U.S. could 
expect from them on Iraq if the CL wins next year's general 
election.  Prodi responded that his government would 
"establish an agenda to withdraw its military from Iraq and 
engage the country in reconstruction."  Fassino qualified 
this by saying the agenda would not necessarily have dates, 
and stated that troops would be withdrawn after certain 
milestones were met.  Both Fassino and D'Alema readily agreed 
with the Ambassador that any decision would need to be made 
based on "facts on the ground next year."  All four 
politicians expressed concern about how the Iraqi 
constitutional process would play out. D'Alema pointed out 
that Iraqi FM Zebari told him in New York last week that the 
U.S. would need to begin a troop withdrawal--toward more of a 
deterrence force "based outside the cities that is available 
when needed."  Rutelli preemptively said that Italians had 
"learned the lessons from Spain" and would not take "any 
unilateral action" on Iraqi troop deployment.  Note: At a 
speech on September 21, Prodi repeated his comment on Iraqi 
troop withdrawal and informed the crowd that he had told this 
to the Ambassador at a lunch the day before.  End Note. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador pressed the four CL politicians to 
agree that a CL government would make decisions on troop 
deployment in Iraq based on "facts on the ground and in 
consultation with the U.S." and reminded them that public 
speculation on troop withdrawal spurs the insurgency. 
D'Alema, Fassino and Rutelli agreed though clearly stating 
that some acceleration of troop withdrawal would be required. 
 Prodi demurred and commented, "we must respond to the 
people's request." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
DEPLOYMENTS IN THE BALKANS, AFGHANISTAN AND THE SUDAN 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador praised the Italian commitments in 
Afghanistan and the Balkans and asked their view on 
deployments there.  Prodi said he was "pessimistic" on 
Afghanistan and mentioned the lack of rule of law outside 
Kabul, Afghanistan's poor resource base for economic 
development, and the growing strength of local warlords. 
Without giving Prodi a chance to answer the Ambassador's 
question, D'Alema said he was also "pessimistic" but that 
there is a "qualitative difference between troop deployments" 
in Afghanistan and Iraq and that it is "the right thing" for 
Italian troops to work with the international community to 
rebuild Afghanistan even if the prospects for success are 
slim.  Rutelli said Italians are "proud" of their military's 
involvement in Afghanistan. 
 
¶6. (C) On Italian troop deployments to the Balkans, the four 
 
 
politicians were unified in support of continued involvement. 
 Fassino, D'Alema and Prodi each pointed out that it was a 
Center-Left government that initially deployed troops to the 
Balkans.  Rutelli interjected that Italian troops are 
performing an important mission in the Sudan as well. 
 
--------------------------- 
TURKEY ENTRANCE INTO THE EU 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked their view on Turkish membrship 
in the EU.  All agreed that Turkey would not enter the EU in 
the foreseeable future.  Prodi cited public opposition in 
France, Germany, Austria and increasingly in Italy. D'Alema 
said French President's Chirac's decision to put all future 
expansion decisions to public referenda had effectively ended 
any chance for Turkish EU membership.  D'Alema also qualified 
Prodi's statement by saying that Italy is not a problem and 
noting Italy's political institutions favor Turkish 
membership.  Fassino stressed the importance of 
Italian-Turkish commercial relations.  However, Fassino also 
said that Pope Benedict XVI is against Turkey's joining the 
EU and that this would have a significant impact on parts of 
the Italian political class.  Rutelli noted that the Pope 
planned to visit Turkey in 18 months. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
ITALY'S MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND TERRORISM 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) All four CL politicians responded that recently 
enacted anti-terror reforms were neither far-reaching nor 
particularly innovative (REF A).  Prodi, who has publicly 
declared that the Berlusconi government would need to reform 
aspects of the law that potentially infringe on personal 
liberties, only commented that the CL had actively supported 
the legislation.  Prodi continued that US-EU cooperation is 
essential to fighting international terrorism and underlined 
the specific importance of greater cooperation against 
terrorist financing. 
 
¶9. (C) All four politicians admitted that Italy must do a 
better job integrating its growing Muslim minority.  They 
said there are different models that have been tried: the 
French have tried forcing their Muslims to become French, and 
the British have tried to integrate them into their society. 
Prodi rejected the French model and stated the Italians must 
find a way to entice Muslims to participate in Italian 
society, rejecting the creation of Muslim "social ghettos." 
He said immigrants must have a clearer path to Italian 
citizenship and strongly criticized the Bossi/Fini 
immigration reform (REF A).  Referring to recent actions in 
Milan to close unauthorized Muslim schools (REF B), they all 
agreed that any Muslim schools must be held to regular 
Italian education norms and offered Italy's Jewish schools as 
a model. 
 
¶10. (C) All four felt the terrorist threat to Italy comes 
from internationally organized terrorist groups, and felt 
that integration of Italy's Muslims is one way to combat 
these terrorist groups' influence in Italy.  Prodi said he 
thought the fact that the London bombers were well integrated 
into English society was an aberration. 
 
¶11. (C) D'Alema stated he did not believe that the war in 
Iraq had "created more terrorists" but said that it has been 
a clarion call within the Muslim community that we cannot 
understand.  He said the reaction inside the Muslim world has 
been something like what would happen in Europe if "Muslims 
took over France."  He recounted a story from a recent trip 
to Libya in which the 18-year-old son of a "very western 
official" who had lived for several years in London, left one 
night to fight jihad. 
 
---------------------------- 
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Prodi cited the Palestinian conflict with Israel as a 
convenient propaganda tool for terrorist groups and said a 
solution is necessary to take away that tool.  He praised 
Israeli PM Sharon's courage for withdrawing from Gaza but 
said the U.S. must stay engaged in order to ensure further 
progress.  Prodi criticized the U.S. for never allowing the 
EU to serve as a mediator in the conflict, and became 
animated describing some personal conflicts he had with 
Sharon.  D'Alema said the U.S. should not be blamed for 
 
 
excluding the EU from the peace process, saying Israel has 
always opposed EU participation and that the U.S. could not 
move against the powerful Israeli lobby.  All agreed that 
economic development is urgent in Gaza. 
 
¶13. (C) COMMENT:  The four Center-Left leaders appeared 
united in principle on the major issues, but with subtle, yet 
important differences in approach and style.  On Iraq, 
Fassino, D'Alema and Rutelli were clear--They support a 
somewhat accelerated Italian troop withdrawal based on facts 
on the ground but in close consultation with the U.S.  Prodi 
seemed less willing to admit that Italian troops might need 
to stay in Iraq for an extended period of time.  In general, 
Prodi seemed the most critical of U.S. positions ("slow down 
on Turkey", "U.S. did not include the EU in the Middle East 
Peace Process", "pessimistic" on Afghanistan), and more 
willing to contradict the other three leaders.  Fassino was 
the most eager to show that his views were similar to U.S. 
positions, and Rutelli seemed the most naturally at ease with 
his views vis-a-vis the U.S.  D'Alema seemed most like a 
senior statesmen. 
 
¶14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Italy's general elections are more 
than a half year away, and only 8 points separate the 
Center-Left from the Center-Right in the latest polls. 
Moreover, should the CL win, we cannot know the dynamics of a 
future coalition until we see how much influence Fausto 
Bertinotti and his Refounded Communist (RC) Party will wield. 
 The stronger he is, the more will be the pressure on the 
other CL parties for an accelerated Italian troop withdrawal. 
 We will continue to work with all four of these leaders, 
both together and separately, to reinforce how important it 
is to maintain dialogue with us on Italian troop deployments, 
and that any redeployment be based on facts on the ground and 
in consultation with the coalition partners and the 
Government of Iraq.  END COMMENT. 
 
SPOGLI 
 
 
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	2005ROME03179 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL