This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 002008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, PRM; GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009 
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA:  EMBASSY RABAT VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A. RABAT 1776 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. ALGIERS 1793 
     ¶C. STATE 73908 
     ¶D. ALGIERS 866 
     ¶E. RABAT 278 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) The August 18 release of the remaining 404 Moroccan 
POWs from Tindouf closed an important humanitarian file in 
the Western Sahara conflict.  In Morocco, the United States 
gained considerable goodwill from our involvement in the 
effort; in fact, we believe this is certainly one of the most 
positive public diplomacy acts -- it seemed to genuinely 
touch the Moroccan people -- we have facilitated in Morocco 
in years.  Numerous embassy contacts, including other 
ex-POWs, have told us privately how much they appreciate what 
the US did, and how they hope this accomplishment heralds 
movement toward a resolution of the broader political 
conflict. 
 
¶2.  (C) While the prisoner release has altered the political 
landscape in a positive way, and does create momentum 
(despite the sour grapes attitude on the part of the senior 
Moroccan leadership), it did not appear to diminish the 
climate of mistrust that prevails between the two sides, and 
between King Mohammed and President Bouteflika in particular 
-- which is a fundamental stumbling block to improved 
Moroccan-Algerian relations.  We believe there will be little 
serious engagement between the two sides without a thawing of 
the personal relations between the two leaders.  Both the 
Moroccan leadership and numerous contacts have expressed the 
pessimistic view that real progress in bilateral relations is 
not likely to come until Bouteflika passes from the political 
scene.  FM Benaissa, while often an overly dramatic 
raconteur, has remarked to us "it will take a generation" for 
any real progress to take place, as not only Bouteflika but 
the people around him move off the political stage.  The 
image of the King returning empty-handed from Algiers in 
April ("like a beggar," King Mohammed told Senator Lugar), 
when the GOM believes it has made all of the gestures to 
Algeria, is something the Moroccans will aggressively seek to 
avoid repeating. 
 
The Border 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Of critical importance to the Moroccans is the 
re-opening of the border with Algeria, a point re-emphasized 
by FM Benaissa in his September 21 meeting with U/S Burns. 
In Moroccan eyes, this is probably the most significant step 
the Algerians could take to demonstrate serious engagement 
with Morocco.  The Moroccan senior leadership continues to 
complain, as the King did with Senator Lugar (ref A) that the 
Algerians are constantly shifting the goalposts on what they 
need to re-open the border.  But there is no question that 
opening the border is not only a symbolic step forward but is 
firmly in US interests and facilitates opportunities for 
exchanges that can bolster ties in a myriad of ways. 
 
¶4.  (C) For the most part, the Moroccans see Larbi Belkheir's 
appointment as Algerian Ambassador to Morocco as a positive 
sign.  The King mentioned Belkheir several times in his 
meeting with Senator Lugar (Ref B) as a possible discreet 
channel between Morocco and Algeria, though he complained 
that the Algerians had never followed up to allow a back 
channel to exist.  Nevertheless, we concur with Embassy 
Algiers' assessment that this designation represents a step 
forward. 
 
Coordination with the Europeans 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) We see opportunities for greater coordination between 
the US and key European players -- especially the Spanish and 
French -- on Morocco-Algeria relations and the Western 
Sahara.  We believe our message to the Europeans during UNGA 
-- join us in pushing for Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement -- 
is the right one. 
 
The Autonomy Plan 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The other key piece of the equation is pushing the 
GOM to produce a credible autonomy plan -- one that goes 
beyond what the GOM offered PRSG Baker in late 2003.  We 
believe that a central message from PRSG Van Walsum to the 
Moroccans, as he takes up his mandate, is to press the GOM 
for an expansion of their previous concept of autonomy.  The 
Moroccans have intimated on many occasions that they are 
looking at a variety of autonomy models, but they have yet to 
produce anything concrete.  Since there appears to be 
substantial consensus within the USG and elsewhere that 
autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the best political 
solution to the Western Sahara conflict, the international 
community needs to force Morocco's hand to produce a credible 
plan that can serve as the basis for negotiations. 
 
¶7.  (C) Thus we believe the preparation of a credible 
Moroccan autonomy plan -- recognizing that the GOM will not 
do so seriously until there is an improved climate of trust 
with Algeria -- should move to the center of our efforts on 
the Western Sahara.  The GOM does not want to be seen to be 
negotiating autonomy with itself and is unlikely to expand on 
its autonomy proposal without strong pressure or incentives. 
We see little value in PRSG Van Walsum, for example, spending 
a lot of time "taking the temperature" of the parties; Alvaro 
De Soto did that for a year.  While Van Walsum -- and we in 
conjunction with our European friends -- press Morocco to 
"stretch its thinking" on autonomy, the PRSG should be 
pressing the Algerians and the Polisario for ideas on how to 
meet their needs on self-determination short of a full-scale 
return to the Baker Plan. 
 
A Census 
-------- 
 
¶8.  (C) One way to incentivize the Moroccans on the autonomy 
issue is to redouble our efforts to press for a census in the 
Tindouf camps.  At Department request (Ref C), Embassy 
Algiers raised this issue with the GOA and the Polisario in 
May.  The Polisario is on record (Ref D) as committing to 
provide full cooperation "in any effort to count the 
refugees," though Polisario "Ambassador" Beisat said the 
census was the sole responsibility of Algeria.  We should 
revitalize this effort, building on the Polisario's stated 
commitment -- both to gain a more accurate picture of the 
dimensions of Polisario political authority and support, and 
to ensure accountability of US funds dedicated to support the 
refugee population.  As part of the effort, we can call on 
the Moroccans to provide solid evidence of their 
long-standing claims that international food aid is being 
sold on the market to line Polisario pockets.  Now is the 
time for a serious international effort to pursue this. 
 
Other Initiatives 
----------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) As we have reported in the past (ref E), there are 
other concrete steps we should encourage the two sides to 
take, some of which are areas that offer potential for joint 
action with the Europeans: 
 
-- encourage greater Algeria-Morocco military to military 
engagement, including direct communication on issues 
concerning the border, terrorism, and illegal immigration. 
The US-Morocco-Algeria naval exercises in June-July in the 
Mediterranean were a small but significant step forward in 
this regard. 
 
-- continue to press for the resumption of the 
confidence-building measures in the Western Sahara, which the 
US has committed funding for. 
 
-- actively encourage the two countries, through the 
bilateral commissions, to develop joint strategies for common 
concerns, especially illegal migration and human trafficking. 
 
-- promote further exchanges between business representatives 
from both sides, building on the September 20-22 OPIC 
regional investment conference in Marrakech.  We believe 
significant increases in investment activity from the US and 
EU will result if the Morocco-Algeria border is re-opened. 
 
 
 
 
 
RILEY