This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

020930Z Sep 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002922 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV ELAB IT ANTITERRORISM FORCE PROTECTION
SUBJECT: BOSSI-FINI IMMIGRATION REFORM: THE RESULTS ARE IN 
 
 
Classified By: LABOR COUNSELOR CANDACE PUTNAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Italian efforts to manage legal immigration 
and limit illegal immigration have met with mixed success. 
The Bossi-Fini law of 2002 produced a limited 
regularization of illegal workers but failed to establish 
viable long-term procedures to either encourage the legal 
immigration Italy needs to sustain its economy or restrict 
the illegal immigration that many fear breeds crime and 
Islamic extremism.  Economists criticized the law as 
ineffective; human rights groups attacked it for violating 
constitutional rights.  In the wake of the London bombings 
and terrorist threats, Italy approved new anti-terrorism 
legislation and recent police crackdowns focused on illegal 
immigrants.  But the debate over how to fix Bossi-Fini in a 
way that meets economic needs, addresses security concerns 
and preserves Italian civil rights has just begun.  End 
Summary. 
 
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History 
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¶2. (U) With the second-lowest birthrate and the largest 
percentage of elderly in its population in Europe, Italy 
needs immigrants to support rising pension and health care 
costs and sustain its future economy. Yet, Italy has 
traditionally been a country of emigrants; immigration is 
a relatively new phenomenon that began in the 1970's. The 
immigrant population doubled between 1975-80 to surpass 
500,000; today there are 2.9 million legal immigrants and 
approximately 600,000 illegal immigrants in Italy.  Current 
estimates suggest that 33% of all illegal immigrants 
crossed the border without visas, and 67% are legal border 
entries who have overstayed their permits. While many 
immigrants transit Italy in the search for better jobs in 
northern Europe, an increasing number, are staying and 
working in the underground economy, which accounts for 
as much as 20% of Italy,s economic output. As the number of 
illegal immigrants rose, new legislation was introduced in 
1998 and 2002 to help combat the phenomena 
 
------------------------ 
Immigration Legislation 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (U) The Bossi-Fini Law of 2002 was designed to 
regularize immigrants already in Italy and to prevent 
further illegal immigration from occurring.  It was 
introduced by Umberto Bossi, leader of the Northern League 
(a right-wing party based in northern Italy that uses often 
xenophobic rhetoric to raise concerns about how immigration 
threatens security, cultural homogeneity and social 
cohesion) and Gianfranco Fini, leader of the National 
Alliance (AN) party (a center-right party with fascist 
roots that also supports strong immigration controls). 
Both the Northern League and AN are members of the 
Berlusconi ruling coalition; Fini is now Deputy PM and FM. 
 
¶4. (U) The Bossi-Fini law sought to control the number of 
legal immigrants and where they could work using a strict 
national and regional quota system. Under the law, 
immigrants seeking entry must have employment prior to 
applying for a visa and/or residency permit.  The law 
requires employers to provide the immigrants with 
transportation and housing and to pay a fee of 300-800 Euro 
per worker.  The government sets national and regional 
quotas on immigration as it sees fit, and the limits do not 
always correspond to employer demand or the availability of 
jobs. Fines for those who assist illegal immigrant 
entrances into the country and those who employ them rose 
steeply under this law. 
 
¶5. (C) Opponents of the Bossi-Fini law focus on economic 
and social concerns.  Italy,s long coastline and geographic 
proximity to North Africa and Eastern Europe make 
regulating immigration a very difficult, if not impossible 
task.  Additionally, because immigrants come to Italy for 
economic reasons, they settle in areas where jobs are 
abundant regardless of the quota system.  The majority of 
businesses (85%) are small to medium size and do not have 
the capacity to deal with the paperwork or cannot afford 
the regularization fee.  Until 2004-2005, there were no 
private jobs banks or employment services and only limited 
legal part-time work, which made it difficult for 
immigrants to find jobs prior to arrival.  The law has 
further complicated bureaucratic processes associated with 
immigrant legalization, family reunification, arrests, 
expulsion, and residency.  Monitoring individuals and 
organizations who break the law is costly, complicated and 
often ineffective. 
 
¶6. (C) Many critics predicted that the quota system, 
coupled with expensive new bureaucratic regulations, would 
encourage rather than discourage illegal immigration and 
underground work.  Employers have an incentive to risk 
fines and bypass the system to employ cheap low-skilled 
laborers, who are arriving in increasing numbers. 
Bossi-Fini also did not address Italy,s long-term need to 
match employment needs (whether for seasonal 
agricultural/construction workers or high-tech specialists) 
to the pool of potential immigrants. 
 
------------------------- 
Impact of Regularization 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) In the first week after implementation, over 30,000 
immigrants were legalized.  Although the government 
expected around 100,000, this was considered a good start. 
Between 2002 and 2003, over 700,000 migrants became 
legalized under Bossi-Fini, creating a dramatic increase in 
the number of tax-paying laborers in the legal work force. 
In 2004, almost 130,000 laborers became regularized. During 
the 
first-quarter of 2005, there was a smaller declared 
employment growth of 1.4%, which government officials are 
attributing partially to the regularization of immigrant 
workers and partially to a 2003 law that increased labor 
market flexibility by allowing employers to hire part-time 
workers without providing full benefits.  The largest 
levels of growth took place in the sectors of construction 
(8.9%)and services (1.3%), traditionally areas of migrant 
employment.  In the north, the region most foreigners 
migrate to upon entrance to Italy, over 180,000 jobs were 
created during the first quarter of 2005. 
 
¶8.  (U) In 2004, anticipating an even larger migration 
flux, the government fixed the 2005 immigration quota at 
79,500; above the original long-term plan of 
60,000-70,000.  The 2005 quota allows for 25,000 seasonal, 
30,000 non-seasonal, and 15,000 domestic worker entrances 
in 2005, with specific limits on how many workers can come 
from each high-level migration country.  Most of the limits 
are on Albanian (3000 per year), Tunisian (3000 per year), 
and Moroccan immigrants (2500 per year), who make up the 
largest percentages of the immigrant population and are the 
biggest source of illegal immigration. 
 
¶9.  (U) The data indicates that the Bossi-Fini reforms are 
not working as the Government had hoped.  The most recent 
Caritas (a Catholic NGO) data estimates that illegal--those 
who came to Italy without visas--and irregular--those who 
came 
to Italy with visas that have expired--immigrants present in 
Italy rose 12.5% between 2002 and 2003. There is a high 
intensity of underground employment in bars and restaurants 
(22.3%), in small commercial enterprises (17.4%), and in 
agriculture (17.3%). 
 
¶10. (U) The number of expulsions of illegal immigrants and 
the number of immigrants turned away at the borders 
declined significantly between 2002 and 2003, but rose 
again in 2004-2005 with the influx of illegals arriving in 
boatloads from Libya.  Italy has been criticized by the 
human rights community for its new policy to quickly return 
these immigrants to Libya without adequate asylum 
processing.  Italy was successful in reducing illegal 
immigration for Albania by providing border control 
assistance and training and is pursuing a similar bilateral 
program with Libya. 
 
----------------------------- 
Security and Social Concerns 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In the wake of the London bombings, Italy enacted a 
new Anti-Terrorism law, and the police have cracked down on 
illegal immigrants with 141 arrests and over 700 planned 
expulsions since the beginning of August.  With a 
heightened terror alert, it is likely this trend will 
continue in Italy through the 2006 national elections. 
 
¶12. (C) The majority of Italians associate immigrants with 
clandestine immigration, and clandestine immigration with 
the black market and crime.  The numbers of illegal 
immigrants 
arrested in for crimes rose in 2004, justifying 
the stereotype. It is important to point out that the 
number of criminal offenses associated with legal 
immigrants, however, is extremely low.  Statistics like 
these, coupled with media coverage of clandestine 
 
immigrants trying to reach southern Italy via 
sea-transport, have heightened growing discrimination 
against immigrants, particularly in the North. Parties 
like Northern League and National Alliance have used 
these images and statistics to gain support for their 
anti-immigrant platforms, which have become popular 
in the 2006 national election campaign. 
 
¶13. (C) Although perhaps overtaken by the new Antiterrorism 
legislation, left and center-left critics of Bossi-Fini 
continue to criticize the law as insufficiently humane. 
In 2004, the Italian Constitutional Court ruled that the 
Bossi-Fini provisions allowing for rapid arrests and 
deportation of illegal immigrants infringed on the personal 
liberties guaranteed in Article 13 of the Italian 
Constitution. 
The law,s restrictions on family reunification, they argue, 
are also counterproductive to efforts to integrate immigrants 
into Italian society.  These critics have a fundamentally 
different approach to immigration than the drafters of 
Bossi-Fini. 
 
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Comment 
-------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Bossi-Fini was successful in bringing a limited 
number 
of illegals onto taxpaying business payrolls. If the 
bureaucratic 
obstacles to legal immigration were eliminated, there would 
likely 
be a further increase in declared work force numbers. 
However, 
the Bossi-Fini quota system and fines have failed to deter 
increased illegal immigration. Lacking other solutions, the 
Government raised its quota level well beyond the average 
they 
originally intended to pursue, but it will not be enough to 
deter illegal entrances.  Bossi-Fini also does not include 
long-term solutions for recruiting the type of workers the 
economy needs or addressing growing integration concerns. 
The Government's recent crackdown in response to the London 
bombings was aimed primarily at immigrants; with extremist 
threats directed at Italy and a 2006 election campaign in 
full 
swing, this trend is likely to continue despite some concerns 
about civil liberties. But the debate over how to fix 
Bossi-Fini 
in a way that meets economic needs, addresses security 
concerns 
and preserves Italian civil rights has just begun. 
SPOGLI 
 
 
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 2005ROME02922 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL